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Several influential interpretations of Marx claim his theory of social change is amoral, that Marx 
had only an incoherent moral conception, or that Marx had moral commitments early in his 
career but abandoned them, perhaps at the writing of The German Ideology but certainly before 
Capital. I argue that none of these is correct. 
Morality, for Marx, is thoroughly historical: it is produced through human activity; 
whether particular actions or social arrangements are moral or immoral varies at different 
historical stages; and its realization in human practice and the closure of the gap between "is" 
and "ought" would lead to the abolition of morality as the theorization of that gap. 
Marx determines what society would be best for human beings and which existing forces 
and historical processes could realize it. He morally evaluates social systems, theories, and 
human actions with respect to whether they promote or inhibit the increase of human beings' 
rational control over their own environment and social development, and the historical 
emergence of "rich individuals". 
Famously, Marx refers to morality as "ideology". Interpreters of Marx have assumed that 
ideology is always reactionary or misleading. However, ideology plays an important role in the 
development of revolutionary consciousness. Ideology can serve as a bulwark of reaction; 
however, Marx shows that the proletariat must develop its own ideology to theorize social 
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contradictions and determine how they can be overcome to allow for a conscious, democratic, 
and rational control over human beings' social existence. 
In the first chapter of my dissertation, I provide a detailed overview of Marx's moral 
theory and its basis in his conception of human nature and alienation. The remainder of the 
dissertation follows the development of Marx's moral thought chronologically, starting with 
Marx's early works including The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The 
German Ideology, continuing with the period including works such as The Communist Manifesto 
and On the Poverty of Philosophy, and ending with Marx's late work including the Grundrisse 
and Capital. I conclude by drawing together the study's main themes and suggesting avenues for 
further research. 
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PREFACE 
I am greatly indebted to many who have inspired, encouraged, and assisted me along the path 
that has led so far to the production of this document, a work of which I am quite proud. I am 
extremely grateful to have had the means and the opportunity to create it. My dissertation 
committee—Michael Thompson, John McDowell, Peter Machamer, and Tommie Shelby—were 
always very positive and encouraging about my work as it progressed in draft form, a kindness 
that has been invaluable to me since to write a dissertation is a notoriously nerve-rattling process. 
My committee provided thoughtful feedback, guidance, and support while giving me a great deal 
of freedom, space, and trust to pursue this project in my own way. In the course of my studies, I 
have also benefited from the kindness and encouragement of other present and former faculty at 
Pitt, both within the Philosophy Department and outside of it. Among these are Laura Ruetsche, 
Andrea Westlund, Anil Gupta, Nicholas Rescher, Joe Camp, Lucy Fischer, and Uwe Stender. 
I would like to thank Olúfémi Táíwò at Seattle University, who has really touched me 
with his warmth and encouragement, and John Bennett at the University of Rochester, with 
whom I engaged in a number of interesting and extended conversations about moral philosophy 
and of course, about my dissertation project, in particular.  Olúfémi and John both generously 
provided careful and detailed feedback on earlier drafts of the second chapter of this dissertation, 
and helped to make my arguments sharper and clearer with their questions and criticisms. Any 
faults that remain, of course, are entirely my own. 
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John Clendaniel has had a large part to play in the process that has resulted in this work. 
He read countless drafts, gave a wealth of thoughtful feedback, and we spent many hours in 
conversation with one another. This dissertation is a work that is deeply personal in the sense 
that it represents some of my most important convictions as well as countless hours of difficult 
contemplation, writing, and research; I also think it is a work that I was uniquely positioned to 
produce. At the same time, it could not have been the same without the efforts of John who 
encouraged me to be at my very best. John is not only my key philosophical interlocutor, but he 
is also my husband, and shows me an astonishing level of love and support. 
I know I am incredibly lucky that, at the University of Pittsburgh, I studied philosophy 
with peers who are brilliant, kind, and supportive. I have learned a great deal from them and 
always felt that my fellow graduate students were cheering me on. One of the things I am most 
glad of about my experience at Pitt is that it was there that I met Jennifer Frey, an amazing 
woman with whom I have shared a really fun and rewarding friendship. Somehow, amidst her 
many projects and responsibilities, she finds the time to listen, to commiserate, to laugh at the 
absurd, and to give counsel. My experience of graduate school would have been far poorer 
without her. 
I am in the enviable position of having friends too numerous to name, who have all 
supported and encouraged me in different ways and who are like family to me. I would like to 
thank them. I would like to thank my parents, Andrea Beaumonte and Walton Wills, who taught 
me early on the value of education and of thinking creatively, and who pushed and fought for me 
to have the educational opportunities that have made my current accomplishments possible. And 
I would like to thank my professors at Princeton University, where I did my undergraduate work 
in philosophy. They have been a huge influence on me and the way I approach philosophy. In 
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moments of doubt, I remember that they believed in me. I would especially like to thank Gideon 
Rosen, who advised my senior thesis at Princeton. 
The University of Rochester, under the auspices of the Northeast Consortium for Faculty 
Diversity, provided me with financial support, office space, library access, and other forms of 
material support for my research, as well as allowing me to benefit from the camaraderie and 
depth of philosophical knowledge among the faculty in its Department of Philosophy. I would 
like to thank Randall Curren, chair of the University of Rochester's Department of Philosophy, 
and all of the faculty there for their hospitality and continued encouragement and kindness. 
JoAnn Moody is Director of the Northeast Consortium for Faculty Diversity and I greatly 
appreciate her work in organizing this program. I am also grateful for the support I received from 
the J. William Fulbright U.S. Student Program, which allowed me to spend a year in Berlin with 
access to German libraries and archives. To complete this project without these forms of support 
would have been many times more difficult. 
The Society of Young Black Philosophers has provided me with encouragement and 
community, and I am very grateful to its members. I would like to express my thanks to the 
Collegium of Black Women Philosophers and to its founder, Kathryn Gines. Before learning of 
and then joining the CBWP, I had heard of a few Black woman philosophers besides myself, and 
I knew they existed, somewhere, but I had never met one. So it is really wonderful to have this 
network of women to share the joys and challenges of academic philosophy with. 
Perhaps above all, I would like to thank Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, who left behind 
such a rich and wide-ranging body of work to explore, to comprehend, to develop further, and to 
attempt to put into practice. They have given us methods and ideas that make it more possible 
not only to understand the world, but also to change it for the better. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I aim to provide a clear elucidation and critical analysis of Karl Marx's moral 
thought as it developed over the course of his writings, beginning with his doctoral dissertation 
in 1840, and ending with Capital, which Marx was in the process of preparing for publication up 
until his death in 1883. I argue for three closely related claims: first, that the theory Marx 
developed in his work does have a distinct moral content (and that Marx's moral critiques of 
class society and rival moral theories are consciously moral, not merely unwittingly so, as some 
have argued1); second, I argue that Marx's conception of morality is based in his conception of 
essential human nature and of human beings as social and natural beings who produce their own 
existence through labor; third, I hope to show that Marx's approach to morality is both plausible 
and defensible. I believe that Marx's attempt to develop a moral naturalism set upon a scientific 
basis should remain appealing for us today. In the light of unfolding political, social, economic 
and ecological crisis, I think the time is ripe for a thorough and systematic analysis of Marx's 
moral critique of class society, and moral argument for a society consciously oriented toward the 
satisfaction of human needs and development of human powers. This is what I have attempted to 
do here. 
                                                 
1 Norman Geras has argued in his paper, “The Controversy About Marx and Justice” that Marx thought capitalism 
was unjust, but did not think that he thought capitalism was unjust. Terence Irwin also makes a similar claim in 
the treatment of Marx that appears in his three-volume The Development of Ethics. 
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I address Marx's moral thought as it develops chronologically, and within the three time 
periods into which I have sorted Marx's writings, I investigate a few principal themes. In the first 
chapter, I treat his works between 1840 and 1847. The second chapter picks up in 1847 and 
concerns his works from then until 1857, and in the third chapter, I discuss Marx's writings 
between 1858 and 1883. I treat these writings as parts of one unified and developing whole, and 
trace the development of themes such as individuality, alienation, rights, and freedom throughout 
these works. In separating Marx's works into these three chronological sections, I do not mean to 
imply that Marx's theoretical development undergoes the sort of “breaks” or “ruptures” which 
interpreters such as French Marxist Louis Althusser have seen in Marx's writings2. Rather, I 
argue that there is a large amount of continuity between Marx's early works, such as The Holy 
Family or the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and his later ones such as Capital 
and the Grundrisse. 
I also disagree with interpreters such as Daniel Brudney who argue that Marx tried, but 
failed3, to abandon philosophy around the time of the writing of The German Ideology4. I argue 
                                                 
2 Nicholas Churchich, in his 1994 book, Marxism and Morality: A Critical Examination of Marxist Ethics, is a 
more recent interpreter who argues that “There can hardly be any doubt that there is, in fact, a definite break in 
the development of Marx's ideas” (Churchich, Marxism and Morality, p.31). I do very much doubt this, and one 
of the main goals of this dissertation is to show that there is significantly more continuity in Marx's thought than 
commentators such as Churchich, Althusser, and others suppose. 
3 Well, I also disagree with interpreters such as Lawrence J. and John T. Jost, who argue in the 2007 paper, “Why 
Marx Left Philosophy for Social Science,” that Marx tried and succeeded. 
4 For a clear and interesting response to Brudney's way of reading Marx, see Ruth Abbey's 2002 paper, “Young 
Karl Does Headstands: A Reply to Daniel Brudney.” (It is a response to Brudney's 2001 paper, “Justifying a 
Conception of The Good Life: The Problem of the 1844 Marx.”) In her reply, Abbey concludes: “Brudney 
contends that under the influence of Feuerbach, Marx eschewed traditional philosophical forms of justification: 
he shared Feuerbach's 'antipathy to philosophical theory'. Yet Marx followed many a Western philosopher in 
posing the question of what was distinctive about human beings and using the answer to inform a conception of 
the good life. He defended his conception of the good life by reference to uniquely human potential: communism 
would make the good life attainable would allow people to express and live in accordance with their distinctively 
human powers. Essence and existence would coincide. Brudney's unwillingness to deem this approach 
'philosophical' seems to betray an unduly restrictive conception of philosophy” (Abbey 2002, p.154). 
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that when we look at Marx's works, what we find is a sustained and conscious interest in 
philosophical questions, and that Marx's ability to provide answers for these questions only 
grows as he deepens his engagement with economic themes. I think one of the most striking 
examples of this sustained philosophical engagement is Marx's discussion of alienation in his 
early works such as the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and then later in the 
Grundrisse and Capital. Similarly, a comparison of Marx's critiques of Utilitarianism in The 
German Ideology and in Capital provides one very useful and interesting point of reference to 
understand how his ability to diagnose the faults of various moral theories sharpens and becomes 
more concrete as Marx develops his understanding of capitalism as an economic system. In the 
later treatment, Marx is able to criticize Utilitarianism not just on the grounds that it is 
hypocritical or that it proceeds from false views about human nature; he argues that even the 
more sophisticated Utilitarianism of John Stuart Mill is fatally flawed because it is Utopian and 
unrealistic about the possibility for goods to be distributed in a different way on the economic 
basis of capitalist production. 
                                                                                                                                                             
 Brudney's response to Abbey, which he gives in the 2002 paper, “Justification and Radicalism in the 1844 Marx: 
A Response to Professor Abbey,” is, I think, not especially successful, because he falls back upon a reading of 
Marx which is highly suspect: namely, that Marx justified his claims about the good life for human beings by 
reference to what those who occupy the standpoint of workers in a fully developed communist society would 
recognize as good. Brudney writes, “I attribute to Marx the view that the proper justification for his account of 
the good life for human beings comes through a distinctive activity, namely, the practical daily activity of 
workers in a true communist society: to be such a worker engaged in such activity is the proper way to see the 
truth of Marx's claims, to see that his claims are true. I argue, however, that Marx's invocation, for justificatory 
purposes, of a standpoint on the far side of social revolution raises a justificatory problem for those of us on the 
near side” (Brudney 2002, p.156). 
 I just can't see how to square any of this with Marx's own insistence that he develops his claims about what is 
best for human beings by proceeding from existing human beings, not possible future ones. Throughout this 
Introduction I attempt to explain what I take Marx's method to be, and if I am successful in doing that, then I 
think it will become quite clear why we ought not to accept Brudney's reading of Marx, at least not on this score. 
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In producing this study, I have focused first and foremost on maintaining a direct and 
close engagement with Marx’s texts. I cite a wide range of his writings, including economic 
works such as Capital and polemics such as the “Circular Against Kriege,” as well as letters and 
newspaper articles that Marx wrote throughout his life. I think that when we take all of these 
writings together, a clear and compelling picture of Marx’s moral thought and the relation in his 
thought between morality and human nature, and between morality and materialism, emerges. 
One of the things that I believe becomes most clear in the systematic, chronological treatment of 
Marx's moral thought which I have produced is that throughout the entire body of his work, 
Marx retains his conviction that “man is the highest being for man,” and argues that the 
production of “rich individuals,” individuals for whom the exercise, development, and expansion 
of their powers is their greatest need, is the highest aim for human beings. This is an aim, he 
argues, that can only be realized in a society in which human beings and their flourishing 
constitute the highest ruling principle, and in which society's resources and productive capacities 
are rationally and democratically controlled by the mass of society, and directed toward the 
satisfaction of human needs and the development of human powers. 
In the remaining balance of this Introduction, I take the opportunity to describe Marx's 
moral conception in relatively broad strokes. I begin by discussing Marx's claim that “It is not 
the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that 
determines their consciousness” (A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, MECW 
29:263). I explore how morality, for Marx, is based in a correct understanding of human nature 
and, specifically, an understanding of humans as both natural and social beings who transform 
their environment and themselves through the labor process. I then go on to describe Marx's 
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methodological materialism. Like any other human product, morality is a thoroughly historical 
phenomenon, and I explain how this is the case, as well as how it is that morality is both 
historical and objective and universally binding. Over the course of the dissertation, each of 
these issues will be examined in greater detail, but I hope in this Introduction to provide a broad 
theoretical context in which to conceptualize that detail. 
Marx's materialism: what it does (and does not) mean to say that “being determines 
consciousness.” 
Marx emphasizes throughout his work5 the thesis that it is being, that is, the concrete lived 
existence of human beings engaged in social production, that plays the fundamental role in 
determining human consciousness. This claim about the ontological priority of matter over ideas 
informs Marx’s approach to understanding the development of morality in human history, 
providing justification for the methodological materialism he espouses and employs. While, like 
Hegel before him, Marx recognizes a dialectical interrelation between the material and the ideal 
and between the abstract and the concrete, Marx’s method is always to begin with concrete, 
determinate being in order to achieve the most penetrating analysis of reality. In The German 
Ideology, Marx and his collaborator Frederick Engels write: 
In direct contrast to German philosophy which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend 
from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from what men say, imagine, conceive, nor 
from men as narrated, thought of, imagined, conceived, in order to arrive at men in the flesh. We 
set out from real, active men, and on the basis of their real life-process we demonstrate the 
development of the ideological reflexes and echoes of this life-process. The phantoms formed in 
the human brain are also, necessarily, sublimates of their material life-process, which is 
empirically verifiable and bound to material premises. Morality, religion, metaphysics, all the rest 
of ideology and their corresponding forms of consciousness, thus no longer retain the semblance 
of independence. They have no history, no development; but men, developing their material 
                                                 
5 Especially in The German Ideology and in the Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy 
(MECW 4:53, MECW 4:138, MECW 29:263) 
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production and their material intercourse, alter, along with this their real existence, their thinking 
and the products of their thinking. Life is not determined by consciousness, but consciousness by 
life. In the first method of approach the starting-point is consciousness taken as the living 
individual; in the second method, which conforms to real life, it is the real living individuals 
themselves, and consciousness is considered solely as their consciousness. (MECW 5:36) 
 
In accusing German philosophy of “descending from heaven to earth,” Marx criticizes a 
method that, he thinks, accepts human beings' self-conceptions too uncritically as a basis for 
theory, as though it were possible to deduce from ideas alone the real conditions of human 
existence. Ideological forms of thought such as morality are products of human activity6 which, 
thinks Marx, cannot be fully or properly understood without a correct appreciation of their basis 
in particular economic, social, and historical circumstances. 
Marx's method is materialist, in the sense that he begins with the concrete and 
determinate, and historical in the sense that he approaches human existence as a dynamic and 
developing process. Marx has this to say about historical materialism in The German Ideology: 
This method of approach is not devoid of premises. It starts out from the real premises and does 
not abandon them for a moment. Its premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, 
but in their actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As 
soon as this active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is 
with the empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as 
with the idealists. 
 
The method of historical materialism proceeds from the understanding that, as Marx puts 
it in the opening of The Eighteenth Brumaire of Luis Bonaparte, “Men make their own history, 
but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make it under circumstances chosen by 
themselves, but under circumstances directly found, given and transmitted from the past” 
                                                 
6 We see that Marx would reject for instance the thesis of moral realism if it implies that moral qualities and moral 
facts have an independent existence or moral bindingness that is independent of human practice. The notion of 
morality as a subject matter having to do with ahistorical abstractions would violate the central claim being made 
in this section of The German Ideology, which is that morality, like other ideological forms, is a thoroughly 
human product. 
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(MECW 11:103). Human beings are active, purposive, and self-directed—yet it is important to 
keep in mind that the external world, and the course of history leading up to the moment in 
which they act, has a part to play in determining that activity, activity which includes intellectual 
production such as the construction of moral theories. 
I wish to emphasize that historical materialism is not a one-sided economic or 
technological determinism7,8. Material circumstances play a fundamentally determining role in 
shaping ideas as human beings attempt to reflect in thought the world around them. However, 
when humans produce those reflections of the world, they go on to act in ways that are informed 
by the ideas they hold. While Marx stresses the fundamental role of the external world and of 
material circumstances in determining consciousness, he also points out that in changing their 
circumstances, human beings also produce the basis for further intellectual development. Human 
beings, interacting with their environment through the labor process, transform their own 
existence and thereby also transform their consciousness9. That consciousness in turn does not 
                                                 
7 Friend and foe alike have construed Marxism as more deterministic than I think is quite accurate. Karl Kautsky, 
in his 1906 book, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, provides many useful insights into Marx's 
moral thought. Yet at the end of the book, Kautsky takes an almost fatalist turn, insisting that communism is 
inevitable. He writes there as a friend of Marx, of course; the foes are too numerous to list. 
8 The thesis that historical materialism is a form of technological determinism was advanced by G. A. Cohen in his 
influential book, Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, and the school of Analytical Marxism occupied itself in 
large part with the task of formulating a non-dialectical Marxism. For Cohen, this meant a technological 
determinism and a brand of functionalism in which historical phenomena arose precisely because they fulfilled a 
function within the capitalist system. For Jon Elster, another influential member of this school, Marxism was best 
constructed along the lines of methodological individualism. While it is of course important to note that 
individuals play important roles as historical agents, I think Elster's methodological individualism, which was 
supposed to capture everything worthwhile in Marx's theory of history, cannot adequately capture the extent to 
which human beings are in fact shaped and determined by factors beyond their control, and that these factors 
often do make it most appropriate to speak of collective actors such as economic classes, or the fact that human 
individuality itself, if it is not supposed to just amount to the fact that the human species is comprised of 
members that are numerically distinct from one another, is a historically emergent phenomenon whose 
emergence is not best explained by the fact of human individuality itself, but by appeal to facts about the nature 
of the human species and the conditions in which it has developed. 
9 And so Marx writes, in A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, that theory, too, becomes a 
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have a validity that can be evaluated in isolation from the circumstances in which it arises and 
that it is consciousness of. 
As humans intervene into the material world on the basis of ideas, their ideas also play a 
role in determining the development of material conditions. Thus there is a dialectical interplay 
and unity between ideas and matter in which matter plays the fundamental part in determining 
the development of this unity, but not the sole part10. The point is doubly important in the 
context of a study of Marx's moral thought because there is the unfortunate tendency to regard 
any thoroughgoing materialism as boiling down in the end to crude determinism, and as 
therefore inhospitable to morality. Treatments of Marx's moral thought have sometimes been 
guilty of this mistake, taking the form of the opposition of the young, ethically-minded, 
“humanist” Marx to the mature, “scientific” (in this case, read: crudely determinist) Marx who 
describes the inexorable march of economic forces which drag human history along in their 
wake11. 
Over the course of this dissertation, I will explain in detail my reasons for thinking that it 
is a mistake to think that it immediately follows from the fact that Marx identified morality as a 
form of ideology, that morality according to him is therefore always false, illusory, or 
                                                                                                                                                             
material force, once it has gripped the masses (MECW 3:182). 
10 Insofar as Analytical Marxism has sought to reconstruct Marxism without dialectics or at least, without dialectics 
as Marx construed it, I believe that it deprives itself of precisely that feature of his theory that has the most 
explanatory power. Interestingly enough, G. A. Cohen, who puts forward an alternative dialectic in History, 
Labour, and Freedom, seems to agree, as he writes: “I do not affirm any dialectical laws. Processes displaying 
the required structure count as dialectical whether or not their stages generate one another: it is enough that they 
follow one another, for whatever reason. In seeing dialectic in a process, we discern its contour in an 
intellectually satisfying manner, but the explanation of why it unfolds as it does is not thereby disclosed to us” 
(Cohen, History, Labour, and Freedom, p. 185). 
11 I am thinking here, of course, of the very influential work of Louis Althusser, especially in his book, For Marx. 
Louis Althusser, Ben Brewster (tr.) For Marx, Verso, 1969 
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misleading12. For the time being, I will simply briefly state that Marx’s intention in describing 
morality as a form of ideology is not to thereby criticize or defame it, but rather to insist that like 
religion or metaphysics, morality is a thoroughly historical phenomenon produced by human 
beings and its validity depends on how well it reflects a reality that can be investigated 
empirically, and how well it follows from its “real premises”. With regard to morality, those real 
premises are the human beings themselves, their activity and the conditions for their flourishing. 
In asking whether an action, state of affairs, or principle is moral or not, we do not need to retreat 
into abstract speculation. Rather, it is possible to determine empirically whether or not a thing is 
moral or immoral by evaluating whether it is such as to promote or to inhibit the development of 
human beings. Later in this introduction, I will explore in greater detail what it means to say that 
morality is thoroughly historical and yet also thoroughly binding and objective. But I would like 
to proceed immediately to a discussion of how morality relates to human nature. 
Labor, human nature, and the relation between natural and social being in Marx's 
thought. 
In keeping with Marx's methodological materialism, his moral outlook is derived in the first 
place from an assessment of what human beings are13 and what, given their nature, is beneficial 
to their flourishing. It must be stated at the outset that Marx does not believe that is possible to 
determine morality based merely on humans' biological being and biological needs, and when I 
                                                 
12 Some commentators, like Kai Nielsen in his 1985 paper, “If Historical Materialism is True Does Morality 
Totter?” argue that the success of an argument aiming to show that Marx endorsed some moral claims depends 
on showing that it is possible for some moral claims to be non-ideological. I take a different tack because, as I 
will argue over the course of this dissertation, I do not think that ideology is a purely reactionary or illusory 
phenomenon, in any case. Ideology can have a revolutionary and progressive content. 
13 For a very interesting and useful treatment of the similarities between the moral naturalism of Marx and that of 
Aristotle, as well as of the important differences between them, see George McCarthy's 1986 paper, “German 
Social Ethics and the Return to Greek Philosophy: Marx and Aristotle”. 
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say that Marx's moral theory takes human nature as its starting point, I certainly do not mean to 
reduce human nature to the merely biological facts about members of the species Homo sapiens. 
Such a biologism would conceive of human nature and of human needs too narrowly and too 
statically. It would not account for the ways in which human beings continually transform their 
conditions of existence by altering their material production and thereby their own 
consciousness, as well as their nature and their needs. However, neither would it be right to say 
that the biological nature of Homo sapiens is irrelevant to morality. Social being—human 
existence as it has been produced and transformed historically through the activity of human 
beings14—and natural, biological being form two moments of a dialectical unity of human nature 
in which natural being plays a fundamental and ontologically prior part. 
Humans are natural beings in the sense that they are biological beings of a certain sort. In 
particular, they are mammals, with a particular anatomy, particular metabolic processes, and a 
particular history of evolutionary development that has led to their emergence as a species. As 
natural beings, humans require such basic materials as food, water, shelter, a breathable 
atmosphere within certain parameters of chemical make-up, etc., in order for their biological 
processes to continue and for the species to survive. And insofar as human beings require food, 
                                                 
14 In The German Ideology, Marx writes: 
 The production of life, both of one’s own in labour and of fresh life in procreation, now 
appears as a double relationship: on the one hand as a natural, on the other as a social relationship. 
By social we understand the co-operation of several individuals, no matter under what conditions, 
in what manner and to what end. It follows from this that a certain mode of production, or 
industrial stage, is always combined with a certain mode of co-operation, or social stage, and this 
mode of co-operation is itself a “productive force.” Further, that the multitude of productive forces 
accessible to men determines the nature of society, hence, that the “history of humanity” must 
always be studied and treated in relation to the history of industry and exchange (The German 
Ideology, MECW 5:43). 
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water, and the like, human beings are, in a very restricted sense, indistinct from animals. But, as 
Marx writes: 
Men themselves begin to distinguish themselves from animals as soon as they begin to produce 
their means of subsistence, a step which is conditioned by their physical organisation. By 
producing their means of subsistence men are indirectly producing their actual material life (The 
German Ideology, MECW 5:31). 
 
Marx argues that the essence of human existence is the labor process, in which human beings 
intervene consciously and purposively into the natural world and the processes unfolding within 
it, as well as intervening into their own relationship to nature and into their own relationships to 
other human beings. In Capital, Marx describes the labor-process in the following way: 
Labour is, in the first place, a process in which both man and Nature participate, and in which man 
of his own accord starts, regulates, and controls the material re-actions between himself and 
Nature. He opposes himself to Nature as one of her own forces, setting in motion arms and legs, 
head and hands, the natural forces of his body, in order to appropriate Nature's productions in a 
form adapted to his own wants. By thus acting on the external world and changing it, he at the 
same time changes his own nature. He develops his slumbering powers and compels them to act in 
obedience to his sway. [...] We pre-suppose labour in a form that stamps it as exclusively human. A 
spider conducts operations that resemble those of a weaver, and a bee puts to shame many an 
architect in the construction of her cells. But what distinguishes the worst architect from the best 
of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At 
the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the 
labourer at its commencement. He not only effects a change of form in the material on which he 
works, but he also realizes a purpose of his own. (Capital, MECW 35:188) 
  
Unlike animals, which engage in their animal behaviors unconsciously and instinctively, human 
beings are what Marx calls “species-beings.” They possess and operate under a conception of 
themselves as a species. Humans can understand what necessary conditions must be fulfilled in 
order for their species to survive and, more than that, to thrive and to realize its capacities. More 
than this, human beings can also produce in accordance with the standards of any other species. 
They are able to understand the needs of another species and provide for that species 
accordingly, in such a way as to promote and direct the processes of nutrition, growth, and 
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reproduction that occur within it. Humans can also produce in accordance with abstractions such 
as beauty (as when they produce art). Marx explains the difference between animal activity and 
human activity thus: 
The animal is immediately one with its life activity; it is that activity. Man makes his life activity 
itself an object of his will and consciousness. He has conscious life activity. It is not a 
determination with which he directly merges. Conscious life activity directly distinguishes man 
from animal life activity. Only because of that is he a species-being15 . (“Estranged Labour,” 
MECW 3:276) 
 
Human nature is not a ghostly something that exists in the heart of every man or that 
“stands behind” the myriad appearances of human existence. Rather, it is what is common to the 
wide range of appearances that human activity can take on. Hence, Marx can write that “the 
essence of man is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the 
ensemble of the social relations” (Theses on Feuerbach, MECW 5:7). In order to determine the 
essence of human existence, Marx assesses a concrete totality of determinate instances of human 
activity and social relations, analyzing them to determine what is common to each of those 
instances. 
Human nature is, according to Marx, that complex of human activity taken as a whole. It 
is therefore dynamic, constantly developing and being transformed as human beings act and 
produce in different ways16. As Marx writes in Capital, in “acting on the external world and 
changing it, [man] at the same time changes his own nature.” Out of this concrete totality of 
human activities and social relations, it is possible to develop an abstraction which is valid for 
                                                 
15 Emphasis mine. 
16 For a recent book-length treatment of the concept of human nature in Marx's thought, see Sean Sayers' 1998 
book, Marxism and Human Nature. Of possible further interest is Terry Eagleton's reply to Sayers' book, “Self-
Realization, Ethics and Socialism.” Eagleton argues against Sayers that it is unsatisfactory to suggest that human 
nature is the totality of human activity. However, Marx does make an abstraction, the labor process, out of this 
concrete totality of appearances, as I argue here. 
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each of these concrete appearances. That abstraction is the labor process as the conscious 
intervention of human beings into the world, setting causal processes into motion in order to 
realize ends that they first posit in thought. Marx argues that this teleological realizing of ends is 
the essence of human existence; it is what separates human beings from other forms of life17 and 
it is the basis out of which human existence develops in its diverse and dynamic appearance. The 
connection between this conception of human nature and the moral outlook Marx develops in his 
work is aptly stated by Alan G. Nasser who writes in his 1975 paper, “Marx's Ethical 
Anthropology”, that 
[W]e are told that if the worker were to be functioning in an “exclusively human” way, his 
production would “[realize] a purpose of his own. . .” But in fact, as a wage-laborer his ability to 
produce is used to realize the purposes of the capitalist, for whom the worker's life-activity is a 
use-value. Under capitalism, the teleological character of human labor is the private property of 
the capitalist class. 
 
That the capitalists' pursuit of their class interests prevents workers from exercising their human 
ergon18 is regarded by Marx as an unethical state of affairs. Indeed, what sort of condemnation 
other than ethical would be appropriate in this context, given Marx's adherence to a normative 
anthropology? For it has been the historical role of ergon-based anthropologies to support claims 
concerning what is ethically good and bad for men. […] It has been suggested that “The slanted 
interest, charged language and acrid tone of Capital imply not moral indignation, but simply 
outrage at the conditions of exploitation”19. But such “outrage,” voiced in reference to an 
explicitly stated normative anthropology, and constituting a systematic network of commendations 
                                                 
17 In her 2002 paper, “Young Marx Does Headstands: A Reply to Daniel Brudney,” Ruth Abbey argues that Daniel 
Brudney is not sufficiently thorough in his presentation of Marx's conception of human nature. Abbey writes: 
“Brudney acknowledges that Marx had a conception of human essence: 'Marx's thought is that human beings are 
most essentially creatures who interact with the material world' (p. 373, cf. 375). He sees Marx as 'claiming that 
an obvious fact—that we transform the material world- reveals what is essential to our nature'. These tenets are 
correct, but do not go far enough. The significant omission lies in Marx's concern with how people work and 
transform their world. Because animals also interact with and transform the material world to ensure survival, 
Brudney's depiction of what is essential to humans does not capture their species distinction” (Abbey 2002, 
p.151-2). 
18 According to Nasser, the ergon argument, found initially in Aristotle, “presupposes the following three claims: 1) 
that it makes sense, and is correct, to say that nature endows man qua man with a special function to perform, 2) 
that this function can be ascertained by determining the kind of activity that distinguishes homo sapiens (or, in 
Marx's case, as we shall see, homo faber) from every other species, and 3) that such activity is (the moral) good 
for man” (Nasser 1975). 
19 Here Nasser quotes Donald C. Hodges, “Marx's Ethics and Ethical Theory,” The Socialist Register, Ralph 
Miliband and John Saville, eds., 1964 (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1964), p.231. 
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and condemnations, is precisely what counts in the Western philosophical tradition as moral 
indignation. 
 
To this, I would only add emphasis to the fact that according to Marx, capitalists are also 
alienated from their essential human nature because their scope for action is limited and 
determined by economic laws that operate beyond their control, even though those laws are 
themselves produced by human activity and social relations. 
What it means to say that morality is determined by human nature. 
Whenever Marx evaluates the moral status of an economic formation, a political system, the role 
of a group or collective, or the specific actions of one individual person, he does so within the 
context of this more abstract and universal conception of human social existence (which is in 
turn based on the concrete totality of human social being)20. Throughout this dissertation, I 
emphasize the fact that in determining what is morally required in a specific historical situation, 
Marx asks whether or not the action, principle, political movement, etc. in question is such as to 
promote or to inhibit the expansion of human powers and the satisfaction of human needs. Put 
differently, in order to know the moral status of a thing, one must know whether or not it is such 
as to help human beings to realize their nature as natural and social beings who satisfy their 
needs and transform their existence consciously through the labor process. However, this is no 
mean feat. I do not intend to make it sound obvious or apparent, simply from a knowledge of this 
abstraction of human essence, which human actions will fit the bill. 
                                                 
20 It will be seen that this reading of Marx puts me into stark disagreement with Allen Wood, who writes in his 
1972 “Marx's Critical Anthropology” that “Marx seems […] to acknowledge no concept of man which could 
serve as a standard against which his present existence could be measured and criticized.” 
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I believe it is a virtue of Marx's theory that his conception of human nature is quite thin. 
He does not think that human beings are essentially selfish, essentially altruistic, essentially 
competitive, fallen, vicious, or any other of a whole host of characterizations that other theories 
have attributed to essential human nature. But then it is fair to ask, Now that one has ascended 
“from earth to heaven,” as Marx puts it in The German Ideology, and abstracted a human essence 
out of a concrete totality of determinate appearances, how do we get back down again? 
The move downward is mediated by different levels of abstraction between essential 
human nature that is universal to all human beings and a particular, concrete historical situation 
and the agents who are in it21. We approach historical questions proceeding from the fact that 
human beings are always at least indirectly producing their own conditions of existence when 
they produce in order to satisfy their needs22. However, that is quite general. This human 
production can take on a variety of forms, and so in evaluating a concrete historical situation it is 
not enough to know merely that human beings produce their existence through the labor process. 
Although of course no human being acts in conditions of absolute knowledge, in seeking to 
determine what is morally right or wrong in a given situation, we must gather as much 
information as possible regarding moments of the concrete totality of social existence in which 
one acts. In short, a scientific materialist knowledge of human social existence is a prerequisite 
for accurate normative judgements. Here is a non-exhaustive description of some of the most 
                                                 
21 The method I describe here is not explicitly laid out by Marx in the way that I have spelled it out. However, one 
instance in which he is clearly applying this method is in The German Ideology. Marx writes that “the first 
premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals” (MECW 5:31). He then 
goes on to a series of concrete determinations: how human beings produce to maintain their existence and how 
they relate to nature, their division of labor, the emergence of exchange, the development of nations and the 
productive forces of those nations, and so on. 
22 In The German Ideology, Marx cautions that this might not be the case for the earliest human beings. 
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important aspects of reality which we must investigate in order to determine what is morally 
required at a particular historical moment.  
In addition to knowing that human beings produce their existence, we must also 
determine how that production is carried out. We must know what the mode of production of a 
given society is, whether there is a division of labor and if so, how labor is divided, and 
furthermore, at what stage of development a society is within that mode of production. This is an 
empirical question about the economic organization of a society. To answer it, we have to 
investigate such matters as who is taking part in production, and whether society is still at the 
stage of consuming what is found ready in nature, as in a hunter-gatherer society, or human 
beings are actively intervening into nature to direct its processes, as in an agricultural society, or 
whether production has become rationalized  and socialized, and its efficiency increased, to the 
massive extent that it has in industrial production. We need to examine how goods are distributed 
once they are produced, and whether a surplus is created and if so, how large a surplus and who 
controls it. 
We also need to know what material resources society has at its disposal, and whether 
these are such as to allow a transition to a higher stage of society—that is, one that is more 
amenable to the realization of human nature. It is Utopian, Marx argues, to advocate a new type 
of society without properly identifying exactly which forces within the old society make such a 
transition and development possible, and how those forces can be directed at such a transition. A 
social transformation can only be genuinely moral at a point at which it is historically possible to 
realize. 
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We need to know what if any classes exist in the society and what the balance of forces 
are among them. The notion of economic class is itself an abstraction out of a totality of 
individual human actors within an economic system. In the case of capitalism, we often see this 
economic system depicted as one in which autonomous individuals interact with one another as 
equals, bringing different wares to market—sometimes corn, sometimes their own labor-power. 
However, when we evaluate the dynamics of this system we see that in fact, these individuals 
relate to the market in different ways, so that these “free” and “equal” individuals tend to belong, 
by virtue of their relation to the capitalist market, in one of two broad categories: those who buy 
labor-power, and those who sell it. And whether you are the capitalist who buys labor-power in 
order to produce commodities which she can then sell to increase her profit, or the worker who 
has nothing to sell but his labor-power in order to satisfy his private needs, your actions are not 
so “free,” but rather determined in significant ways by the economic laws which govern the 
movement of commodities in such a society. And these actors are not so “equal,” because those 
who live by buying labor-power and amassing profit tend to have the upper hand over those who 
live by selling their labor-power daily, thereby contributing to the store of dead labor in the 
hands of the capitalist. 
So in determining what an actor ought morally to do within a given historical situation, 
we must determine the class membership of the particular historical actor in question,  how and 
whether her actions promote the interests of her class, and furthermore how those class interests 
stand in relation to the interests of society or of humanity taken as a whole. We need to know the 
level of organization of that class, whether it has become conscious of its interests and whether it 
has developed a political leadership capable of advancing those interests. 
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We need to know the nature and breadth of the individual person's scope for action, and 
therefore it is important to understand the historical factors which have led up to the moment in 
which she acts, as well as knowing the individual's own personal qualities and capacities. 
The investigation into each of these questions, according to Marx, will proceed from an 
understanding that each of these aspects of social being have arisen out of a long process of 
human beings producing their own existence through their active adaptation to the world in 
which they live. However, in order to derive specific, concrete moral claims out of this abstract 
and general principle, we must understand the particular manner in which this essence is 
realized, and also the manner in which it is distorted, frustrated, or limited, in the various 
historical formations that have arisen during this process. It may sound as though it is an awfully 
tall order, to need to know so much about the historical context in which an agent acts. But the 
point is that in order to say with a high degree of accuracy what is morally required in a given 
historical situation, we need to know as much of this context as possible and we need to 
understand it in a manner informed by categories such as class and mode of production, so that 
we can understand how all the parts of this totality interact with one another and form a 
developing whole into which human beings can consciously and rationally intervene. With 
regard to morality, what it means to say, as Marx does, that “When reality is depicted, 
philosophy as an independent branch of knowledge loses its medium of existence” (The German 
Ideology, MECW 5:37), is to say that we cannot make accurate moral claims without 
investigating the concrete historical situation as thoroughly and systematically as possible. 
Philosophy continues to exist as part of our knowledge, but there is no longer a hard and fast 
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border between philosophical knowledge and the scientific knowledge of society and nature23. 
The question, What is to be done? is answered by determining what, in a particular situation, is 
most likely to promote the realization of human nature, and this is something that can be 
determined empirically via the method I have sketched here. 
Throughout this dissertation but especially in the third chapter, where I discuss Marx's 
moral thought as it develops between the years 1858 and 1883, I argue that Marx puts forward a 
moral argument for communism. But while Marx does think that in the present historical 
moment, human beings ought to work to promote communism, this does not entail that at all 
historical times, the promotion of communism has been the morally right activity for humans to 
engage in. As I have tried to stress, what is moral at a given point in time depends on a whole 
range of determinate factors. To make such a suggestion would be to illegitimately abstract from 
the specific historical circumstances which make communism possible at a certain stage in the 
development of capitalist production. As Marx argues, to call for communism at a time when it is 
not yet possible to achieve, or even to call for communism at a time when it might be achieved, 
but to propose means such as mere moral persuasion, which are unequal to the task of actually 
realizing a communist society, is hopelessly utopian. In order to draw the conclusion that human 
beings ought to promote communism, Marx does not abstractly imagine what ideal future society 
would best suit human beings as he imagines them to be. He examines how the alienation of 
humans from their essence leads to a debased, limited existence for human beings and even 
threatens their continued existence, full stop. He examines the economic tendencies already 
                                                 
23  And so I wholly disagree with Philip J. Kain who in his 1984 paper, “Marx and the Abolition of Morality,” 
argues that according to Marx, “Only science can be justified, not morality. Moral judgments cannot be 
empirically verified and they are not true or false. ” 
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existing within capitalism that are leading to a greater rationalization and socialization of human 
production, and provide the basis for greater conscious control of human beings over their own 
powers. He looks to the existing workers' movement and its political and economic aims, and 
how the achievement of its aims would affect the entire society of which it is a part. 
Communism, as Marx tells us, is not an “ideal to realize,” but a real, existing movement within 
capitalist society, and a movement which Marx believes human beings can and should work to 
promote. 
Adopting Marx's moral conception, it is possible to make moral judgements not just 
about what a class or society as a whole ought to do, but also about individual agents and their 
actions. Again, in evaluating the actions of a particular individual agent, in order to answer the 
question of what this person ought or ought not to do, we have to understand the relevant 
historical context. We need to know what paths for action are actually open to her, and how her 
individual actions are likely to make an impact on the historical situation in which she acts. The 
greater the historical import and the greater the potential of her action to either promote or inhibit 
the realization of human nature, the greater the moral significance of her action. Early in his 
career, Marx writes that for human beings there is an imperative “To overthrow all relations in 
which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy 
of Right, MECW 3:182). Within human social arrangements that continue to allow for and even 
to promote the domination of things over people and of man over man, it is always possible to 
ask what can be done to do away with this debasement, and how a particular action relates to the 
struggle to overthrow it. The answer to the question of how a person should act is determined by 
assessing empirically the conditions in which she acts and the potential of her action to promote 
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the further realization of essential human nature, an abstraction that is itself determined 
empirically by assessing a concrete totality of human history and existing social relations. In this 
sense, Marx's method for determining what is moral or immoral at a given historical moment is a 
scientific method. 
Human nature and human needs. 
The satisfaction of human needs is an important part of Marx's moral conception, and those 
needs, according to Marx, develop and expand as human powers and the sophistication of their 
social production increases. Marx regularly invites his reader to keep in mind that the 
prerequisite for any more complex or sophisticated form of social existence is that humans' basic 
natural needs for food, water, shelter, etc., be satisfied. But as social beings, humans have not 
only their strictly biological needs, but also needs that come about as a result of humans' attempts 
to satisfy their biological needs and the complex of needs that arise historically out of that initial 
pursuit. In producing according to their existing needs, human beings not only satisfy those 
needs, but they also create new needs which in turn have new requirements for their fulfillment, 
setting the process into further motion as human beings then develop new forms of production in 
order to meet those new needs.  In the Grundrisse, Marx refers to these needs, “historic needs—
needs created by production itself,” “needs which are themselves the offspring of social 
production and intercourse,” as “social needs”. Social needs, the “needs created by production 
itself,” have their basis in the natural needs towards which production was historically first 
directed and which must still at present continually be satisfied. As Marx writes in The German 
Ideology, 
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The first premise of all human existence and, therefore, of all history, [is that humans] must be in a 
position to live in order to be able to "make history". But life involves before everything else 
eating and drinking, a habitation, clothing and many other things. The first historical act is thus the 
production of the means to satisfy these needs, the production of material life itself. And indeed 
this is an historical act, a fundamental condition of all history, which today, as thousands of years 
ago, must daily and hourly be fulfilled merely in order to sustain human life24. 
And since those natural needs for food, drink, shelter, etc. are directly determined by the 
characteristics of humans as natural beings, it is right to say that human biological being plays a 
fundamental role in determining the development of social needs. However, it is not the case that 
social needs are in any way simply reducible to natural needs, and it would also be foreign to 
Marx to regard natural needs as the “real needs,” and the social, historically arisen needs, as 
somehow less genuine. Marx provides a specific example of how basic, biological needs give 
rise to increasingly social needs in his discussion of a group of French workers, whose need for 
higher wages in order to ensure continued access to food and housing gives rise, in the struggle 
against their bosses, to a need for solidarity with fellow workers. This socially produced need is 
no less a genuine need for human beings than is the biological need for food25. 
                                                 
24 The passage continues, and it is worth quoting at some length: 
 “The second point is that the satisfaction of the first need (the action of satisfying, and the 
instrument of satisfaction which has been acquired) leads to new needs; and this production of 
new needs is the first historical act. [...] 
 The third circumstance which, from the very outset, enters into historical development, is 
that men, who daily remake their own life, begin to make other men, to propagate their kind: the 
relation between man and woman, parents and children, the family. The family, which to begin 
with is the only social relationship, becomes later, when increased needs create new social 
relations and the increased population new needs, a subordinate one (except in Germany), and 
must then be treated and analysed according to the existing empirical data, not according to “the 
concept of the family,” as is the custom in Germany. These three aspects of social activity are not 
of course to be taken as three different stages, but just as three aspects or, to make it clear to the 
Germans, three “moments,” which have existed simultaneously since the dawn of history and the 
first men, and which still assert themselves in history today. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:42) 
25 From Human Requirements and the Division of Labour, “When communist artisans associate with one another, 
theory, propaganda, etc., is their first end. But at the same time, as a result of this association, they acquire a new 
need – the need for society – and what appears as a means becomes an end. In this practical process the most 
splendid results are to be observed whenever French socialist workers are seen together. Such things as smoking, 
drinking, eating, etc., are no longer means of contact or means that bring them together. Association, society and 
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Human beings' alienation from their essence under capitalism, and the moral argument for 
communism. 
Marx writes that the significance of communism as a goal for human beings is that it will realize 
“a new manifestation of the forces of human nature and a new enrichment of human nature” 
(“Human Requirements and the Division of Labour,” MECW 3:306), thereby laying the material 
basis for the realization and development of existing capacities and the appearance of new ones, 
and corresponding needs. Under capitalism, Marx argues, human beings are so separated from 
the natural world and from their own species-being (their own particularly human mode of 
interaction with the natural world, i.e. the labor process and interaction with its products) that 
their needs as human beings in fact are limited to bare subsistence—or even somewhat less. This 
is the case because under capitalism a person's needs have no effective capacity to be fulfilled 
unless the person has money to fulfill the need. For workers, particularly, their needs are reduced 
to just those needs that must be fulfilled in order for their work to be done. As Marx writes, “It is 
not only that man has no human needs—even his animal needs cease to exist” (MECW 3:308). A 
central element of Marx's opposition to capitalism is that it limits the development of human 
beings by inhibiting the fulfillment of human needs. Worse, in limiting the development of 
humans and new human capacities, it also limits the range of human needs to the barest 
essentials. Capitalism bars humans from the kind of relationship to the natural world and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
conversation, which again has association as its end, are enough for them; the brotherhood of man is no mere 
phrase with them, but a fact of life, and the nobility of man shines upon us from their work-hardened bodies.” 
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products of their labor that would create more sophisticated forms of human interaction with 
their environment, and therefore, corresponding new needs, as well. 
Furthermore, Marx argues that in class society, human production is carried out in an 
alienated manner, so that, instead of being directed consciously and rationally by human persons, 
labor—what labor is performed and how it is performed, and who performs it—appears  
determined by economic laws that operate independently of anyone's control. In class society, 
and particularly in capitalism, this basic teleology in the conscious life activity of man is 
disrupted. The person who carries out the work of realizing a product may have no ideal 
representation of the work at all. The worker produces not in accordance with a standard that she 
has set consciously for herself, but rather produces as part of an extended process that appears 
not to be determined by any human rationality or human goal-positing at all, but instead, by 
abstract economic laws of supply and demand. The work, as a result, begins to lose its human 
character, a process accelerated by the character of work itself, which becomes increasingly 
odious to the worker and becomes a denial and a sacrifice of the human being, rather than a 
realization and expression of the human being in the external world. 
This disruption of the basic teleology in the labor process occurs not only for the 
industrial worker producing in a manner dictated by the laws of the market. Rather, it takes place 
in all manner of human activity, including intellectual and political activity. Operating within 
class society, human beings behave less as individual actors and more and more as exemplars of 
this or that class, in manners dictated to a great extent by the economic and social system of 
which they are a part. 
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The question arises, then, of how that teleology is disrupted, and how it comes to be the 
case that economic laws, rather than human beings, govern production. This result comes about 
as human beings produce and regularities begin to appear within that totality of human activity—
regularities that are neither fully understood nor controlled, and which come to develop the 
appearance of external laws of production. Thus, a world which human beings have produced 
actually appears to be independent from and hostile to human beings (we can say, human beings 
become alienated from their own product, the social world). The essence of social being, which 
is the labor process as conscious life activity, is mediated by social forms so that it no longer 
appears as the product of conscious life activity and the developing complex of teleological goal-
positing and production by concrete human individuals. Instead, it actually comes to defeat the 
teleological aspect which is a normal part of the labor process and of conscious life activity. (For 
an example of this, one might consider the demonstrated impotence of humanity at this point in 
history, dominated as it is by the profit motive, to address the environmental crisis which 
threatens to wipe out mankind on Earth altogether. Even the most simple, basic aim of human 
beings to safeguard their continued survival is thwarted by social arrangements that inhibit the 
ability of humans to act rationally and effectively in accordance with that goal.) 
The solution to this disruption, Marx thinks, is to bring the appearance of social being 
into accordance with its essence. This means that production must be brought under the rational, 
conscious control of human beings. And for that to occur, without regularities in human 
production taking on the appearance of social laws, social production must be coordinated 
socially, and directed not towards  profit, but towards the creation of a society in which the free 
development of each is the precondition of the free development of all. What I am describing 
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here is in Marx's thought the transition from capitalism, to the transitional stages of socialism, 
and eventually, to fully developed communist society. It is important not to interpret Marx's 
vision of this future society, in which “the free development of each is the condition for the free 
development of all,” as some Marxian “end of history.” Instead, Marx argues that class society 
constitutes the pre-history of the human species, and that only with humanity's rational control 
over its own powers and over the natural world of which human beings are a part, can an actually 
human history begin to unfold. Marx refers to this in the Critique of Political Economy when he 
writes: 
The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production 
– antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from 
the individuals' social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within 
bourgeois society create also the material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The 
prehistory of human society accordingly closes with this social formation. (MECW 29:264) 
 
With the resolution of this antagonism, the material basis for moral theory as a way to theorize 
the gap between human existence as it is and human existence as it ought to be, will also 
disappear. This is a thesis that I return to at several points throughout the dissertation. 
In addition to analyzing other moral theories, Marx, over the course of his writings, 
develops a moral philosophy based on human beings “in their actual, empirically perceptible 
process of development under definite conditions,” and the requirements that must be satisfied in 
order to bring about the circumstances in which we might see what Marx calls the “all-sided 
development” of “rich individuality”26. Marx examines the goals of such important struggles as 
the French Revolution and the workers' movement, and considers how they represent the highest 
                                                 
26 For an interesting and recent treatment of the concept of “rich individuality” in Marx, see Michael Lebowitz, The 
Socialist Alternative: Real Human Development, Monthly Review Press, 2010. 
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consciousness about what is necessary in order for human beings to preserve the historical gains 
of class societies and to move closer toward an “all-sided development.” Based on his 
understanding of these struggles, their aims, and their historical role, together with his complex 
understanding of human nature, Marx draws the conclusion that man is the highest being for 
man, and that human development itself is therefore the most important goal for human beings. 
In his criticisms of other moral theories and of existing class society, his standard becomes: the 
continued existence of humanity, the preservation of its cultural heritage in its diversity and 
achievements, and the promotion of “rich individuality” and an “all-sided development” of 
human needs and capacities. In the Grundrisse, Marx asserts the desirability of: 
the development of the rich individuality which is as all-sided in its production as in its 
consumption, and whose labour also therefore appears no longer as labour, but as the full 
development of activity itself, in which natural necessity in its direct form has disappeared; 
because a historically created need has taken the place of the natural one. (MECW 15:251) 
  
Marx argues that one of the aims of human social existence is for human beings to bring 
increasingly more of the natural world and more of their own social relations under their 
conscious, rational control. That ability of human beings to extend greater control over 
themselves and over the natural world is a key aspect of bringing about their “all-sided 
development”. The extent to which labor is carried out as a mere means to life or as life-activity 
itself is another key aspect of the all-sided development of human beings. In alienated labor, the 
essence of man's social being, labor, is converted into a mere means for the maintenance of his 
continued existence as a biological being with merely natural needs. The extent to which those 
natural needs, such as, say, the need to eat, have been transformed into social, historically arisen 
needs, is a further marker of the extent to which this all-sided development has taken place. For 
instance, for primitive man, the need to eat may have had the appearance of a need for raw flesh. 
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Today, after centuries of social development, it is the need for adequate access to affordable 
grocery items and the tools to carry out appropriate culinary preparation. Here, we can say that a 
“historically created need has taken the place of a natural one”. 
When Marx refers to the “rich individuality” that could first be developed in communist 
society, he refers to the human being in whom human essence has been brought into accordance 
with human appearance. Instead of appearing as a debased, limited creature, hampered and 
controlled by economic laws, the human both is, essentially, a social being with a capacity for 
unlimited development through the labor process, and actually appears to be so in a society in 
which the natural world and the social sphere have been brought under man's conscious and 
rational control, and directed on the basis of human needs. (The existence of human persons as 
individuated beings at all, is itself the result of social production, a point Marx makes when he 
says that man “is not only a social animal, but an animal that can isolate itself only within 
society”27. Only at a certain stage in the development of production can human beings emerge as 
individuals and not merely as “herd animals”28, pursuing goals and interests that are not 
narrowly subordinated to the struggle for survival.) 
Dynamism and processual development are key elements of essential human nature—a 
part of human nature that is stunted in a society that does not allow human beings to satisfy their 
full range of needs and to develop an unfolding array of human powers in the natural world. 
Marx's call for the abolition of human beings' alienation from essential human nature and more 
                                                 
27 Der Mensch ist ein Thier, das nur in der Gesellschaft sich vereinzeln kann. (English: MECW 28:18, German 
MEW 13:616) 
28 Marx writes, “Man becomes individualized only through the process of history. Originally he is a species being, 
a tribal being, a herd animal—though by no means a zoon politikon in the political sense. Exchange itself is a 
major agent of this individuation. It makes herd-like existence superfluous and dissolves it” (Grundrisse, MECW 
15:420). 
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specifically, of human beings from the world they themselves have produced, is a call for labor 
to be carried out in accordance with human essence, as conscious, purposive activity that 
increases and develops man's command over the external world and over himself, and is directed 
towards the satisfaction of human needs and development of human powers. Such a 
reconciliation of essence and appearance, Marx argues, would usher in the beginning of truly 
human history. 
Morality as objective, universal, and historical 
Throughout this dissertation, I address Marx's criticisms of specific moralities, especially 
Christian morality, Kantian morality, and Utilitarianism. A large part of Marx’s writings on 
morality is devoted to a treatment of the history of morality as it has developed in human 
societies. In carrying out that treatment, Marx examines how particular historical—specifically, 
social and economic—conditions have provided the basis for different manifestations of 
morality. Marx argues that not only is the content of morality historical, but also that morality 
itself is a product of human activity and has arisen in the course of human social development, 
and that it will be abolished at a time when the gap between society as it is and society as it 
ought to be has been closed, and human appearance has been brought into accordance with 
human essence. In a society already organized so as to promote the all-sided development of the 
human individual, the wish, expressed in various forms of morality, for human freedom and the 
brotherhood of man, would be realized in human social arrangements. 
For Marx, ethics are derived in the first place from an understanding of what human 
beings are, but there is no reason to think that what human beings are is simply static or eternal. 
If that were the case, it would actually be very difficult to make sense of the charge of 
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ahistoricism that Marx levels against other moral theories. In fact it is precisely because human 
social being is constantly changing and developing, that the fact of the matter about what is good 
or bad for human beings at various historical stages changes and develops as well. For Marx, 
morality is essentially historical. It is historical in (at least) two important senses. The first is that 
the validity of specific moral commands and specific moral theories depends, not on some set of 
eternal moral truths, but rather on human social development and the question of which things 
will promote human development at a particular point in human history. 
Morality is also historical in the sense that morality is a social product that has arisen at a 
particular stage in human history and, Marx predicts, will also pass away when the gap between 
human existence as it is and human existence as it ought to be is closed. In a fully developed 
communist society, Marx argues, the social contradictions which create the basis for morality 
and for other ideological forms of thought such as politics will be abolished. Not only are 
particular moral precepts contingent and historical, but morality as such is a historical and 
transitory phenomenon that can pass out of existence. 
Marx does not think that what is moral in a given society at a given historical stage is 
simply whatever counts as moral according to the dominant moral theory of the time. Rather, an 
action, principle, state of affairs, or other object of moral judgement is morally good if it 
contributes to further human development and to the greater conscious control of human beings 
over their own existence (and morally bad if it inhibits these). In this way, morality for Marx 
accommodates both the fact that human beings have an essential nature as social beings who 
produce their own existence through labor, and the fact that this essence is expressed in different 
ways in different circumstances. Therefore, the fact of the matter about what promotes human 
  31 
development, the expression of human essence, and the abolition of alienation, is different in 
different historical settings. 
In his 1991 book, The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought, Cornel West argues that 
Marx did not take a scientific approach to morality or attempt to ground it in objective reality 
and in essential human nature, but instead developed what West calls a “radical historicism.” 
West reads Marx quite differently than I do, and claims that “The major difference between 
Marx and the Marxist philosophers regarding approaches to ethics is that Marx is not bothered 
by charges of moral relativism, whereas the philosophers are bothered by such charges”29. He 
argues that for Marx, any form of justification, including moral justification, is not a matter of 
accounting for the truth of what one says, but rather, a “way of reminding ourselves and others 
which particular community or set of we-intentions we identify with.” West argues that Marx 
abandoned philosophy, and writes that: 
The vision of philosophy as a quest for philosophic certainty and search for philosophic 
foundations is an ahistorical vision, a hapless attempt to escape from the flux of history by being 
philosophic, that is, by being bound to certainty, tied to necessity, or linked to universality30. 
  
I think that in clarifying Marx's opposition to morality conceived as a set of eternal moral 
commands, West emphasizes the historicism of Marx's moral conception, but in the process, 
unmoors Marx's moral theory from the theoretical basis which accounts for its validity and 
universal bindingness. We might go on making claims about what is or is not moral and whether 
it is or is not worth doing, but these would not be factive claims about what the world is like; 
                                                 
29 Cornel West, The Ethical Dimensions of Marxist Thought, p.167. 
30 Ibid., p.3. 
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they would just be ways of reminding one another “which particular community or set of we-
intentions” we identify with. 
If a moral theory is incapable of making universal claims upon human beings, regardless 
of their cognitive states or subjective group identifications, then it hardly merits being called a 
moral theory at all. It would in that case be little more than a set of Club Rules. Marx, I argue, 
wants more than this. He insists time and again that revolutionary struggle and the achievement 
of a communist society would not merely be beneficial for workers, but rather that these things 
are necessary for the well-being and continued development of the human species taken as a 
whole. When members of the bourgeoisie choose, based on their understanding of history and of 
an ongoing social crisis, to side with the proletariat, they are not, according to Marx, simply 
trying a new set of “we-intentions” on for size. Rather, they are abandoning their narrow class 
interests because they have come to recognize their interests as human beings and to adopt the 
standpoint of the species as a whole. Marx looks to establish exactly the type of certainty and 
universality for his claims about communism, and about the role of workers' struggle in 
advancing the cause of humanity, that West rejects on his behalf. 
I argue that Marx identifies the proletariat as a class that represents the interests of all 
humanity31. The proletariat, Marx argues, cannot realize its aims as a class without overthrowing 
                                                 
31 Others have argued that this is not the case. For instance, Allen Buchanan in his 1979 paper, “Revolutionary 
Motivation and Rationality,” argues that according to Marx, “In every revolution in the past, including the 
French, the revolutionary class, not being a majority, found it necessary to present its own special interests as 
universal rights in order to enlist the support of other classes. Granted Marx's assumption that the intermediate 
classes become 'proletarianized,' so that the proletariat becomes the vast majority, with only one class 
confronting it as its implacable foe, such ideological window-dressing is no longer necessary. The proletariat, 
like previous revolutionary classes, is motivated by its own interests; but unlike its predecessors, it can boldly 
acknowledge this fact” (Buchanan 1979, p. 61). 
 I read Marx quite differently. I think that for Marx, in the French Revolution, the bourgeoisie actually did 
represent the interests of all of humanity, as for humanity to progress, it was required that feudalism be overcome 
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the whole class society and system of private property of which it is a part, and it is precisely this 
that must be done in order for human beings' alienation from their essential nature to be 
abolished. With the abolition of alienation, according to Marx, humans will be able to fully 
realize their essence as natural and social beings who satisfy their needs, and transform 
themselves and their environment, through conscious, active adaptation to the world via the labor 
process. Marx argues that the working class in its current conditions of existence under 
capitalism prefigures communist society. Workers, he writes, have no stake in the capitalist 
system and have no particular interests that conflict with the rights of other classes because what 
they suffer is “no particular wrong but wrong generally” (The Holy Family, MECW 3:186). The 
moral condemnation of capitalist society made from the point of view of the proletariat has a 
universal validity for all human beings32. 
In this Introduction, I have made a number of complex claims that demand further close 
elucidation and analysis. I hope my readers will find that in this dissertation, I have given these 
claims the attention they deserve. However, I am well aware that Marx's writings are rich, 
nuanced, and almost needless to say, the subject of vigorous debate in almost every detail. In the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and that capitalist production become the dominant mode of production of society. Similarly, I think that the 
establishment of bourgeois rights was a very progressive step, and not only for the bourgeoisie but also for the 
proletariat. However, while Marx thinks that the bourgeoisie's interests were at a certain point also the interests 
of humanity, that is no longer the case as it has become possible to move on to a higher stage of human social 
development. This is a transition that can only be carried out through the self-emancipation of the working class, 
and when they perform this historical act, they emancipate not only themselves, but also the rest of society, 
which is a point Marx makes very explicitly at the end of The Holy Family. 
32 George Brenkert, in his 1977 paper, “Marx, Engels, and the Relativity of Morals,” argues that Marx did not 
theorize a universal morality. I think that like Cornel West, Brenkert rightly emphasizes the extent to which what 
is moral or immoral, according to Marx, can be different in different historical contexts, but does not place 
appropriate emphasis on the extent to which Marx's conception of human nature does provide a basis for moral 
objectivity and universality. Charles W. Mills' 1994 paper, “Marxism, 'Ideology', and Moral Objectivism,” is a 
recent attempt to defend the thesis that Marxism is compatible with the idea of an objective morality, and Mills 
rightly contends that Marx's main point of contention with moralists and Utopian socialists is that they think 
moral philosophy alone has a greater efficacy vis a vis social change than it actually does. 
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following chapters, I attempt to erode the basis for the most stubborn misconceptions regarding 
Marx's approach to morality, as well as to provide a clear and compelling picture of the 
continuity and development in that approach throughout Marx's writings. Although numerous 
authors have tackled the question of Marx's moral thought in both article- and book-length 
treatments, this particular project, such a detailed and sustained close analysis of Marx's moral 
thought throughout the entirety of his works, over the whole of his intellectual career, from a 
perspective that endorses Marx's method as he developed it, is at least as I understand it, rare in 
the Anglophone tradition. I believe that this project is an important contribution to philosophy 
and in particular, to moral philosophy and to the study of Marx's work. 
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2.0  MARX’S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1840 TO 1847 
The goal of the present chapter is to present Marx's ethical views as they developed during the 
years from 1840 to 1847, a period that begins with a doctoral dissertation probing the 
relationship between freedom and necessity, and ends with a 400-page assault on ethical egoism 
in The German Ideology. 
Marx's philosophical thought underwent a transformation during this time, from a Left 
Hegelian critique of existing society, to the formulation of historical materialism, a new 
philosophical and practical method to analyze and overthrow oppressive social relations and 
usher in a new society based on the needs of human beings. Even as we consider this 
development in Marx's thought, we must also appreciate the great deal of continuity in his work. 
It would be wrong to say, as some do33, that The German Ideology represents a wholesale 
rejection of ethical concerns or worse yet, a turn toward a strict economic determinism in which 
human agency could only be an illusion. Rather, Marx's views as they are expressed in the The 
German Ideology represent not so much a break with ethical concerns or with the philosophical 
orientation of his works up to that point, as they do a clear articulation of the material, economic 
transformation that would be necessary in order to resolve the crises produced by class society, 
                                                 
33 I am thinking here specifically of Louis Althusser, and especially of Althusser's book, For Marx, and its arguably 
outsized influence on the reception of Marx's thought. Also, of the recent work of Dan Brudney in his book, 
Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy. 
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and allow for the full realization of essential human nature, ending what Marx calls the 
“prehistory” of human beings. 
Marx, throughout his career, is concerned with the full development of concrete 
individuals, and the expression of their personalities. He does not think that moral injunctions 
alone are sufficient to bring this about. Instead, he considers what radical changes in society 
would permit a change and development in the real life activity of individuals. The core of his 
critique of capitalism is that it alienates human beings from their essence as social beings who 
engage in conscious, teleological interaction with their natural and social environment. 
Capitalism, instead of developing the “rich individual,” reduces the individual to those 
components of his being which are useful to capital, and in the case of “useless” individuals who 
are not necessary as workers, tends to the complete annihilation of their individuality, in poverty, 
starvation, and death. While it is sometimes held that Marx breaks with morality in The German 
Ideology, it is there that Marx writes that capitalist production produces the worker “in the role 
of commodity,” and in keeping with this role, produces him as “a mentally and physically 
dehumanized being” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:121). As I will argue throughout this 
chapter and over the course of this study, such charges are distinctly moral criticisms for Marx, 
who sees the reconciliation of human appearance with human essence, the establishment of 
human mastery over their natural and social environment so that they may direct them in 
accordance with human needs, and the pursuit of an ongoing and limitless development of 
human powers, as the highest moral aim for human beings. 
 In the 1844 manuscript, “Antithesis of Capital and Labour”, Marx writes that capitalism 
produces “immorality, deformity, and dulling of the workers and the capitalists” (Economic and 
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Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:284). All of these are considered by him to be 
modes of dehumanization, ways in which the human individual is stunted and prevented from 
realizing itself as a developing being. 
Marx sees this “immorality” as a serious deficiency in human beings, one as regrettable 
as physical deformity and intellectual dulling. Just as capitalism produces broken, malnourished 
bodies, and stunted intellects, so capitalist society promotes antisocial behavior and frustrates 
human solidarity. It produces persons who act, not as what Marx calls “species-beings,” 
individuals who act under a conception of themselves and their fellows as members of one 
species with needs and conditions for flourishing that belong to the species, but rather as 
atomized, egoistic competitors who act only out of the most immediate and narrow self-interest. 
This “immorality” is of a kind with physical deformity and dulled senses and intellect, a failure 
of capitalism to develop the individual in all of his capacities, making “the life of the species into 
a [mere] means of individual life” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 
3:299), and an unhappy  life, at that. 
Thus, while Marx's philosophy proceeds from individuals and their life-activity, and his 
critique of capitalism is based on its inability to permit individuals to flourish and develop their 
personalities, his concern with individuals should not be confused with an abstract egoism that 
opposes self-interest to the interests of society. Clarifying the distinction between this “abstract 
egoism” and a theory that upholds the primacy of actually existing individuals is the task of the 
immediately following section (Section 2.1), which explores these themes in Marx's doctoral 
dissertation, On the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature, 
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along with an evaluation of Marx's views concerning the relationship between freedom and 
necessity, and the relation of this to ethics. 
In Section 2.2, I explain Marx's theory of alienation, and its role in explaining how it is 
that society frustrates the development of individuals, but also creates the possibility for an 
overthrow of the existing society. Marx's theory of alienation also clarifies his reasons for 
identifying the proletariat as a progressive, revolutionary force within capitalist society. 
In Section 2.3, I address Marx's critique of rights, and show why human rights are an 
inadequate solution to the moral crisis created by class society. And in 2.4, I explain Marx's 
criticisms of the dominant moralities of his time: Christian morality, Kantianism, and 
Utilitarianism. 
Section 2.5 explains Marx's materialist difference from and opposition to the “utopian” 
socialists, who thought too much could be done with good ideas, alone. Marx's emphasis on a 
concrete proposal to close the gap between what is and what ought to be distinguishes his 
approach to morality from other theories which are merely, as Marx puts it, impuissance mise en 
action34. 
In Section 2.6, I conclude by drawing together the major themes of the present chapter 
and indicating how Marx continues to develop them in his later work. 
                                                 
34 “Impotence in action,” from Marx, The Holy Family, MECW 4:201. 
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2.1 MARX AND INDIVIDUALITY 
Marxism is frequently regarded as a theoretical and political orientation that, unlike for example 
liberalism or libertarianism, is at odds with a concern for individual persons and their well-being. 
Marx's critics have attributed to him a tendency to devalue the individual, to regard it as a 
figment of capitalist ideology, and to be blind to the roles that individual persons play as 
conscious actors in human history. However, in presenting Marx in this manner, they stray very 
far from any faithful representation of his views. Marx does not conceive of the communist 
society as one in which some value (equality, material comfort, the “good of society,” etc.) is 
realized at the expense of individuals. Quite the opposite: Marx argues that a communist society 
is the only one in which the full development of all-sided individuals as the highest value for 
human beings can be truly realized. 
Throughout his writings, a massive number of Marx's criticisms of capitalism and his 
arguments for communism are based on the relative abilities of these two social systems to 
encourage or inhibit the development of individual human beings. For example, in the Critique 
of the Gotha Programme, Marx argues that capitalism is despicable because it results in “the 
enslaving subordination of the individual to the division of labor” (Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, MECW 24:87), impeding the full development of the individual's capacity to act, 
and restricting the expression of his full personality. Under capitalism, the ability of individuals 
to satisfy needs and develop skills, interests, and talents is limited to those needs and skills 
narrowly suited to wage-labor. Communism, however, would bring about “the all-round 
development of the individual” (Critique of the Gotha Programme, MECW 24:87). Marx 
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justifies communism precisely on the grounds that it would permit, for the first time in human 
history, the full and free development of individual personalities, providing a material and 
economic basis that would allow persons to pursue creative endeavors and develop an array of 
talents and capacities determined by their own unique interests35. He believes that persons in 
such a society would therefore experience these activities not as one or another stifling vocation, 
but as the active expression of their unique personalities.  
Although Marx's focus on the individual has not passed entirely without mention36, it 
remains nonetheless surprising to many that the development of the individual person is central 
to Marx's worldview. He is, after all, most usually (and quite rightly) associated with the seeking 
of collective responses to social ills. But to see this orientation as inhospitable to a concern with 
the individual is to rely upon a rigid opposition that is alien to Marx's own view, on which the 
struggle for communism is itself the struggle for “the true resolution of the strife […] between 
the individual and the species” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:296). 
In capitalist society, the interests of individuals regularly conflict with one another and 
with society as a whole. Any attempt to pursue social goods within a capitalist society must 
therefore involve limitations on the capacity of individuals to pursue their self-interest. (The 
                                                 
35 And so Marx writes, famously, in The German Ideology: 
 as soon as the distribution of labour comes into being, each man has a particular, exclusive sphere 
of activity, which is forced upon him and from which he cannot escape. He is a hunter, a fisherman, 
a herdsman, or a critical critic, and must remain so if he does not want to lose his means of 
livelihood; whereas in communist society, where nobody has one exclusive sphere of activity but 
each can become accomplished in any branch he wishes, society regulates the general production 
and thus makes it possible for me to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the 
morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, 
without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic. (MECW 5:47) 
36 I have in mind treatments such as Sowell 1963, Shaw 1980, and Forbes 1990. Jon Elster, in attempting to capture 
this aspect of Marx's thought, argues in the 1985 Making Sense of Marx that whatever is valuable in Marx's 
theory of history can be cashed out in terms of methodological individualism, although I think this is going too 
far. 
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particulars of what limitations ought to be placed and how they ought to be enforced is the stuff 
that mainstream political philosophy is made of.) Marx argues that this conflict and competition 
among individuals is an artifact of the specific features of class society, and not a necessary and 
ineliminable feature of human social interaction. His argument is not that the interests of 
individuals must be set aside while persons altruistically pursue “the common good,” but rather 
that for the vast majority of people, their material interests point to the need for an economic 
system in which society's productive capacity is organized and implemented for the benefit of 
human beings, and points away from the capitalist system that heads into ever-deepening crises, 
constantly plunging new layers of individual persons into dehumanizing poverty and despair. 
Capitalist society is so very far from valuing and meeting the needs of individual human beings 
that while “individualism” as a credo or buzzword holds great ideological sway, a mix of 
economic, political, and environmental crises present a very real ontic threat to the continued 
existence and development of concrete, empirical, individual human beings. 
Some of the interpretations of Marx that have been most influential in the academy have 
focused, in different ways, on Marx's conception of individuals as historical actors. Louis 
Althusser, the French Marxist, famously advanced the view that concern with individuals is a 
youthful folly of “Early Marx,” a Left-Hegelian humanist who apparently vanished into thin air 
shortly before “Late Marx” put pen to paper to write The German Ideology, become a strict 
economic determinist, and make a complete break with philosophical humanism and all 
pretensions to moral theory37. In the book, For Marx, Althusser attacked Soviet philosophers 
                                                 
37 Thomas Nemeth, in his paper, “Althusser’s Anti-Humanism and Marxist Philosophy,”  presents a thorough 
and well-researched assessment of the debates between Althusser and Soviet philosophers, which I think sheds some 
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developing a Marxist Humanism that would challenge Stalinist philosophy and emphasize the 
place of free, conscious human action in Marxist theory. He writes that one of his aims is to 
“draw a line of demarcation between the true theoretical bases of the Marxist science of history 
and Marxist philosophy on the one hand, and, on the other, the pre-Marxist idealist notions on 
which depend contemporary interpretations of Marxism as a ‘philosophy of man’ or a 
‘Humanism’”38.As Thomas Nemeth outlines in his 1980 paper, “Althusser’s Anti-Humanism and 
Marxist Philosophy,” these views on the part of Althusser drew him into a debate with Soviet 
Marxist philosophers. Althusser strictly counterposed ideology, including philosophy and 
humanism, in particular, to science. On this basis, Althusser argued that Marx’s turn to a more 
thoroughly developed and scientific approach, that of historical materialism, necessarily 
coincided with an abandonment of philosophy and humanism, and of themes such as alienation 
and human nature. One of the central tasks of the present study will be to demonstrate that in fact 
Marx does continue to engage with and to develop such themes throughout the whole of his 
intellectual corpus. 
“Rational Choice Marxism,” a strand of Marxist interpretation that emerged within 
Anglophone analytical philosophy in the Eighties, sought to emphasize that individuals engage 
in rational decision-making and can and often do act on the basis of such decisions. Writers such 
as Jon Elster stressed that human beings occupy a role not merely as patients but also as agents in 
history, and that human social existence cannot be understood unless one begins with an 
assessment of the activity of individual persons. However, they emphasized this aspect of Marx’s 
                                                                                                                                                             
light on the shortcomings of Althusserianism as an interpretation of Marx’s theory, especially insofar as it struggles 
to accommodate the at least apparently philosophical aspects of Marx’s later works.  Studies in Soviet Thought, Vol. 
21, No. 4 (Nov., 1980), pp. 363-385. 
38  Louis Althusser, Ben Brewster (tr.) For Marx, Verso, 1969 p. 13. 
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thought at the expense of capturing how history can unfold and develop in a law-like manner, at 
all, and sought to replace Marx’s dialectical theory of historical materialism with the 
methodological individualism of rational choice theory. Elster justifies this move in the 
following way: 
It is quite extraordinary, in my view, how Marx could shift from near-nonsense to profound 
insight, often within the same work. In the Grundrisse, for instance, we have on the one hand the 
most striking statements of methodological collectivism and dialectical deduction, and, on the 
other hand, equally striking analyses of the way in which micro-motives are aggregated into 
macro-behaviour, to use T. C. Schelling’s phrase. It is my firm belief—it is the basis, in fact, for 
the whole enterprise of writing this book—that the central insights of Marx are so valuable that we 
would do him and us a disservice were we to accept en bloc the methodology in which they were 
embedded39. 
  
A detailed evaluation of the overall merits of these schools as brands of Marxism lies 
somewhat beyond the purview of the present study. However, as descriptions of Marx's 
understanding of the role, value, and nature of individual persons, they leave a great deal to be 
desired. Marx (quite clearly, I think) believes that while under capitalism, society's productive 
forces appear to operate on their own accord, independently of human beings, in fact, these 
forces are the product of the activity of individuals. The historical transition from capitalism to 
communism is never conceived of as a process in which individuals passively succumb to 
economic laws that operate upon them wholly independently of their activity, but rather as the 
practical activity of individuals achieving rational control over their own productive forces. And 
I think that Marx is quite able, within the theoretical framework that he uses, to properly account 
for these facts about human action. Notice the following passage about life under capitalism, the 
                                                 
39  Jon Elster, Making Sense of Marx Cambridge University Press, New York:1985, pp. 4-5. 
  44 
relationship between large-scale social forces and individual human activity, and the role of 
individuals in bringing about communism, excerpted from The German Ideology: 
[Under capitalism] the productive forces appear as a world for themselves, quite independent of 
and divorced from the individuals, alongside the individuals; the reason for this is that the 
individuals, whose forces they are, exist split up and in opposition to one another, whilst, on the 
other hand, these forces are only real forces in the intercourse and association of these individuals. 
Thus, on the one hand, we have a totality of productive forces, which have, as it were, taken on a 
material form and are for the individuals themselves no longer the forces of the individuals but of 
private property, and hence of the individuals only insofar as they are owners of private property. 
[…] On the other hand, standing against these productive forces, we have the majority of the 
individuals from whom these forces have been wrested away, and who, robbed thus of all real life-
content, have become abstract individuals, who are, however, by this very fact put into a position 
to enter into relation with one another as individuals. […] Things have now come to such a pass 
that the individuals must appropriate the existing totality of productive forces, not only to achieve 
self-activity, but, also, merely to safeguard their very existence. (The German Ideology, MECW 5: 
86-7) 
 
The full expression and development of individual human beings and the satisfaction of 
their needs is for Marx the highest aim for human beings and the basis of his moral outlook, 
informing both his justifications for communism and his critiques of a range of moral theories. 
This commitment is central to Marx's philosophy all throughout his writings. It is crucial, 
however, to sort out the difference between advocating for the fulfillment and development of 
concrete individual persons, and espousing the sort of abstract egoism that Marx frequently and 
energetically attacks. Marx’s interest in the distinction between individuals as atomistic 
abstractions and individuals as real concrete beings is one that he first treats in his doctoral 
dissertation, On the Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature. 
He returns to the question in his spirited attack on the ethical egoism of Max Stirner, a campaign 
which comprises the bulk of The German Ideology. While it is of course true that Marx's 
philosophy develops a great deal over the period between these two works, there is also a great 
deal of continuity in Marx's thought and in the types of philosophical questions he regards as 
central to his work. 
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In the following parts of this section on Marx's writings on individuals, I present his 
views first as they are laid out in his doctoral dissertation and then as they are developed later in 
The German Ideology. 
2.1.1 Marx on Epicurus and the Swerve 
Marx's doctoral dissertation, a study of the differences between the atomistic physical theories of 
Democritus and Epicurus, is also an early treatment by Marx of the relationship between 
freedom and necessity, and an examination of the ontological status of abstract objects. Marx 
defends Epicurus against the charge leveled against him by Cicero, Leibniz, and others, that he is 
little more than a poor plagiarist of Democritus. Marx argues that not only does Epicurus make 
unique philosophical contributions of his own, but that his physical theory represents a 
theoretical advance beyond Democritean atomism. This advance consists partly in Epicurean 
physics' avoidance of the strict mechanistic determinism that is a hallmark of Democritus's view, 
and Marx credits Epicurus for formulating a materialist worldview that can accommodate 
freedom. He also argues that Epicurus's work shows that a proper description of the world must 
proceed from an assessment of the sensuous activity of concretely existing individuals, and not 
from speculation about individuals as unqualified, ideal abstractions. 
The relevance of Marx's earlier study of Greek atomistics to his conception of human 
individuality is clarified by a passage in The Holy Family, in which Marx criticizes the view that 
the role of the modern state is to “hold together the individual self-seeking atoms.” Marx writes, 
and it is worth quoting the passage at some length: 
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Speaking exactly and in the prosaic sense, the members of civil society are not atoms. The specific 
property of the atom is that it has no properties and is therefore not connected with beings outside 
it by any relationship determined by its own natural necessity. The atom has no needs, it is self-
sufficient; the world outside it is an absolute vacuum, i.e., it is contentless, senseless, meaningless, 
just because the atom has all fullness in itself. The egoistic individual in civil society may in his 
non-sensuous imagination and lifeless abstraction inflate himself into an atom, i.e., into an 
unrelated, self-sufficient, wantless, absolutely full, blessed being. Unblessed sensuous reality does 
not bother about his imagination, each of his senses compels him to believe in the existence of the 
world and of individuals outside him, and even his profane stomach reminds him every day that 
the world outside him is not empty, but is what really fills. Every activity and property of his 
being, every one of his vital urges, becomes a need, a necessity, which his self-seeking transforms 
into seeking for other things and human beings outside him. […] It is therefore not the state that 
holds the atoms of civil society together, but the fact that they are atoms only in imagination, in 
the heaven of their fancy, but in reality beings tremendously different from atoms, in other words, 
not divine egoists, but egoistic human beings. (The Holy Family, MECW 4:120-1) 
 
Marx's study of the atom, though too-often ignored, figures importantly in his philosophical 
development. Marx draws upon it here precisely because classical liberal political philosophy 
relies so heavily on the conception of the human being as an isolated being, who needs little from 
other human beings and from society except perhaps to be left alone to pursue its own happiness. 
Human beings are individuals, yes, but real, concrete individuals with needs that impel them 
constantly to seek out other human individuals and maintain relationships with them, and to 
make use of the natural world, metabolizing it as what Marx calls their “inorganic body.” For 
individual human persons to flourish, develop, and maintain a continued existence, they must 
make their needs effective in the world outside themselves and realize themselves in and through 
their connections with the outside world. It is in this way that an individual person's “self-
seeking” can be transformed “into seeking for other things and human beings outside him.” In 
order to further understand the relationship of Marx's study of atoms to his theory of human 
individuality, it will be first necessary to describe the physical systems of Democritus and 
Epicurus in a bit of detail. 
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Democritus argued that the fundamental physical structure of matter is composed of 
atoms—small, indivisible particles—that move in straight lines. The motion of atoms in 
Democritean physics is determined entirely by external forces on them, either the downward pull 
of gravity, or the force of collisions between atoms. Epicurus adopted the framework of 
Democritean atomism, but, notably, with the following alteration: atoms did not simply move in 
a straight line, the path of which was strictly determined by external forces acting on the atom. 
Rather, atoms sometimes, but not always, “swerved” slightly from their original paths, in a 
motion determined not by the action of external forces, but by the atoms' own intrinsic natures. 
As Walter Englert argues persuasively in his very useful book, Epicurus on the Swerve 
and Voluntary Action, Epicurus developed his doctrine of the swerve as a response to a challenge 
from Aristotle to explain the motion of animals—a self-movement which resisted explanation in 
terms of strict mechanistic determinism—using atomistic theory40. This challenge left Epicurus 
with two choices: “either to assert that living creatures only apparently had this power, and that 
all their motions could be explained in terms of the weight and collisions of atoms from which 
they are made, or to find a new motion in the atoms that could account for the property in 
animals” (Englert, p. 55). Epicurus chose the latter course. With the addition of the swerve to his 
atomistic physics, Epicurus posited a type of atomic motion that allowed for atoms to move in 
ways not determined purely by their weight and collisions. The apparently nondeterministic and 
voluntary motion of animals could then be explained in virtue of this property of the atoms that 
comprised them. 
                                                 
40  Walter Englert, Epicurus on the Swerve and Voluntary Action, Scholars Press, 1987. 
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This “swerve” distinguishes Epicurus's physics from Democritus's. Since the motion of 
atoms is not completely determined by external forces, Epicurus's physics describes a world that 
is not strictly mechanistically deterministic. For Marx, this is a crucial and fruitful departure 
from Democritus, because in Epicurean physics, atoms as individual entities are not simply 
subject to external necessity. Marx sees the swerve as a natural physical explanation for the 
possibility of individuals to intervene into the material world beyond themselves, through 
activity determined by their own unique qualities, thereby allowing the “existence” of an atom to 
be in harmony with its “essence.” This harmony of existence with essence constitutes the real 
expression of the atom, the reconciliation of the conflict between freedom and necessity. As 
Marx writes: 
The contradiction between existence and essence, between matter and form, which is inherent in 
the concept of the atom, emerges in the individual atom itself once it is endowed with qualities. 
Through the quality the atom is alienated from its concept, but at the same time is perfected in its 
construction. It is from repulsion and the ensuing conglomerations of the qualified atoms that the 
world of appearance now emerges. (Doctoral Dissertation on Epicurus, MECW 1:61) 
 
The swerve allowed the atom to differentiate and distinguish itself in terms of its relationship to 
other atoms. But atoms as abstract objects are incapable of realizing themselves in matter in this 
way. Only concrete individuals with specific qualities can repel other atoms, thereby 
differentiating themselves and coming to exist in correspondence with their essences. As George 
McCarthy writes in his very lucid and detailed treatment of Marx on Epicurus, on Epicurean 
physics, 
For the atom to exist and be real, it must have certain spatial qualities such as size, shape, and 
weight and thus take on a determinate existence. However, as a determinate being with material 
existence, the atom must take on qualities or properties that contradict its essence as pure 
immediacy and abstract individuality (alienation). It is this contradiction between material 
existence and essence (Concept) that lies at the heart of Epicurus's philosophy and his view of 
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Greek society. Marx saw in Epicurus the first philosopher to incorporate the notion of the 
contradiction between essence and reality into his thought.41 
 
Abstract unqualified objects cannot exist because they cannot affect matter, and thereby cannot 
bring about the expression of their essences. It is for this reason that Marx says “abstract 
individuality is freedom from being, not freedom in being” (Doctoral Dissertation on Epicurus, 
MECW 1:62). Moreover, Marx argued, reasoning based on contemplation of such abstract 
objects will necessarily lapse into methodological idealism, eschewing material determinations 
as mere appearances that distract from a proper appreciation of the nature of reality, rather than 
being the absolute starting place for a proper understanding of reality. 
The Epicurean swerve was attacked by a number of commentators on the basis that 
Epicurus provided inadequate philosophical justification for belief in such a property of atoms. 
Cicero notably complained that Epicurus's doctrine of the swerve was “wishful thinking, not 
careful argumentation.” He argued that Epicurus's theory of the swerve was lacking, since 
Epicurus says 
neither that an atom moves from its place and swerves because it is struck from without, nor that 
there is some cause in the void through which the atom moves which explains why it does not 
move in a straight line, nor that there is in the atom itself some change which occurs on account of 
which the natural motion of its own weight does not obtain. (Cicero, De Fato42 46-47) 
  
Marx argues that this demand for a cause of the swerve is in fact beside the point, since 
for it to be caused in the way that Cicero demands would be for it to be brought back into the 
domain of a mechanistic determinism. Marx writes, “To inquire after the cause that makes the 
                                                 
41 George McCarthy, Marx and the Ancients: Classical Ethics, Social Justice, and Nineteenth-Century Political 
Economy, Savage: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 1990, p.31. 
42  This is Englert’s translation of the text, and it appears in Walter G. Englert, Epicurus on the swerve and 
voluntary action, Scholars Press, 1987 p.56. 
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atom a principle—a clearly meaningless inquiry to anyone for whom the atom is the cause of 
everything, hence without cause itself” (Doctoral Dissertation on Epicurus, MECW 1:50).   
Marx's defense of the Epicurean swerve is that on Epicurus's physics, the atom itself is 
the active principle in nature. Therefore, the movement of Epicurus's atom is so very far from 
requiring an explanation in terms of the forces exerted upon it by the rest of the natural world, 
that the Epicurean atom itself determines that world. Marx admires in Epicurus's thought its lack 
of reliance upon an external source of motion (such as, to name one, Aristotle's “unmoved 
mover”), in order to explain the existence and appearance of the natural world. For Epicurus, the 
activity of individual atoms explains the observable phenomena of the natural world. 
While for our purposes it is necessary to present a general explanation of the doctrines in 
Epicurus that Marx chose to treat in his first extended philosophical work, what is crucial to 
notice in the doctoral dissertation is not so much this or that vagary of Epicurus's physics and 
Marx's reaction to each bit of it, but rather Marx's interest in defending what he recognizes as a 
brand of materialism that can accommodate freedom, conscious activity and intervention into the 
material world. It also tells against the view that Marx himself espoused a mechanistic 
determinism that would have far more in common with Democritus, whose physics he already 
rejects at this stage in his philosophical development, than it does with Epicurus. However, Marx 
is also critical of the role that atoms as abstract individuals continue to play in Epicurus's 
physics. As McCarthy writes: 
The radical individualism of Epicurus was necessary to undermine positivism and religion, but 
was not adequate to develop a real social anthropology or theory of society based on friendship, 
citizenship, and public participation. For this, a turn to Feuerbach's notion of species being and 
Aristotle's view of democracy and citizenship would become necessary. 
It would be Marx's immediate task in his early writings to move from one level to the other, to 
move from abstract self-consciousness and freedom to concrete self-consciousness in the political 
economy. In order to overcome the contradictions of existence and essence—materialism and 
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ethics—implicit in Epicurean physics, the alienation of the objective and physical world must be 
overcome through social praxis. The theoretical praxis and ethical critique of the philosopher must 
be transformed into effective action on the world and a change-over of the institutions of political 
economy. The Dissertation sets the path, the direction, and the priorities for Marx's earliest and 
later studies on the social relations of production. Just as the Dissertation begins with a critique of 
the foreign externality of nature, Capital begins with a critique of the “natural laws” of political 
economy. It is this relation between self-consciousness and nature in all its material forms—from 
physics to political economy—that is at the heart and soul of Marx's lifework. (McCarthy, Marx 
and the Ancients, pp. 44-45) 
  
In certain quarters, Marx is understood as having failed to recognize or at least, been 
unable to successfully account for, the role of the individual person, either as a moral subject or 
as a historical actor. It is true that Marx rejects what I refer to here as “abstract individualism.” 
But far from downplaying or ignoring the nature of the human individual and her needs as an 
individual, Marx bases both his political theory and his moral outlook on humans as they exist; 
natural and social beings, with needs that impel them to associate with one another. These 
themes are already present in his doctoral dissertation, in his argument against the existence of 
abstract objects, and in his insistence that a correct description of reality must be based on the 
sensuous activity of concrete individual beings. Marx further clarifies his conception of 
individuality, together with its consequences for morality, in The German Ideology, as I will 
discuss in the following subsection. 
2.1.2 Marx's Treatment of Individuality in The German Ideology 
Many of the themes in Marx's dissertation on Epicurus remain salient in The German Ideology, 
which represents Marx's first mature expression of his materialist worldview, and the first 
sustained explication and application of the method of historical materialism. “The first premise 
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of all human history,” Marx writes, “is, of course, the existence of living human individuals” 
(The German Ideology, MECW 5:31). He continues 
The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite 
individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s 
imagination, but as they actually are43, i.e. as they act, produce materially, and hence as they work 
under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will. (The 
German Ideology, MECW 5:35-6) 
 
In drawing his conclusions about the sort of society that would be conducive to the 
development and well-being of human persons, Marx's method is not to proceed from an abstract 
conception of “Man,” but rather, to begin with a careful evaluation of individual human beings 
and their practical activity. “Real, positive science,” he writes, is the “expounding of the practical 
activity, of the practical process of development of men” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:37). 
Marx writes that his method is therefore distinct from both empiricism and idealism: 
[Historical materialism's] premises are men, not in any fantastic isolation and rigidity, but in their 
actual, empirically perceptible process of development under definite conditions. As soon as this 
active life-process is described, history ceases to be a collection of dead facts as it is with the 
empiricists (themselves still abstract), or an imagined activity of imagined subjects, as with the 
idealists. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:37) 
 
His method is not speculative, imposing theory upon reality, but rather proceeds from an 
evaluation of individual human beings and their activity. The relevance this has for Marx's 
                                                 
43 Lest this should seem too uncontroversial a method, contrast Marx's statement here with this statement of John 
Rawls's, in Political Liberalism: “I can, however, sketch an account of a political conception of the person drawn 
on in setting up the original position. To understand what is meant by describing a conception of the person as 
political, consider how citizens are represented in that position as free persons. The representation of their 
freedom seems to be one source of the idea that a metaphysical doctrine is presupposed. Now citizens are 
conceived as thinking of themselves as free in three respects [….] First, citizens are free in that they conceive of 
themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good. […] A second 
respect in which citizens view themselves as free is that they regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of 
valid claims. […] The third respect in which citizens are viewed as free is that they are viewed as capable of 
taking responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims are assessed. […] [T]he aim of 
justice as fairness is to resolve [the question of which conception of political justice is most appropriate for 
realizing in basic institutions the values of liberty and equality] by starting from the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation in which the fair terms of cooperation are agreed upon by citizens so conceived (Rawls, 
Political Liberalism, pp.29-34). (My emphasis.) 
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approach to morality is that he does not proceed from an abstract concept of goodness and then 
judge how far the existing state of affairs strays from this ideal. He begins by examining existing 
human beings and their activity, and determining what goals are already aimed at in and 
suggested by this activity. As Marx writes earlier in the German Ideology 
Communism for us is not a condition that is to be established nor an ideal to which reality must 
adjust itself. We call communism the actual movement which abolishes present conditions. The 
conditions under which this movement proceeds result from those now existing. (The German 
Ideology, MECW 5:49) 
  
Although it is not widely regarded as such, I argue that The German Ideology is a 
valuable work of moral philosophy, and an important expression of Marx's moral outlook. After 
all, roughly two-thirds of the hefty volume is devoted to a merciless critique of Max Stirner's 
1845 defense of ethical egoism, The Ego and Its Own44 (Der Einzige und sein Eigentum45). Also, 
while I reserve most of what I have to say regarding the concept of alienation in Marx's early 
works for the following section of this chapter, here I discuss Marx's disagreements with Stirner 
on the question of how to solve the problem of alienation, a question which figures importantly 
into Marx's moral thought. 
Marx's polemic against ethical egoism has been largely ignored, partly due to the fact that 
The German Ideology was not published until 1933, nearly ninety years after its completion. 
Moreover, the book runs roughly 700 pages, and in its abridged form, the form in which it is 
most commonly read (especially by English-language readers), the 400 pages of polemic against 
Stirner have been excised. The polemic itself is challenging for even the most careful reader if he 
has not read Stirner's book, required reading among intellectuals in 1845 Berlin, but almost 
                                                 
44  Max Stirner, David Leopold (tr.), The Ego and Its Own, Cambridge University Press, 1995. 
45  This title is sometimes translated into English, more aptly, I think, as “The Individual and His Property.” 
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totally forgotten today. These factors have contributed to Marx's attack on Stirner being 
overlooked and deemed inessential at best, a condition which is little changed since Paul Thomas 
rightly pointed out in his 1975 paper, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner,” that The German Ideology: 
has rarely been read in its entirety; the long section Marx devoted to a phrase-by-phrase dissection 
of Max Stirner's Der Einzige und sein Eigenthum, in particular, has been almost completely 
ignored. […] The task remains both to credit Marx's critique of Stirner with the importance it 
deserves, and to consider this critique in its context. (Thomas, “Karl Marx and Max Stirner”, pg. 
159) 
  
In The Ego and Its Own, Stirner rejects all morality on the basis that it demands the 
sacrifice of the individual for a good that is not his own. Of course, communism is included in 
this category of theories that posit a “good cause” for which the individual must sacrifice 
himself46. Stirner discovers that every “good cause,” which has been thought to be a good in 
                                                 
46 Nicholas Churchich seems to concur with Stirner's critique of Marx's communism. Churchich writes, “While it is 
debatable whether Marx is an individualist or an anti-individualist, in The German Ideology he definitely argues 
for the primacy and supremacy of collectivism. Like Rousseau, he starts with individualism but ends with the 
sacrifice of the individual to the collective and of private interests to the interests of the whole” (Churchich, 
Marxism and Morality, p.165). Churchich does not provide a clear argument for this view, but it seems to me that 
his reason for holding it is that he rejects Marx's claim that “abstract egoism” is a historical phenomenon 
produced by particular social and economic conditions, and not a necessary and ineliminable feature of human 
nature. Churchich writes that “Marx has failed to trace egoism to its real source within the personality of the 
human individual himself. He has also failed to understand that it is only by man's own moral effort that the 
harmonisation of self-interest and common interests is possible. The centre of man's moral and social life must 
be found within the self rather than outside it” (Churchich, Marxism and Morality, p.164). If that all is true, then 
Marx's solution to the antagonism between individual and society would indeed be unsatisfactory. If Stirnerian 
egoism is an ineliminable part of human nature, then all the social transformations in the world could not resolve 
the conflict between such egoistic individuals, and the interests of the community taken as a whole, and so 
realizing social, communal goods would indeed mean violating the private interests of Stirnerian egoists. 
However, 1) it strikes me as somewhat disingenuous to attribute to Marx the view that he espouses the sacrifice 
of the individual, because Marx pointedly does not think that egoism is a necessary feature of human beings, and 
argues that the transition to the sort of socialist society he espouses would be a transition in which this egoism 
fades away as an aspect of human life, and 2) Churchich means to put the burden of proof onto Marx to show 
that human nature is plastic and adaptable, but it seems to me that it is Churchich who is operating with the much 
more robust and “thick” conception of human nature, and so what we need in order to agree with him that Marx's 
communism must necessarily involve the sacrifice of the individual's interests, is a very good argument to show 
that it can never be possible for human beings to exist without Stirnerian egoism. When Churchich does attempt 
to give such an argument, he refers to something that is much like a soul—the immutable “personality of the 
human individual himself.” Elsewhere, he writes that “Moral values, it must be recognised, are rooted in the 
endeavour of personal spirits and without this endeavour they could not be sustained” (Churchich, Marxism and 
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itself, is actually an egoistic cause, seeking its own good. (Apparently, causes are quite capable 
of engaging in their own self-directed activity, not to mention, of duping human beings into 
servitude.) For Stirner, the human pursuit of a “good cause” is always little more than a new 
brand of sacrifice and self-denial. Therefore, since every cause is itself an “egoistic cause,” 
individuals should take the place of their own “good causes,” and pursue only the narrowest self-
interest. Stirner writes: 
What is not supposed to be my concern! First and foremost the good cause, then God's cause, the 
cause of mankind, of truth, of freedom, of humanity, of justice; further, the cause of my people, 
my prince, my fatherland; finally, even the cause of mind and a thousand other causes. Only my 
cause is never to be my concern. […] My concern is neither the divine nor the human, not the true, 
good, just, free, etc., but solely what is mine [das Meinige], and it is not a general one, but is—
unique [einzig], as I am unique. Nothing is more to me than myself! (Stirner, The Ego and Its 
Own, p.5-7) 
 
Stirner's writings might have been dismissed at the time of their publication, had they not 
been quite so effective against their principal target: the ethical humanism of Ludwig Feuerbach. 
Feuerbach famously argued in The Essence of Christianity that “God” was merely an abstraction 
and personification of man's qualities. “The Divine Being,” he wrote, “is nothing other than the 
being of man himself, or rather, the being of man abstracted from the limits of the individual 
man or the real, corporeal man, and objectified, i.e., contemplated and worshiped as another 
being, as a being distinguished from his own”47 (Feuerbach, The Fiery Brook, p.111). The 
oppressive, alienating nature of religion would be overcome once God was replaced by “Man” as 
                                                                                                                                                             
Morality, p.99). Churchich is openly hostile to materialism, at one point even taking on a rather suspicious tone 
with regard to Marx and Engels' belief in evolution, “Assuming that men are the direct descendants of creatures 
which in the form of their bodies and brains were similar to apes, Engels indicates [...]” (Churchich, Marxism 
and Morality, p. 98). It seems to me that positing the existence of a “human personality” or of “personal spirits” 
which make Stirnerian egoism impossible to abolish involves much more controversial and tendentious 
assumptions than any that Marx can be accused of making.  
47  Ludwig Feuerbach, George Eliot (tr.), The Fiery Brook: selected writings of Ludwig Feuerbach Anchor Books, 
1972. 
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a divinity for himself, and human beings shed their pious attitude toward the abstraction, God, 
and took up a new one toward the abstraction, Man, recognizing that what had previously been 
regarded as a superhuman being was in fact only an objectification and deification of human 
qualities. Through the adoption of this new correct idea, “what is regarded as atheism today,” 
namely, the denial of the existence of God, “will be religion tomorrow” (Feuerbach, The Fiery 
Brook, p.130), a religion of Man. But Thomas 1975 is very clear in explaining the seriousness of 
the challenge Stirner posed to this view: 
The weakness in Feuerbach's argument that Stirner seizes upon is rooted in Feuerbach's 
conception of man's divinity, not as something man had to build or to create, but as something to 
be regained at the level of consciousness. Once it is regained, man must by implication give way 
before his new-found divinity. Stirner maintained that "divinity" will be as oppressive and 
burdensome a taskmaster as any other spirit or collectivity to which individuals, historically, have 
succumbed. […] Feuerbach's celebrated reversal of subject and predicate--his substitution of man 
for God as the agent of divinity--changes nothing; mankind as a collectivity is just as oppressive 
and sacred as God, because the real individual continues to be related to it in a religious manner. 
(Thomas 1975, p.161-2) 
 
Feuerbach's humanism was developed to solve the problem of alienation, but in fact it only 
seemed to reproduce the problem, this time with the abstraction “Man” raised to the level of a 
divinity. Stirner argued that Feuerbach's humanism simply replaced a religious fear of God, and 
a Christian ethic of self-renunciation, with a religious sacrifice of the individual for the good of 
abstract “Man.” Stirner rejected the problem of alienation, and also any quest for personal 
development or self-improvement, on the grounds that these cause individuals to adopt a 
religious, self-denying attitude to their possible, unalienated, better selves. Even to suggest that 
individuals should develop their own talents and capacities is to suggest that they sacrifice 
themselves in the interest of an alien “good cause.” 
Marx (as did many of the Young Hegelians) recognized the importance of Stirner's book 
as a critique of Feuerbach's ethical humanism. A mere change in thought would not resolve the 
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problem of alienation or do away with the self-renunciation of the individual which was 
characteristic of religious practice. However, Stirner himself made the same mistakes he accused 
Feuerbach of, lapsing into idealism and attributing to “causes” powers over human beings which 
they simply could not have (as though it were really the “causes,” the “fixed ideas,” that had led 
human beings astray, and not the real relations between human beings that had given rise to these 
ideas in the first place). Accordingly, Stirner's proposed solution to the problem was one that 
could be carried out entirely in the realm of thought: individuals had simply to choose to pursue 
their own narrow self-interest as an egoistic cause.  “In the final analysis,” Marx writes, Stirner: 
arrives merely at an impotent moral injunction that everybody should himself obtain satisfaction 
and carry out punishment. He believes Don Quixote's assurance that by a mere moral injunction he 
can without more ado convert the material forces arising from the division of labour into personal 
forces. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:342-3) 
  
Marx's critique of Stirner's ethical egoism displays a philosophical continuity with his 
explication of the distinction between abstract and concrete individuality in his doctoral 
dissertation, and the statement, “abstract individualism is freedom from being, not freedom in 
being” might be just as at home here as it is in that earlier work. For Stirner, the problem of 
alienation can simply be swept away through a further retreat of the private individual into 
herself as her only cause or concern, which she opposes to social concerns. Mutual dependencies 
and interrelations among human beings are regarded as illusory, at best, and dangerously 
deceptive, at worst. Not only does Stirner's brand of ethical egoism call on the individual to 
embrace asocial behavior and attitudes, but it argues that the individual should satisfy herself at 
her present level of development, whatever that may be, rather than strive to further that 
development. It posits the human person as a static, isolated atom, rather than as a concrete 
individual, developing and existing within society, and for whom the problem of alienation can 
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only be resolved through a transformation of society, brought about through coordinated human 
action aimed at common goals. 
The connection between individual and society in Marx's thought is further clarified in 
Marx's defense of communism against Stirner's charge that communism calls for the 
subordination of individuals to the “good cause” of society. Stirner argues that for communists, 
“Society, from which we have everything, is a new master, a new spook, a new 'supreme being'” 
(Stirner, The Ego and Its Own, p.111), for whom the individual must sacrifice himself. Marx 
answers that far from denigrating the individual, the development of a communist society, and 
the practical activity required to achieve that society, are the only methods by which the well-
being of individuals can actually be pursued, a goal which Stirner's “mere moral injunctions” 
cannot achieve. Stirner is mistaken in believing 
that the communists want to “make sacrifices” for “society”, when they want at most to sacrifice 
existing society; in this case he should describe their consciousness that their struggle is the 
common cause of all people who have outgrown the bourgeois system as a sacrifice that they 
make to themselves. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:213) 
 
Stirner, on the other hand, offers no genuine solution to the real challenges that concrete 
individuals face. He argues against any organized political (much less, revolutionary) activity on 
the grounds that such coordinated, planned action would subordinate the individual to the needs 
of a collective. (Stirner does imagine that individuals might spontaneously form a “Union of 
Egoists” whose purpose is to restrict any social incursion into their egoistic pursuits, but provides 
no explanation as to how such a union might be achieved.) Marx points to the workers' 
movement, a real political movement developing at the time of his writing as a means by which 
the social conditions that limit the ability of individuals to flourish and pursue their own 
development as an end might be abolished. Stirner turns his back on this existing political current 
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and retreats into the realm of ideas, thereby depriving himself of any genuine explanation of how 
the problem of alienation might be solved. 
2.1.3 Conclusion of Section on Individuality in Marx's Early Writings 
In this section, I have argued that while Marx rejects abstract individualism, he theorizes 
concrete individuality throughout his early writings, including The German Ideology. The 
distinction between the two ways of conceptualizing human individuals can be understood in 
large part as a distinction between methodological idealism and methodological materialism in 
understanding human social existence. Abstract individualism, Marx writes, suffers from the fact 
that it proceeds from the self-conception of bourgeois actors, taking for granted their self-
understanding as essentially autonomous persons whose ability to satisfy their egoistic interests 
is limited by the existence of other, competitive and equally autonomous individuals. However, 
from a materialist point of view, it is clear to see that these bourgeois atoms exist only in thought; 
in reality, human individuality can only emerge and develop in and through society, which is not 
merely some necessary evil erected and tolerated in order to keep the competing atoms at bay. 
Rather, it is the necessary condition for the development of human beings who exist not merely 
as what Marx later calls “herd animals” or as exemplars of the species, but rather as real, 
concrete individuals who interact with the natural and social world in increasingly diverse ways. 
In any case, I would certainly disagree with the claim made by Nicholas Churchich in his book, 
Marxism and morality: a critical examination of Marxist ethics: “in The German Ideology 
[Marx] definitely argues for the primacy and supremacy of collectivism. Like Rousseau, he starts 
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with individualism but ends with the sacrifice of the individual to the collective and of private 
interests to the interests of the whole”48. 
On the model of human beings as essentially competitive atoms, personal freedom is, 
first and foremost, having relations in which the influence of society upon the individual is as 
attenuated as possible. (Think here of Isaiah Berlin's identification of purely negative freedom as 
the only politically or morally valuable freedom, a freedom from the influence or the claims of 
other individuals who likewise pursue their own narrow self-interest49. But as Marx argues in 
the passage from The Holy Family which I cited earlier in this chapter, “Every activity and 
property of his being, every one of his vital urges, becomes a need, a necessity, which his self-
seeking transforms into seeking for other things and human beings outside him” (The Holy 
Family, MECW 4:120). The desire for self-realization and for the satisfying of one's own needs 
is not a desire for fewer or less significant relationships to other human beings. In practice, it is 
rather a desire for more and richer connections and interactions with the world outside of oneself, 
including with other individuals. As we will see throughout this study and especially in later 
chapters, one of Marx's most trenchant critiques of class society and of capitalism in particular is 
that human beings are actually much less able to satisfy their needs and to freely direct their lives 
than they would be in a society in which decisions about how society is to be arranged and how 
its resources are to be used were made socially and democratically, and in a conscious and 
planned manner. Indeed, a real development of human individuality, according to Marx, can only 
be made possible through massive encroachments on the “individual rights” of bourgeois 
                                                 
48  Nicholas Churchich, Marx and Morality: a critical examination of Marxist ethics James Clarke & Co., 1994 
p.165. 
49  See Isaiah Berlin, Four Essays on Liberty, Oxford University Press, 1969. 
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property owners to direct social resources according to their own private, egoistic needs and free 
from social interference. 
In the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, Marx writes that a scientific 
approach to understanding human existence will require an awareness and an analysis of the 
“rich human being” who “is simultaneously the human being in need of a totality of human 
manifestations of life--the man in whom his own realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need” 
(Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:304). Years later, in the Grundrisse, 
Marx refers to this process of self-realization as “the development of the rich individuality which 
is as all-sided in its production as it is in its consumption” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:251). Human 
beings in class society, Marx argues, are in various ways hampered and limited in their ability to 
pursue their own realization—their own free and full development, the satisfaction of their 
expanding needs and the proliferation of their powers—as an end. In the following section, in 
which I address Marx's treatment of alienation in his early works, we will investigate the nature 
of these limitations further and examine how Marx thinks they can be overcome in a transition to 
a communist society. 
2.2 ALIENATION 
Alienation, in its most basic form, is a condition in which human existence takes on a character 
that is at odds with human nature. Otherwise put, in alienation, human appearance is not 
reconciled with human essence. Although human beings are essentially social beings who 
produce their own existence through conscious, purposive activity in the labor process, when 
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human beings are alienated from their essence, this process in which they consciously and 
purposively direct and produce their own existence is frustrated. Human beings' products—
material, social, and intellectual—take on a foreign and hostile character. Instead of furthering 
human aims, in alienation, human aims are thwarted by their own products. The products seem to 
exist independently, as though their emergence and development were not determined by human 
activity. The fact that these things have been produced through human activity, and can be 
controlled and directed through that activity, is partly or entirely obscured. Alienation is not only 
an inversion of the relationship between human beings and their products, but it is also a 
condition in which human beings are alienated from their essence as social beings who produce 
their own environment and reproduce their own existence through labor. 
Marx describes numerous instances of alienation. A factory worker whose job is to play 
assistant to a machine, making its “activity” more efficient and ensuring that its processes unfold 
smoothly, is alienated in numerous ways, one of which is that here the machine seems truly 
active, while the worker is little more than an appendage to it. Economic laws of supply and 
demand appear to be responsible for the thousands of people thrown out of work when a business 
shuts down. But those laws themselves are simply the abstract expression of an assembly of 
social relations which could be fundamentally transformed through the conscious and rational 
intervention of human beings into their own economic and historical development. In religion, 
myths and characters that human beings have created appear as forces that exist independently 
from human beings and direct their lives. And while human beings have created these characters, 
in religious belief this relation is inverted, so that human beings believe that it is the characters 
who have created them. 
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Alienation is not unique to capitalist society; rather, it has been a feature of all class 
societies. But under capitalism, alienation has been developed and sharpened to an extent not 
reached in those earlier societies. As Marx writes in the 1844 Manuscript, “Rent of Land,” it is 
necessary that the “romantic” appearance of feudal relations 
[…] be abolished--that landed property, the root of private property, be dragged completely into 
the movement of private property and that it become a commodity; that the rule of the proprietor 
appear as the undisguised rule of private property, of capital, freed of all political tincture; that the 
relationship between proprietor and worker be reduced to the economic relationship of exploiter 
and exploited; that all [...] personal relationship between the proprietor and his property cease, 
property becoming merely objective, material wealth; that the marriage of convenience should 
take the place of the marriage of honour with the land; and that the land should likewise sink to the 
status of a commercial value, like man. It is essential that that which is the root of landed property-
-filthy self-interest--make its appearance, too, in its cynical form. It is essential that the immovable 
monopoly turn into the mobile and restless monopoly, into competition; and that the idle 
enjoyment of the products of other people's blood and sweat turn into a bustling commerce in the 
same commodity. Lastly, it is essential that in this competition landed property, in the form of 
capital, manifest its dominion over both the working class and the proprietors themselves who are 
either being ruined or raised by the laws governing the movement of capital. The medieval 
proverb nulle terre sans seigneur is thereby replaced by that other proverb, l'argent n'a pas de 
maître, wherein is expressed the complete domination of dead matter over man. (“Rent of Land,” 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:266) 
 
Under capitalism, the economic tendency is for absolutely everything to be converted 
into a commodity—something that is up for sale and potentially alienable. This includes human 
beings' own capacity to perform labor, as the majority of human beings are compelled to take 
their labor-power to market. (And as United States Representative Steven King recently stated, 
arguing on the floor of the House of Representatives against wage protections for workers, 
“Labor is a commodity just like corn or beans or oil or gold, and the value of it needs to be 
determined by the competition, supply and demand in the workplace50.” He was roundly—and 
rightly—criticized for justifying laissez-faire economic policies with this comment. However, it 
would be quite wrong to ignore or deny that Rep. King made a very succinct and accurate, if 
                                                 
50 Political Correction, http://politicalcorrection.org/blog/201106020015 Retrieved: July 6, 2011. 
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brutal, statement of a central principle of capitalist production. It is merely the approving 
formulation of what Marx already mentioned in 1844: that in capitalism, “the worker's existence 
is […] brought under the same condition as the existence of every other commodity” 
(Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:65). 
The appearance of human beings as atomized individuals striving for the satisfaction of 
mere “egoistic need” also develops hand in hand with the expansion and sharpening of 
alienation. As the Hungarian Marxist philosopher, Istvan Mészáros, writes, in capitalist society, 
Alienation is therefore characterized by the universal extension of 'saleability' (i.e. the 
transformation of everything into commodity); by the conversion of human beings into “things” so 
that they could appear as commodities on the market (in other words: the 'reification' of human 
relations); and by the fragmentation of the social body into 'isolated individuals' (vereinzelte 
Einzelnen) who pursued their own limited, particularistic aims 'in servitude to egoistic need', 
making a virtue out of their selfishness in their cult of privacy51. 
 
To satisfy one's needs in capitalist society, one requires money. And whether capitalist or 
worker, in order to make money, one has to sell something. Marx writes in “On the Jewish 
Question”: 
Selling [Veräußerung] is the practical aspect of alienation [Entäußerung]. Just as man, as long as 
he is in the grip of religion, is able to objectify his essential nature only by turning it into 
something alien, something fantastic, so under the domination of egoistic need he can be active 
practically, and produce objects in practice, only by putting his products, and his activity, under 
the domination of an alien being, and bestowing the significance of an alien entity – money – on 
them. (On the Jewish Question, MECW 3:174) 
 
However, the sale of labor-power to satisfy private, “egoistic” needs is particularly 
alienating in that “Estranged labour reverses this relationship [between conscious being and 
species being], so that it is just because man is a conscious being that he makes his life activity, 
his essential being, a mere means to his existence.” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
                                                 
51 Meszaros, Istvan, Marx's Theory of Alienation, p. 35. 
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1844, MECW 3:276). Labor under capitalism alienates the human being from his own essence, 
and changes “the life of the species into a means of individual life” (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:276) insofar as man's essential nature as a member of the species 
Homo sapiens, his ability to labor, is converted into a commodity to be sold in order to satisfy 
the private, egoistic needs of the individual. It is this inversion which Marx argues would (and 
should) be set aright in the transition to a communist society. 
I devote the bulk of the present section to a discussion of the alienation of workers 
through the sale of their labor-power. However, both worker and capitalist are alienated under 
capitalist society, a point which it is crucial not to ignore. According to Marx, everyone who 
lives under capitalism lives in a society governed by anarchic laws and processes that operate 
beyond anyone's control (again, think here of the economic laws of supply and demand which 
not only determine the fate of the worker, but also dictate to the capitalist what and how much is 
to be produced, and under what conditions). Under capitalism, both workers and capitalists take 
part in human activity that is directed at the accumulation of profit as its highest end, and are 
therefore alienated insofar as they fail to recognize human development (the realization of 
human essence as an active adaptation to the environment through the labor process, and the 
ongoing and limitless development of human powers) as the highest aim for human beings and to 
engage in practices that reflect that status. 
The question arises, then, of why, if both capitalist and worker are alienated in capitalist 
society, does Marx focus on the working class as a potentially revolutionary force in society, and 
not on the capitalists who apparently hold so much more power? The answer is twofold. First, 
Marx argues that because of their role in production, workers are uniquely positioned to redirect 
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society's resources and make human development the conscious aim of human production. 
Capitalism socializes the labor process, prompting relations of solidarity and cooperation to 
develop among workers—it is precisely the further development of such relations that would 
help contribute to the production of a society based on human solidarity and democratic control 
of the means of production. Relatedly, while it is not possible for every person to be a capitalist, 
it is possible to have a society in which every person is a worker. The worker's conditions of 
existence are generalizable in a manner that would allow for the abolition of class society (for 
everyone to be a member of the same class is for there to be no classes at all). And Marx argues 
that it is the abolition of class society, together with a preservation and further development of 
the productive capacities developed in capitalism, that can provide the material basis for the 
abolition of alienation. 
Secondly, workers and capitalists both experience alienation, but they experience it in 
decidedly different ways. As Marx writes in The Holy Family: 
The propertied class and the class of the proletariat present the same human self-estrangement. But 
the former class feels at ease and strengthened in this self-estrangement, it recognises 
estrangement as its own power and has in it the semblance of a human existence. The latter feels 
annihilated in estrangement; it sees in it its own powerlessness and the reality of an inhuman 
existence. It is, to use an expression of Hegel, in its abasement the indignation at that abasement, 
an indignation to which it is necessarily driven by the contradiction between its human nature and 
its condition of life, which is the outright, resolute and comprehensive negation of that nature. 
(The Holy Family, MECW 4:36) 
 
It is this indignation and awareness of her own abasement that impels the worker to abolish the 
conditions in which she exists and to forge new ones in which her human nature is affirmed and 
expressed, rather than “outright, resolutely and comprehensively negated.” And as Marx writes 
in his “Comments on James Mill”: 
Labour to earn a living involves: 1) estrangement and fortuitous connection between labour and 
the subject who labours; 2) estrangement and fortuitous connection between labour and the object 
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of labour; 3) that the worker's role is determined by social needs which, however, are alien to him 
and a compulsion to which he submits out of egoistic need and necessity, and which have for him 
only the significance of a means of satisfying his dire need, just as for them he exists only as a 
slave of their needs; 4) that to the worker the maintenance of his individual existence appears to be 
the purpose of his activity and what he actually does is regarded by him only as a means; that he 
carries on his life's activity in order to earn means of subsistence. Hence the greater and the more 
developed the social power appears to be within the private property relationship, the more 
egoistic, asocial and estranged from his own nature does man become. (Comments on James Mill, 
MECW 3:220) 
 
The working class, because of its position in capitalist society, is both capable of overthrowing 
the existing relations of production and, because of its experience of capitalism, can be rationally 
motivated to do so on the basis of its economic interests. 
It is true that throughout most of the history of capitalist society, we do not see the 
overwhelming majority of workers consciously struggling together to bring about communism. 
However, workers do attempt, in various ways, to resist the oppressive conditions of capitalist 
society. They do so, for instance, when they strike against low wages, demand a shorter 
workday, or fight to keep their pensions. And, at crucial points, workers can and do become 
revolutionary. Marx examines the history of those working class struggles as well as the 
economic, political, and social context in which they are waged. He also develops a conception 
of human nature and of human needs that is abstracted out of the real existence of individual 
human beings throughout history. Looking at human needs, and analyzing the content of 
workers' demands and determining what sort of society would be necessary in order for these 
needs and demands to be met, Marx argues that these needs and these demands point to the need 
for human beings to achieve a communist society. 
Although as I have noted, there are a number of forms of alienation, in the present 
section, I focus on Marx's discussion of alienated labor in capitalist society. Much of Marx's 
early remarks about human alienation and alienated labor in particular are contained in The 
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Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, and so I give special attention to that group of 
writings. 
 In the manuscript titled “Estranged Labor,” Marx writes that “The alienation of the 
worker in his product means not only that his labor becomes an object, an external existence, but 
that it exists outside him, independently, as something alien to him, and that it becomes a power 
on its own confronting him” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:272). 
In unalienated production, a person's products would be a confirmation and expression of 
individuality and free activity, and ability to appropriate and transform nature to achieve human 
ends. However, under capitalism, the worker's own product seems to him like an enemy, because 
it is produced not in accordance with the worker's teleological goal-positing but rather in 
accordance with the economic laws of supply and demand, which operate in spite of him. As a 
commodity, the product becomes added to the capitalist's store of “dead labor”, of capital. 
Possessed now of a mass of stored-up accumulated labor, the capitalist is in a position to exercise 
even greater control over workers. Production appears to worsen the worker's lot, rather than to 
improve it. The capitalist who can sell off his supply of wares in order to satisfy his needs is in a 
much better position to wait out a strike than is the worker who has nothing to sell but his own 
labor-power, which he cannot store but must constantly sell in order to satisfy his needs. As a 
result, “The worker becomes an ever cheaper commodity the more commodities he creates. The 
devaluation of the world of men is in direct proportion to the increasing value of the world of 
things” (MECW 3:272). 
If the result of labor under capitalism is the alienation of the worker in his product, then, 
Marx reasons, the activity of labor itself must be a process of active alienation, since “the 
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product is after all but the summary of the activity, of production” (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:274). He writes that labor under capitalism is active alienation in 
several respects: 
First, the fact that labour is external to the worker, i. e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; 
that in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but 
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins 
his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside 
himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at 
home. His labour is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labour. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character 
emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labour is 
shunned like the plague. External labour, labour in which man alienates himself, is a labour of 
self-sacrifice, of mortification. Lastly, the external character of labour for the worker appears in 
the fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does not belong to him, that in it he 
belongs, not to himself, but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human 
imagination, of the human brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of 
him--that is, operates as an alien, divine or diabolical activity--so is the worker's activity not his 
spontaneous activity. It belongs to another; it is the loss of his self.  (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:274) 
 
In this description of the character of labor, Marx turns his attention from the worker's 
product as accumulated or “dead” labor, to the character of the labor process itself. Labor, Marx 
thinks, is in reality the essence of free human activity and a process through which human nature 
can be fully realized. However, under capitalism, labor is so odious that the worker performs 
labor only because through the sale of his labor-power he can satisfy his private needs. Insofar as 
the worker's labor-power is not his own, and belongs to a foreign power (the capitalist), labor 
appears as a denial and a sacrifice of the worker's existence, and as something to be studiously 
avoided whenever possible. 
Because labor takes on such an unattractive character, instead of recognizing the labor 
process as the essence of human activity, workers feel that they are truly themselves and truly 
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human only when they are at leisure or satisfying those needs which they have in common with 
animals. 
As a result, therefore, man (the worker) only feels himself freely active in his animal functions – 
eating, drinking, procreating, or at most in his dwelling and in dressing-up, etc.; and in his human 
functions he no longer feels himself to be anything but an animal. What is animal becomes human 
and what is human becomes animal. 
Certainly eating, drinking, procreating, etc., are also genuinely human functions. But taken 
abstractly, separated from the sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate 
ends, they are animal functions. (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:275) 
 
In the Introduction to this study, I discussed the distinction between natural being and 
social being. Insofar as humans are natural, biological beings, they have their natural needs more 
or less in common with other mammals. Their biological make-up is such that in order for the 
human species to persist and to flourish, human beings must have their biological needs for food, 
water, housing, and so on, satisfied, and they must continue to propagate themselves as a species 
through sexual reproduction. Human beings are distinct from other natural beings, however, in 
that they satisfy these natural needs socially, through the labor process. Human beings, through 
socially mediated labor, intervene consciously and purposively into their environments in order 
to satisfy their natural needs and in so doing, transform both their environments and themselves, 
produce new forms of social interaction, and develop new powers and in turn, new social, 
historically arisen needs. They produce themselves not merely as natural, but also as social 
beings. In unalienated labor, human beings recognize this continual process of satisfying social, 
historically arisen needs and developing new powers as an end in itself, the realization of human 
beings' essential nature as natural and social beings who satisfy their needs through labor. 
In alienated labor, natural, biological needs, instead of being regarded as the ontological 
basis for a limitless development of social, historically arisen needs, are “separated from the 
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sphere of all other human activity and turned into sole and ultimate ends.” The powers which 
have been developed in and through human history—capacities for language, for theorizing, for 
engineering, and so on—are converted into little more than new ways of satisfying man's natural, 
biological needs and of serving his “animal functions.” As a result of the odious character of 
labor under capitalism, workers subjectively experience themselves in their “animal functions” 
as free and active, and experience themselves in their distinctively human functions as little more 
than animals. 
While Marx describes a subjective experience of alienation in labor under capitalism, it is 
important to emphasize that alienation is not merely subjective. It is an objective relationship 
between human beings and their essential nature as social beings who produce their own 
existence through the labor process. In alienation, this relationship is inverted and disturbed. The 
worker's subjective experience of alienation from his own essence as a conscious and freely 
active being is born out of the real condition in which his activity is not his own. Marx writes of 
the alienation of labor: 
This relation is the relation of the worker to his own activity as an alien activity not belonging to 
him; it is activity as suffering, strength as weakness, begetting as emasculating, the worker's own 
physical and mental energy, his personal life--for what is life but activity?--as an activity which is 
turned against him, independent of him and not belonging to him. Here we have self-estrangement, 
as previously we had the estrangement of the thing. (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, MECW 3:275)  
 
And if the worker is alienated from his product and from himself, then, Marx argues, these things 
must have been alienated to someone else—to other human beings. “Every self-estrangement of 
man, from himself and from nature, appears in the relation in which he places himself and nature 
to men other than and differentiated from himself. [...] [The worker] creates the domination of 
the person who does not produce over production and over the product” (Economic and 
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Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:279). Hence what seemed to be a domination of 
things over human beings turns out to be a social relation: the domination of capitalists over 
workers. 
The alienation of the worker's labor results in the possession of that labor by another 
human being. Marx argues that every “self-estrangement” is realized and expressed as a 
relationship between human beings. The worker “creates the domination of the person who does 
not produce over production and over the product” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, MECW 3:279). It is for this reason that the working class alone has the capacity to abolish 
the dominion of man over man and heed the categorical imperative to “overthrow all relations in 
which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being” (Introduction to a Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:182). 
In this section, I have discussed alienation as the separation of human beings from human 
essence, and as a condition in which human beings' products appear to exist and to operate 
independently and in spite of human activity. The alienation of labor, for Marx, has both a 
subjective and an objective character. Workers labor under conditions that are odious and 
oppressive, and find themselves unable to direct their own activity freely, instead being 
compelled to sell their labor-power in order to satisfy their needs. As a result, workers 
subjectively experience work as dehumanizing, and subjectively experience their “animal 
functions” as those in which they are really human and freely active. This subjective experience 
is based in an objective condition in which their labor belongs to and is directed by a foreign 
power: the capitalist. 
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Yet, alienation does not only affect workers. Capitalists also experience alienation, albeit 
in a different form. They experience their decisions as dictated by economic laws of supply and 
demand that appear to operate independently of human actors. However, these economic laws 
can allow them to expand their financial wealth, and so capitalists tend to experience alienation 
as friendly and affirming, and as a phenomenon which affords them some “semblance of a 
human existence,” to return to Marx's remarks in The Holy Family. 
It is the sale of labor-power and the proletariat's active self-alienation that produces 
alienation for both capitalist and worker. Hence, Marx writes, “the emancipation of the workers 
contains universal human emancipation” (MECW 3:280). The workers cannot abolish their own 
alienation as a class without also abolishing a society based on the separation of human beings 
from their essential human nature, and abolishing the domination of one man over another. In the 
following section, in which I address Marx's treatment of rights in his early work, we will 
explore these themes further and understand what Marx means when he writes that “only in the 
name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay claim to universal dominance,” 
and that it can only do so at “a moment in which its demands and rights are truly the rights and 
demands of society itself” (Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Law, MECW 3:184). 
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2.3 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF RIGHTS 
Whether it has been termed a regrettable oversight or something of a scandal, it has been noted 
that Marx does not seem to justify communism by appealing to rights52. Indeed, this supposed 
indifference to rights is sometimes cited as evidence of the amoralism of Marxist theory. But 
throughout his early work, Marx presents a critique of rights in the modern state that 
demonstrates the inadequacy of bourgeois rights theory to address the needs of human beings. 
His rejection of bourgeois rights theory is in fact informed by his view that the satisfaction of 
human needs and the development and fulfillment of individual persons is the highest aim for 
human beings.  The cornerstone of his critique is that bourgeois rights theory relies on an 
account of individuals as atomized competitors with rival interests, as well as that it is a holdover 
from the system of entitlements in feudal society, and functions in the modern state to protect the 
privilege of the bourgeoisie. This role, Marx argues, is not an accidental one, but rather part and 
parcel of rights as such. Therefore, rights are an artifact of class society and the conditions of 
scarcity, competition, and domination that typify relations among human beings under 
capitalism. They would have no application in a society in which “the free development of each 
is the condition for the development of all” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:506), 
nor can they justify the transition to such a society. So much the worse, Marx thinks, for rights. 
Marx's first major work after his doctoral dissertation is a critique of Hegel's 
Rechtsphilosophie. At the writing of the Rechtsphilosophie, designed to be an explanation of the 
nature of morality, Hegel held that “what is rational is actual”—that is, that the existing Prussian 
                                                 
52  Allen Wood, for instance, makes this claim in his 1981 book, Karl Marx. 
  75 
state represented the most rational form of society, and the resolution of all of the contradictions 
that had propelled the development of history up until its formation; therefore, no further 
political development was either desirable or possible. In his Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of 
Right, Marx argues that instead of providing an objective account of the nature of right and 
morality as such, Hegel had merely described the structure of the Prussian state, and asserted it to 
be the highest level of social organization possible. However, this assertion of Hegel's 
overlooked the contradictions that still existed within the state. Marx argues: 
Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state as it is, but rather for 
presenting what is as the essence of the state. The claim that the rational is actual is contradicted 
precisely by an irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts and asserts 
the contrary of what it is53.” (Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', Cambridge University 
Press, 1970, p.64) 
 
However, it must be emphasized that Marx argues it will be crucial to penetrate more 
deeply in his assessment of reality than Hegel had—not to sweep Hegel's work aside altogether. 
Marx regards Hegel's work as extremely fruitful, if not for reasons that Hegel himself had in 
mind, observing somewhat wryly that “It was a great though unconscious service of Hegel to 
have assigned modern morality its true position” (Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:108). Hegel's Rechtsphilosophie did succeed, albeit perhaps 
                                                 
53 Here I have preferred the translation found in the 1970 Cambridge University Press translation of Marx's 
Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right'. Marx's original German text reads as follows: “Hegel ist nicht zu 
tadeln, weil er das Wesen des modernen Staats schildert, wie es ist, sondern weil er das, was ist, für das Wesen 
des Staats ausgibt. Daß das Vernünftige wirklich ist, beweist sich eben im Widerspruch der 
unvernünftigen Wirklichkeit, die an allen Ecken das Gegenteil von dem ist, was sie aussagt, und das Gegenteil 
von dem aussagt, was sie ist” (Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels - Werke. (Karl) Dietz Verlag, Berlin. Band 1. 
Berlin/DDR. 1976. p.267.) 
 The MECW translates the selection thus: “Hegel is not to be blamed for depicting the nature of the modern state 
as it is, but for presenting that which is as the nature of the state. That the rational is actual is proved precisely in 
the contradiction of irrational actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts, and asserts the 
contrary of what it is” (MECW 3:63). 
 “Essence” strikes me as a more natural and less ambiguous translation of “Wesen” than does “nature,” which is 
what appears in the MECW translation. 
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unwittingly, in demonstrating the manner in which the activity of the modern state is given a 
moral cover and justification. The government of the Prussian state declared itself to be 
concerned with public affairs, and yet the bureaucracy safeguarded its own interests at the 
expense of the public. “The Estates are the sanctioned, legal lie of constitutional states, the lie 
that the state is the people's interest or the people the interest of the state” (Critique of Hegel's 
'Philosophy of Right', Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.65)54. This contradiction between the 
appearance of the modern state and its actual character belies the claim that it could be rational, 
and moreover, suggests that in order to make a scientific appraisal of the state, it will not be 
sufficient to evaluate only its ostensible, stated goals. It will be necessary to examine the real 
activity of the state, and its actual impact and consequences for the human beings who live and 
are affected by it. 
The core of Marx's analysis of rights is his analysis of the relationship between right and 
privilege. For Marx, rights are a political expression of economic relations. Because the form 
that the state takes is determined by the dominant economic form of a society, and by the 
safeguards needed to protect the privileges of the class upon whom the state is based, there is a 
tendency to transform into morally significant rights what already exist as privileges held by the 
ruling class. In addition to his critique of the Prussian state, it is largely in reference to the 
National Assembly of France's 1789 Declaration of the Universal Rights of Man that Marx 
                                                 
54 Again, the Cambridge University Press translation is far preferable to the MECW translation. Marx's original 
German text reads: “Das ständische Element ist die sanktionierte, gesetzliche Lüge der konstitutionellen Staaten, 
daß der Staat das Interesse des Volks oder daß das Volkdas Staatsinteresse ist” (Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels - 
Werke. (Karl) Dietz Verlag, Berlin. Band 1. Berlin/DDR. 1976. p.276) The MECW translation reads: “The 
estates element is the sanctioned, legal lie of constitutional states, the lie that the state is the nation's interest, or 
that the nation is the interest of the state” (MECW 3:65). Translating the word “Volk” as “nation,” instead of 
“people,” is problematic here, as Marx's aim is to distinguish between the state interests and the interests of the 
individual persons living under the state. To translate “Volk” as “nation” obscures this meaning. 
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develops his critique of rights, pointing out that the rights of man are historically arisen and 
contingent, not, as the Declaration asserts, “natural, inalienable, and sacred.” 
 Hans-Peter Jaeck writes in his study, Die französische bürgerliche Revolution von 1789 
im Frühwerk von Karl Marx (1843-1846) (The French Bourgeois Revolution of 1789 in the Early 
Writings of Karl Marx): 
Marx saw, as he had expressed in The Holy Family, in the constitutional representative democracy 
that had been created through the revolution of 1830, the present end-product of the “political 
expression” of the bourgeoisie of their own class interests, the official expression of their 
exclusive power, the political recognition of their particular interests55. 
 
The right to private property stands out for Marx as the prime example, the “specific 
mode of existence of privilege, of rights as exceptions” (Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 
Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:109), as the right to property is itself, jus utendi et abutendi56, the 
entitlement to exclusive control over material resources, irrespective of the interests of other 
persons. Similarly, the right to liberty, which is guaranteed by the modern state, is “based not on 
the association of man with man but rather on the separation of man from man. It is the right of 
this separation, the right of the restricted individual, withdrawn into himself. The practical 
application of man’s right to liberty is man’s right to private property” (On the Jewish Question, 
MECW 3:162-3). Marx continues: 
What constitutes man’s right to private property? 
 
                                                 
55 My translation. The original German text reads: “Marx sah, wie er in der „Heiligen Familie“ zum Ausdruck 
brachte, im konstitutionellen Repräsentativstaat, der durch die Revolution von 1830 geschaffen worden war, das 
vorläufige Endprodukt der „politischen Aufklärung“ der Bourgeoisie über ihre eigenen Klasseninteressen, den 
offiziellen Ausdruck ihrer ausschließlichen Macht, die politische Anerkennung ihres besonderen Interesses“ 
(p.65). 
56 “The right to use or abuse.” 
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Article 16. (Constitution of 1793): “The right of property is that which every citizen has of 
enjoying and of disposing at his discretion of his goods and income, of the fruits of his labor and 
industry.” 
 
The right of man to private property is, therefore, the right to enjoy one’s property and to dispose 
of it at one’s discretion (à son gré), without regard to other men, independently of society, the right 
of self-interest. This individual liberty and its application form the basis of civil society. It makes 
every man see in other men not the realization of his own freedom, but the barrier to it. (On the 
Jewish Question, MECW 3:163) 
 
Depicting the rights of man as human rights, as the modern state does, obscures their basis in  
antagonism and egoistic competition. Just as the ancient state had slavery as its economic basis, 
Marx notes in The Holy Family that the modern state is based on capitalism and the man of civil 
society, i.e., “the independent man linked with other men only by the ties of private interest and 
unconscious natural necessity, the slave of labour for gain and of his own as well as other men's 
selfish need” (The Holy Family, MECW 4:113). 
While it is necessary to demand that the rights recognized by the modern state and 
nominally guaranteed to all its citizens are respected and fulfilled, this demand is limited in that 
these rights are themselves formulated to protect privileges which by and large simply do not 
exist for the vast majority of persons. (One might consider, for instance, the gap between the 
formal freedom of speech guaranteed by the United States' constitutional democracy, and the 
actual, relatively meager, resources available to most individuals to disseminate their viewpoints 
in an effective way.) Therefore, when it comes to improving the situation of workers, and 
advancing not just political emancipation, but human emancipation (i.e., not merely negative 
freedom from interference but also positive freedom to access society's resources and develop 
one's capabilities and talents), merely securing the rights guaranteed by the modern state remains 
inadequate.   
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As Marx writes in his essay, “On the Jewish Question,” contrasting what he calls merely 
political emancipation from human emancipation, “The limits of political emancipation are 
evident at once from the fact that the state can free itself from a restriction without man being 
really free from this restriction, that the state can be a free state without man being a free man” 
(On the Jewish Question, MECW 3:152) Here, Marx is referring to the fact that the state may not 
be a religious state, and yet the citizens of the state may remain in the grips of religion and 
remain restricted by it. Further: 
one should be under no illusion about the limits of political emancipation. The division of the 
human being into a public man and a private man, the displacement of religion from the state into 
civil society, this is not a stage of political emancipation but its completion; this emancipation, 
therefore, neither abolished the real religiousness of man, nor strives to do so. (On the Jewish 
Question, MECW 3:155) 
 
In a condition of human, rather than merely political, emancipation, the strict division 
between the public and the private sphere disappears, because the human being is able to act as a 
species-being—his activity is not the activity of an isolated atom, but rather the activity of an 
individual cooperating with other individuals, who has an understanding of himself as a member 
of the species, and who regards other persons as the source of his freedom, not as limiting 
barriers against it. The rights of man do not: 
go beyond egoistic man, beyond man as a member of civil society – that is, an individual 
withdrawn into himself, into the confines of his private interests and private caprice, and separated 
from the community. In the rights of man, he is far from being conceived as a species-being; on 
the contrary, species-like itself, society, appears as a framework external to the individuals, as a 
restriction of their original independence. (On the Jewish Question, MECW 3:164) 
  
However, Marx's analysis of rights is not wholly negative and does not end with his 
observation that rights have their historical origin in the need to provide moral justification for 
existing privileges. Indeed, it is the proletariat's lack of privilege that prefigures a new society, 
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one from which privilege is totally absent. Workers have no private property that allows them to 
compel or direct the labor of other human beings, and therefore, Marx argues, no claims that 
conflict with the ability of other human beings to enjoy access to material resources, if those 
resources are allocated and employed in a social and rational way57. The proletariat satisfies the 
requirement that “only in the name of the universal rights of society can a particular class lay 
claim to universal dominance,” and is “a sphere of society […] claiming no particular right 
because no particular wrong but unqualified wrong is perpetrated on it” (Introduction to a 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:186). 
But none of this is to say that Marx does not see a place for the discussion of rights and 
democratic demands in the pursuit of revolutionary ends. In fact, Marx argues that the appeal to 
rights plays a progressive role in preparing the proletariat to act as a united power. In The 
German Ideology, Marx even goes so far as to complain that Max Stirner, author of The 
Individual and its Property, wrongly denigrates the role that discussion of rights can play in 
motivating and convincing workers to seize power, presenting proletarians as a “'closed society', 
which has only to take the decision of 'seizing' in order the next day to put a summary end to the 
entire hitherto existing world order,” when “in reality, the proletarians arrive at this unity only 
                                                 
57 Of course, workers often do own small-scale private property such as homes, cars, and so on. However, workers 
in general tend not to own much more than what is necessary to satisfy their own needs, construed narrowly. I 
am here contrasting personal private property with private property as capital. Capital is private property that 
gives its owner the ability to control the activity of others and subordinate it to one's own narrow ends. Workers 
may own small amounts of private property, but this ownership does not allow them to purchase the labor-power 
of others or to satisfy their needs by amassing capital. Moreover, workers do not own the means of production or 
society's natural resources and therefore are not in a position to bar other human beings from having access to 
them. 
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through a long process of development in which the appeal to their right also plays a part”58 (The 
German Ideology, MECW, 5:323). 
Communism is the generalization of the situation of the proletariat, and so the 
“dissolution of society existing as a particular class is the proletariat” (Introduction to a 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:186). While Marx argues 
that the proletariat has no “particular right,” he does not mean that it has no rights at all, but 
rather that the rights of proletarians and of people in a transitional socialist society are quite 
distinct in content from the rights of man recognized in bourgeois society. They are rights which 
correspond not to the isolated citizen, guarding his private sphere in a world of competition, but 
rights that correspond to a person who has no claim to private property and who survives and 
develops through cooperation with fellow persons upon whom he shares a mutual dependence. 
So it is a stunning oversimplification to state, as for instance George Brenkert does, that “rights 
are not part of Marx's ethics”59. And I also disagree with R. G. Peffer who writes that one of 
Marx's criticisms “of justice and rights is based on his misconception that all moral theories are 
ideological in the sense that they invariably and necessarily support the social status quo”60  
(Peffer, Marxism, Morality and Social Justice, p.323). Quite the contrary. Marx states: 
When the proletariat demands the negation of private property it merely elevates into a principle 
of society what society has advanced as the principle of the proletariat, and what the proletariat 
already involuntarily embodies as the negative result of society. The proletariat thus has the same 
right relative to the new world which is coming into being as has the German king relative to the 
existing world, when he calls the people his people and a horse his horse61. 
                                                 
58 Emphasis mine. 
59 Brenkert, Marx's Ethics of Freedom, p.89. 
60 I disagree on two counts. I do not think that Marx thinks that rights can never have a progressive content, and I 
also do not think that ideology in general is, for Marx, necessarily reactionary. 
61 Introduction to A Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', Cambridge University Press, 
1970, Cambridge,  pg. 142. Emphasis mine. 
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Nonetheless, Allen Wood, whose 1981 study of Karl Marx's thought has been influential 
in the discussion of Marx's moral views, also argues that “Marx never claims that [goods such as 
physical health, comfort, etc.] ought to be provided to people because they have a right to them” 
(p. 127, Karl Marx). There is perhaps a certain half-truth to the charge. Marx is not in the habit 
of making moral appeals to capitalists, that they recognize the human rights of workers and 
“provide” goods to people. However, he does think that it is the proletariat's very lack of private 
property that entitles them to a society without private property as a defining aspect of social 
existence, a society which is not based on a network of competing entitlements. 
In later works, Marx argues that increasingly sophisticated economic and social 
arrangements can give rise to increasingly sophisticated forms of right, until eventually, a society 
is produced which supersedes rights. Therefore, we will return to the subject of rights in later 
chapters of the present study.  
2.4 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF SEVERAL DOMINANT MORAL THEORIES: 
CHRISTIANITY, KANTIANISM, AND UTILITARIANISM 
Throughout his writings, Marx puts forward a number of critiques of dominant moral theories. 
Christianity, Kantianism, and Utilitarianism are three such theories which receive particular 
attention. Marx argues that these moral theories each depend, in one way or another, on a 
mistaken conception of human nature. Christianity, he charges, sees the realization of human 
essence not in man's rational, conscious and purposive interactions with the natural and social 
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world, aimed at the development of his own powers as an end. Rather, it encourages human 
beings to turn away from the world and to sacrifice. It gives expression to the alienation that 
human beings experience, but defers the hope for an abolition of human alienation to the “world 
beyond,” and conceives of that abolition not as a task for humans, but as a task for a supernatural 
being. Kantianism, Marx writes, depends on a conception of the “free will” that fails to account 
for the fact that human beings do not form their wills in a purely autonomous way, but do so 
within historical conditions that play a determining role in shaping their will, though to greater or 
lesser extents. Marx also argues that Kantian morality accommodates itself too readily to a 
powerlessness of human beings to intervene effectively into reality. And Marx argues that 
Utilitarianism substitutes one relation, that of usefulness, for a great, irreducible diversity of 
human social relations and therefore relies upon a distorted and narrow picture of human social 
being. 
In addition to Marx's criticism that each of these moral theories gets human nature wrong 
in a significant way, Marx also attacks these moral theories because, in different ways, they serve 
to legitimize and bolster capitalism. Over the course of the present section, I will discuss Marx's 
specific arguments for how this is the case. 
Allen Wood, in his book, Karl Marx, argues that Marx's theory of morality bars him from 
making substantive moral judgments which would criticize social relations in an actually existing 
society. According to Wood, Marx sees the role of morality as being purely to uphold and justify 
the status quo. Wood thinks—and his thoughts on the matter have been all too influential—that 
for Marx, any application of morality to criticize the existing state of affairs would be outside of 
the purview of morality (which can only bolster the existing social order) and is therefore 
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factually incorrect. Wood even attributes to Marx the view that it is not possible to coherently 
critique past social systems. 
[...]it is only insofar as moral standards serve the function of sanctioning social relations that they 
exist. Standards which are at odds with prevailing relations do not fulfill the function proper to 
moral standards. Hence they must be not only socially impotent but also wrong, because they are 
at odds with the proper social function of morality. Material production thus provides a basis for 
moral standards, the only real basis Marx thinks they can have. For Marx, as for Hegel, the 
morally rational is determined by the socially actual (Wood, Karl Marx, p.132). 
 
But Marx might have been somewhat startled to learn that his conception of morality is identical 
to Hegel's, since he explicitly rejects exactly the Hegelian view that Wood attributes to him. 
“The claim that the rational is actual,” Marx says, “is contradicted precisely by an irrational 
actuality, which everywhere is the contrary of what it asserts and asserts the contrary of what it 
is”62. In fact, the whole moral outlook Wood ascribes to Marx would have come to him as no 
small surprise, as Marx regularly makes moral criticisms of feudalism and capitalism, as well as 
criticisms of the moral theories that have been developed at both of these economic stages and 
served to justify and provide ideological support to them. 
For instance, Marx explicitly states that the mutual moral condemnations of the feudal 
landowner and the capitalist are both legitimate, justified, and correct: 
the landowner knows the capitalist as his insolent, liberated, enriched slave of yesterday and sees 
himself as a capitalist who is threatened by him. The capitalist knows the landowner as the idle, 
cruel, egotistical master of yesterday; he knows that he injures him as a capitalist, but that it is to 
industry that he owes all his present social significance, his possessions and his pleasures; he sees 
in him a contradiction to free industry and to free capital--to capital independent of every natural 
limitation. This contradiction is extremely bitter, and each side tells the truth about the other. One 
need only read the attacks of immovable on movable property and vice versa to obtain a clear 
picture of their respective worthlessness. (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
MECW, 3:286) 
 
                                                 
62 Karl Marx, Critique of Hegel's “Philosophy of Right,” Cambridge University Press, 1970, p.64. 
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“Movable property claims to have created pure morality,” deriding feudal landed property for 
being marked by “brute, immoral force and serfdom.” The landowner, on the other hand, 
complains that the capitalist is a person “estranged from the community who freely trades it 
away and who breeds […] pauperism, crime, and the dissolution of all social bonds.” When 
Marx argues that both of these indictments are true, he can only be appealing to a standard that 
transcends both of these economic forms. He certainly does endorse, quite explicitly, at least two 
separate moral criticisms that could not be made if applying only the moral standard of the 
economic systems they are meant to be criticisms of. So it is only through a tortured 
interpretation that one could maintain that Marx does not think it is possible to make legitimate 
moral criticisms of an existing economic system, using moral values that condemn and point 
beyond it, rather than support and justify it. 
Wood's understanding of Marx's conception of morality and its role in society is one-
sided and overly simplistic. It ignores that within a class society exists not only the ruling class 
as a dominant force, but also that class that opposes the society and seeks to overcome it. In the 
case of capitalist society, the proletariat is itself a material force militating against capitalism and 
the interests of the capitalist class, and as such has its own ideology, including its own morality, 
which corresponds to its interests in overthrowing the existing society. Indeed, it is only even 
possible for the proletariat to transform society at “a moment in which its demands and rights are 
truly63 those of society itself” (Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of Right', Cambridge University 
Press, 1970, p.140). So not only does the proletariat have its own morality that opposes 
bourgeois morality, but its morality is objective for all human beings because its interests are 
                                                 
63 Emphasis mine. 
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consonant with the interests of all human beings. Thus, Marx writes that the proletariat is “a 
sphere of society […] claiming no particular right because no particular wrong but unqualified 
wrong is perpetrated on it” (Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy 
of Law, MECW 3:186) It is from this point of view that Marx offers his own criticisms of 
capitalist society as well as his criticisms of a range of moral theories. Here, I will discuss his 
criticisms of the moralities which receive the lion's share of his attention in this regard: Christian 
morality, Kantian morality, and Utilitarianism. 
2.4.1 Marx on Christian Morality 
While for the purposes of this study, I focus here on Marx’s critique of the particular morality 
espoused by Christianity, Marx’s criticisms of Christianity are very much of a piece with his 
overall critique of religion, as such. Religion, for Marx, is an expression of the alienation that 
marks human experience in class society. As Marx writes in his 1844 introduction to The 
Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, “This state, this society, produce religion, an inverted 
world-consciousness, because they are an inverted world”64 (Introduction to a Contribution to 
the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:175). Myths and characters that human 
beings create appear as forces that exist independently from human beings, and in a complete 
inversion, are believed to have created human beings. In this way, religion is a symptom of a 
society in which human beings’ labor, and the products of that labor, also confront humans as 
independent entities, determining their existence quite apart from their own ability to intervene. 
                                                 
64 Marx's emphasis. 
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For these reasons, it is not enough to simply criticize religion or provide proofs of its logical 
incoherence or empirical falsity, if the conditions of ignorance and oppression that give rise to it 
are allowed to remain. It is the actual irrationality of human life in class society that gives rise to 
the irrationality codified in religion. At the same time, religion is also often the only consolation 
left to the oppressed. Marx’s critique of religion is not purely negative; rather, he recognizes that, 
as he puts it, “the miserableness of religion is at once the expression of real misery and the 
protest against real misery. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless 
world, just as it is the spirit of spiritless conditions. It is the opium of the people”65. 
Marx, of course, was not alone among the Young Hegelians in criticizing religion. 
Ludwig Feuerbach, Bruno Bauer, and even a turncoat such as Max Stirner all devoted a great 
deal of philosophical attention to the falsity of religion, its reactionary role in holding back 
human progress socially, intellectually, and politically, and the need for religion to be done away 
with. What does separate Marx from the other thinkers in his milieu is Marx's argument that the 
abolition of religion could not be carried out purely in the realm of ideas. The real, oppressive, 
alienating conditions which give rise to religion and find themselves expressed and reflected in 
religion would have to be overthrown. Only then could religion fall away. So Marx's specific 
criticisms of Christian morality must be seen in this light. While religion does itself become a 
material force that determines social existence once it is believed by human beings, religion is 
                                                 
65 My translation from the German, “Das religiöse Elend ist in einem der Ausdruck des wirklichen Elendes und in 
einem die Protestation gegen das wirkliche Elend. Die Religion ist der Seufzer der bedrängten Kreatur, das 
Gemüt einer herzlosen Welt, wie sie der Geist geistloser Zustände ist.” Karl Marx/ Friedrich Engels - Werke. 
(Karl) Dietz Verlag, Berlin. Band 1. Berlin/DDR. 1976. p.378. The standard English Translation in the MECW 
reads, “Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and also the protest against real 
distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of 
spiritless conditions” (Introduction to a Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 
3:175). I think the MECW translation of the first sentence here is not especially exact. 
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not the source of human troubles; rather, it is the other way round. The critique of religion in 
general and of Christianity in particular is necessary not merely as a tactical maneuver in some 
ideological battle, but because it demonstrates and reveals what real change is necessary in the 
material conditions of human beings and in society. “The struggle against religion is therefore 
indirectly a fight against the world of which religion is the spiritual aroma” (MECW 3:175). As 
Marx writes in his Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right: 
The weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be 
overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped 
the masses. Theory is capable of gripping the masses as soon as it demonstrates ad hominem, and 
it demonstrates ad hominem as soon as it becomes radical. To be radical is to grasp the root of the 
matter. But for man, the root is man himself. […] The criticism of religion ends with the teaching 
that man is the highest being for man—hence, with the categoric imperative to overthrow all 
relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, forsaken, despicable being.... (Introduction to a 
Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Law, MECW 3:182) 
 
Marx's opposition to the particular morality espoused by Christianity is based on the fact 
that he sees Christian morality as an ethic of servility and self-denial. As such, it is at odds with a 
moral outlook centered on the development and self-fulfillment of human beings. One of his 
most thorough criticisms of Christian morality in his early work actually appears as an extended 
critique of Christian values as they are represented in Eugene Sue's popular 1843 novel, Les 
Mystères de Paris. This is where we will begin. 
In the last chapters of The Holy Family, Marx critiques the moral lessons drawn by the 
Young Hegelian Szeliga66 from Sue’s novel. The novel is about an aristocrat, Rudolphe, who 
disguises himself as a worker, and “rescues” two working class people from their fates. One of 
these is Marie, a prostitute who recognizes the inhumanity of her situation, but herself is strong 
                                                 
66  This was the pen name of F. Z. Zychlinski. 
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and “preserves a human nobleness of soul” (The Holy Family, MECW 4:168)67.  Marie judges 
her own moral standing by the extent to which she has helped or harmed other human beings, 
and judges her situation as good or bad by the extent to which it helps or hinders her in 
expressing her nature. “She measures her situation in life by her own individuality, her essential 
nature, not by the ideal of what is good” (The Holy Family, MECW 4:170). 
Our hero, Rudolphe, rescues Marie from life in the city and removes her to the 
countryside, placing her under the care of a Madame George. Marie is taught Christian morality, 
and learns that in order to become worthy of her “rescue” she must give herself over to God. 
From this moment Marie is enslaved by the consciousness of sin. In her former most unhappy 
situation in life she was able to develop a lovable, human individuality; in her outward 
debasement she was conscious that her human essence was her true essence. (The Holy Family, 
MECW 4:174) 
She must sacrifice and deny herself, renouncing the joys and satisfactions of earthly life so that 
she might be worthy of heavenly life. She enters a convent and learns not to see other human 
beings as the ground of her fulfillment and satisfaction, but rather to seek validation and approval 
in a supernatural, alien God. She retreats from the world into the life of a convent where she 
eventually dies, fittingly (or in any case, melodramatically) enough, uttering a prayer with her 
last breath. 
Marx's excursion into literary criticism is no mere digression. Where Szeliga presents this 
tale as an excellent bit of moral didactic, Marx means to show that the Christian morality which 
is supposed to redeem those who abide by it “saves” only by destroying the individual person 
                                                 
67 The other is Chourineur, whose rescue Rudolphe accomplishes by inculcating in him a servile manner. This is 
described by Szeliga as Chourineur's transformation into a “moral being” (MECW 4:163). He becomes dog-like 
towards his new master, Rudolphe, even going so far as to say that “Je me sens pour vous, comme qui dirait 
l'attachement d'un bouledogue pour son maître” (MECW 4:164). Szeliga describes this transformation as the 
restoration of Chourineur to mankind, but really, he has become little more than what Marx refers to as a “moral 
bulldog.” 
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who must renounce her earthly existence in exchange for heavenly life. We can recall Marx's 
discussion of the concrete individual in his doctoral dissertation. It is only in relation to the other 
concrete objects that exist in the material world that an individual can find development, 
expression, and existence. Marie’s “Christian consolation,” then, is precisely the annihilation of 
her real life and essence—her death” (The Holy Family, MECW 4:176). The withdrawal from 
the world is the annihilation of individuality and of being. 
It is worthwhile in this context to note Marx's treatment of love which appears earlier in 
The Holy Family. The Young Hegelians inveigh against love on the grounds that it makes 
“sensuous objects” of human beings. Edgar Bauer wrote, “the beloved is important to the lover 
only as this external object of the emotion of his soul, as the object in which he wishes to see his 
selfish feeling satisfied” (The Holy Family, MECW 4:21). Marx and Engels viciously attack this 
view. Other human beings, after all, are external objects. The emotion of love cannot be 
denounced simply on the ground that it causes human beings to recognize others as the 
externally independently existing objects that they are. It is precisely this capacity of human 
beings to love that helps lead them to an understanding of the external, objective world as 
something that exists independently of the individual subject. Marx and Engels write, “love first 
really teaches man to believe in the objective world outside himself” (The Holy Family, MECW 
4:21). Edgar Bauer complains that in loving another person, the lover wishes to see his “selfish 
feeling satisfied.” But if that is true, then it is this love-relation that allows human beings to see 
that they must seek their satisfaction outside of themselves and in the world around them. It 
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causes them to attach importance to human beings. This hardly seems like the worst thing an 
emotion could be accused of68. 
For Marx, this is precisely what is of principal value in the relation of love. It is love that 
allows humans to understand that the satisfaction of their needs does lie in other human beings. 
The other human being becomes an object for his lover, a being with objective, independent 
reality. This is a basic principle in Marx's moral conception and in his philosophy as a whole. 
The interaction between, and mutual dependence upon, fellow human beings is what leads to 
consciousness, language, and in fact forms the entire basis of human social development. In so 
far as Christian morality teaches us to seek love and approval in an alien god rather than in one 
                                                 
68 As a further example of how Marx thinks private property and class society hamper the expression of love as a 
real recognition of the specific qualities of individuals, and as the treatment of individuals in a way 
corresponding to their specific qualities, consider his criticism of primogeniture, in The Holy Family. Hegel 
argues in the Philosophy of Right that the agricultural class is particularly well-suited to political life because its 
ethical life is family life, based on the possession of land, and “its particular members attain their position by 
birth, just as the monarch does” (§305, Philosophy of Right). Marx argues that this cannot be, as family life is 
also the basis of this class's social existence, and therefore it will think of non-familial relations in familial terms. 
“This class,” he argues, “will apply patriarchal laws to a non-patriarchal sphere” (p.95). The material basis of this 
class's standpoint, he claims, disqualifies it as a political leader for society. 
 Primogeniture is merely the external appearance of the inner nature of landed property. 
[…] The fact that it does not pass to their children in accordance with the “equality of their love 
for them” frees it, makes it independent even of the smaller society, the natural society of the 
family, and its will and its laws […]. Hence in the estate which is based on family life, the basis of 
family life, love, as the actual, and therefore effective and determining principle, is lacking. It is 
spiritless family life, the illusion of family life. In its highest development the principle of private 
property contradicts the principle of the family. In contrast with the estate whose ethical life is 
natural, the estate of family life, it is only in civil society that family life becomes the life of the 
family, the life of love. The former is rather the barbarism of private property against family life 
(MECW 3:98-99). 
 Following Hegel, Marx accepts here that love is the basis of family life. However the agricultural class, whose 
basis, Hegel argues, is family life, actually lacks love as its basis. Primogeniture as the principle by which 
inheritance is made overrules love relations within the family. The children are provided for not on the basis of 
specific love-relationships within the family, but rather on the basis of their formal standing, as the first-born son, 
for example. Primogeniture inverts the relationship between subject and predicate, rendering private property as 
the subject and “first-born son” as the predicate. “Every first born in the series of landed proprietors is the 
inheritance, the property, of the inalienable estate, the predestined substance of his will and activity” (MECW 
3:106). This is, for Marx, an example of how private property prevents the true expression of love and of the 
nature of the family, subordinating these to property. 
  92 
another, and to deny the satisfaction of our needs as an important task for human beings, it is 
inhuman, alienating, and destructive. 
Several years later, in an article for the Deutsche-Brüsseler-Zeitung, Marx is even clearer 
in his argument for why Christian morality and its basis in a dogma of original sin and 
redemption is inadequate as a theory of human liberation. His argument is formulated against the 
claim made by a Prussian state functionary that there is no need for “all this tedious talk of 
communism, if only those who have the vocation for it develop the social principles of 
Christianity, then the Communists will soon fall silent.” Marx’s reply merits quoting at length: 
The social principles of Christianity have now had eighteen hundred years to be developed, and 
need no further development by Prussian Consistorial Counsellors. The social principles of 
Christianity justified the slavery of antiquity, glorifies the serfdom of the Middle Ages and are 
capable, in case of need, of defending the oppression of the proletariat, even if with somewhat 
doleful grimaces69. The social principles of Christianity preach the necessity of a ruling and an 
oppressed class, and for the latter all they have to offer is the pious wish that the former may be 
charitable. The social principles of Christianity place the Consistorial Counsellor's compensation 
for all infamies in heaven, and thereby justify the continuation of these infamies on earth. The 
social principles of Christianity declare all the vile acts of the oppressors against the oppressed to 
be either a just punishment for original sin and other sins, or trials which the Lord, in his infinite 
wisdom, ordains for the redeemed. The social principles of Christianity preach cowardice, self-
contempt, abasement, submissiveness and humbleness, in short, all the qualities of the rabble, and 
the proletariat, which will not permit itself to be treated as rabble, needs its courage, its self-
confidence, its pride and its sense of independence even more than its bread. The social principles 
of Christianity are sneaking and hypocritical, and the proletariat is revolutionary. 
So much for the social principles of Christianity. (The Communism of the Rheinischer Beobachter, 
MECW 6:231) 
  
Beyond the personal costs borne by the individual who practices self-denial and the 
renunciation of earthly life, there is the role that Christianity has historically played on a broader 
social scale, as an ideology that preaches accommodation to the status quo and inculcates in the 
masses of human beings exactly those traits which tend to make them more easily governable by 
                                                 
69 I must admit that in light of Marx's remarks, I simply do not understand Nicholas Churchich's complaint that 
Marx “overlooks the fact that Christianity came into existence centuries before capitalism” (Churchich, Marxism 
and Morality, p.265). 
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the ruling class and dissuade them from seeking a new social arrangement here on earth. Notice 
that this article is written in September 1847, only two months before Marx began writing The 
German Ideology, and around the time he is supposed by some to have abandoned moral 
criticism. Yet, when Marx condemns Christianity for having justified the “vile acts of the 
oppressors against the oppressed,” it takes a special kind of moral tone-deafness not to hear a 
clear moral critique of Christianity, as well as an indication of what values a revolutionary 
morality, which could be an aid to human liberation, would encourage, namely “courage, self-
confidence, and pride.” 
2.4.2 Marx on Kantian Morality 
Kant und Fichte gern zum Aether schweifen, 
Suchten dort ein fernes Land, 
Doch ich such nur tüchtig zu begreifen, 
Was ich - auf der Straße fand!70 
 
It is natural to compare Marx's philosophy with that of Kant, who figures so prominently in the 
German intellectual tradition and whose work provides much of the theoretical backbone for the 
philosophical justification of classical liberalism. Therefore, it is perhaps not surprising that the 
relationship between Marx and Kant's philosophy, and the question of their mutual compatibility, 
is a repeated theme throughout the critical assessment of Marx's work. Marx himself very rarely 
mentioned Immanuel Kant by name. But what he does say about Kant is illuminating and allows 
                                                 
70 From Marx's early poem, “On Hegel,” written prior to 1837. (Marx/Engels, Gesamtausgabe, Abt. 1, Hb. 2, 
1929) In English, the text reads, “Kant and Fichte soar to the aether gladly/ Searching for a distant land/ But I 
only seek to grasp properly/ What I found on the street!” (My translation.) 
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us to better understand what Marx took to be some of the most important divergences between 
his own philosophical outlook and Kant's. More broadly, his criticisms of Kant's moral 
philosophy shed further light upon Marx's criticisms of philosophical idealism as a whole, as 
well as the contours of his own historical materialism. 
 Kant's moral theory rests upon his notion of the autonomous, “rational free will.” In the 
Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant writes that 
The will is a kind of causality belonging to living beings in so far as they are rational, and freedom 
would be this property of such causality that it can be efficient, independently of foreign causes 
determining it; just as physical necessity is the property that the causality of all irrational beings 
has of being determined to activity by the influence of foreign causes. (Kant, Groundwork of the 
Metaphysics of Morals, pg. 52) 
 
This amounts to a negative freedom, out of which emerges a positive freedom of the will 
to conform itself to the Moral Law. This autonomous will is wholly undetermined by any factors 
aside from the Moral Law, which it freely binds itself to, thereby subjecting itself to it. It is the 
fact that the free will legislates this law to itself that is supposed to give the Moral Law its 
bindingness upon rational actors. The Moral Law can be summed up as one Categorical 
Imperative, which Kant formulates in various ways, for instance, as a command to “Act only 
according to that maxim whereby you can, at the same time, will that it should become a 
universal law” (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pg. 42). Kant also gives it a 
second formulation: "Act in such a way that you treat humanity, whether in your own person or 
in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end and never merely as a means to an 
end” (Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, pg. 38). 
On Kant's theory, the good will, so constituted as to be in conformity with the Moral 
Law, is the only thing that can be good without qualification. Hence, the only proper object of 
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moral judgement is the will, and actions are moral or immoral only insofar as the will that brings 
them about is either good or bad. Further, for Kant, for an action to be good, it must be motivated 
by a sense of duty to follow the Moral Law. 
Marx minces no words in his forceful rejection of Kantian morality. In The German 
Ideology, Marx diagnoses it as an ideological symptom of the German bourgeoisie's incapacity 
in the late 1700s to impose its will upon reality and carry through a bourgeois revolution in 
Germany, as had been accomplished by the bourgeoisie in France. Marx writes, “Kant's good 
will fully corresponds to the impotence, depression and wretchedness of the German burghers, 
whose petty interests were never capable of developing into the common, national interests of a 
class” (The German Ideology, 5:193-4). However, this has not stemmed the tide of interpreters, 
from Bernstein to Philip J. Kain in his 1988 book, Marx and Ethics71, who have sought to find a 
home within Marxist theory for Kantian morality. In this subsection, I will explain and assess 
Marx's critiques of Kantian morality, and discuss why a marriage of their two approaches has 
seemed appealing. I cannot, in this space, explore exhaustively the reasons for believing that 
such a marriage is not desirable, possible, nor necessary in order to provide Marxism with a 
moral content. I do attempt, however, to outline several good reasons for thinking this is the case. 
Marx put forward two main arguments against Kantian morality. The first is that because 
of its focus on the autonomous “free will” and its conformity with the Moral Law as the main 
issue for morality, Kantian morality fails as a guide for social change. Marx writes that “Kant 
was satisfied with 'good will' alone, even if it remained entirely without result, and he transferred 
                                                 
71 In his book, Marx and Ethics, Kain aims to show that Marx's moral outlook in his early work is broadly Kantian. 
He writes, “I hope to show that in many ways Kant and Marx agree and that in a very significant sense Marx is 
Kantian in his use of the categorical imperative” (p.15, Marx and Ethics). 
  96 
the realisation of this good will, the harmony between it and the needs and impulses of 
individuals, to the world beyond”72 (The German Ideology, MECW 5:193). Kantian morality, 
then, is for Marx a prime example of what he refers to as “impotence in action.” It is a morality 
that accommodates itself to powerlessness over reality, retreating into the realm of the private 
and ideal. Furthermore, even regarding this autonomous “free will,” Kant leaves wide open the 
gap between what “is” and what “ought” to be, arguing that the total conformity of individuals' 
wills with the Moral Law can only be realized in the “Kingdom of Ends,” a condition which 
Kant argues cannot be realized in the material world73. 
                                                 
72 Marx's emphasis. 
73 Kant has been defended against the first sort of criticism that Marx makes: that Kantian morality is concerned 
only with the good will and not with actual outcomes. John Stuart Mill, R. M. Hare and David Cummiskey are 
three notable commentators who have argued that the universalization principle amounts to consequentialism, in 
the end, since to ask whether or not a particular moral principle can be universalized is, these authors argue, just 
to ask what the consequences of such a moral principle would be. 
 I don't find this consequentialist reading of Kant very convincing. For one thing, it requires a great deal of doubt 
in Kant's own descriptions of his moral theory, as he seems to go to great pains to make it crystal clear that on his 
view, morality is not about ends or results, but rather purely focused on the self-determination of the autonomous 
will. This point is by no means decisive for rejecting the consequentialist reading of Kant, because he might have 
been wrong about the implications of the moral theory he developed. Still, I mention this issue because it is one 
that makes it prima facie more difficult to accept the consequentialist reading of Kant. 
 More significant, I think, is the fact that this reading seems to shift the meaning of “consequentialism” to an 
intolerable degree. Consequentialism, I take it, is the view that for a particular object of moral judgement, its 
moral goodness or badness depends on the consequences that result from it. Consequentialists might disagree 
about what types of consequences matter for the moral goodness or badness of the thing in question. But I don't 
think they can disagree about whether it matters or not that the consequences under consideration are ones that 
have any likelihood at all of actually happening. Yet on the type of “consequentialism” that these authors 
attribute to Kant, that notion would be discarded. 
 On Kant's theory, in deciding how I should act, I ask myself, What would transpire if everyone else were 
compelled to act just as I do, and because I have acted in such and such a way? But of course,  that such a state 
of affairs might obtain is scarcely possible to imagine. The question Kant poses has nothing to do with the real 
consequences of my actions, and the fact that my individual actions may actually have precious little impact 
upon social practice has no significance whatsoever for the rightness or wrongness of the act about which I am 
deliberating. Instead, it is a useful device with which to determine whether the act I am contemplating is in 
conformity with the Moral Law, which is “the objective principle valid for every rational being”, or not. The act 
turns out to be good or bad not in virtue of its consequences (which may in any case be negligible), but in virtue 
of its conformity with the Moral Law. So I don't believe that the consequentialist reading of Kant is successful or 
can defend him from Marx's criticism that his moral theory restricts itself, problematically, to the realm of the 
ideal, and does not provide a satisfactory treatment of the real outcomes of good or bad wills. 
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Marx's second argument against Kantian morality is that its focus on the free will belies 
the extent to which the will is itself determined by material conditions and material interests. The 
abstraction of the “free will” is illegitimate according to Marx because it attempts to prize apart 
the intellectual life of individuals from their economic, social, and historical context. A person 
with a will that is “wholly independent of foreign causes determining it,” to adopt Kant's phrase, 
simply does not exist in reality, and therefore such a subject makes a rather poor starting point 
for moral theory. (Later, in 1853, Marx writes, there critiquing Hegel, “Is it not a delusion to 
substitute for the individual with his real motives, with multifarious social circumstances 
pressing upon him, the abstraction of “free-will” — one among the many qualities of man for 
man himself”74!) 
This latter objection is also of a piece with Marx's critique of political liberalism, a 
critique that contains his second criticism of Kant's emphasis of the “free will.” Classical 
political liberalism justifies and explains the authority of the state by maintaining that it is based 
upon the will of the people. The French Revolution's Declaration of the Rights of Man, for 
instance, states that “Law is the expression of the general will”75. 
While drawing upon the French Revolution for inspiration, Kant, Marx argues, 
overlooked the fact that French republican ideas had their basis in specific economic and social 
conditions, and were developed by individuals whose wills were not “free” in the sense of being 
wholly undetermined by forces external to it, but rather were forged in specific historical 
                                                 
74 Karl Marx, “Capital Punishment” New York Daily Tribune, February 17-18, 1853, MECW 11:496-497. 
75  “Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 26 August 1789”, in Philipp Kiiver, Sources of 
Constitutional Law: Constitutions and Fundamental Legal Provisions from the United States, France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, the ECHR and the EU, Europa Law Publishing, 2010. 
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circumstances and whose content changed in response to ongoing political developments. Marx 
writes: 
The characteristic form which French liberalism, based on real class interests, assumed in 
Germany we find again in Kant. Neither he, nor the German middle class, whose whitewashing 
spokesman he was, noticed that these theoretical ideas of the bourgeoisie had as their basis 
material interests and a will that was conditioned and determined by the material relations of 
production. Kant, therefore, separated this theoretical expression from the interests which it 
expressed; he made the materially motivated determinations of the will of the French bourgeois 
into pure self-determinations of “free will”, of the will in and for itself, of the human will, and so 
converted it into purely ideological conceptual determinations and moral postulates. (The German 
Ideology, MECW 5:195) 
 
 The state arises from factors that exist quite independently of anyone's will, and 
has its basis in the economic and social development of a given society at a certain time. As 
Marx writes, “The material life of individuals, which by no means depends merely on their 
“will,” [...] is the real basis of the state” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:329). 
One of the earliest and most influential of Marx's interpreters who have argued for 
combining Kantian morality with Marxist theory is the German social democrat Eduard 
Bernstein. Bernstein was a member of the German Social Democratic Party and wrote 
throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s, developing his theory of “evolutionary socialism”: a 
reformist socialism which eschewed revolutionary activity. Bernstein interpreted Marx as an 
economic determinist who saw communism as the necessary result of a crisis-ridden capitalist 
society doomed to collapse. However, Bernstein took the relative prosperity of German society 
at the end of the 1800s to be proof that capitalism would continue to expand, workers' living 
standards would continue to rise, and therefore it was more preferable for the working class to 
limit its political program to gradual reforms of capitalism, than to a revolutionary overthrow of 
it. These gradual reforms would eventually add up to a communist society. But if communism 
was not inevitable, as Bernstein understood Marx to have assumed, then it would have to be 
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shown that it was a good moral choice. Since Bernstein understood Marx's theory to be 
deterministic, he argued that it did not have the resources for a moral philosophy on its own. 
That moral philosophy would have to be lifted from somewhere—from Kant. 
We can already see that there are two important errors in Bernstein's argumentation. The 
first is that the fact of present economic expansion, taken by itself, by no means invalidates the 
thesis that capitalism is inherently crisis-ridden, as Bernstein, and no doubt, everyone else in 
Europe found out not so long after the 1899 publication of Bernstein's Evolutionary Socialism76. 
Secondly, Marx never subscribed to the crude economic determinism that Bernstein attributed to 
him. Although it is true that Marx thought crises were inevitable, he by no means committed 
himself theoretically to the view that communism was also inevitable. 
Karl Kautsky, in his 1906 book, Ethics and the Materialist Conception of History, further 
develops a Marxist critique of Kantian morality. His work in this regard is largely a response to 
Bernstein's argument that Marx's theory needed to be supplemented by Kantian morality. Kant 
argues that the Categorical Imperative is a universal and eternal maxim of reason. In this sense, 
Kautsky argues, Kant cannot account for the possibility of a future society struggled for on the 
basis of human solidarity. Kautsky writes: 
The “timeless moral law, that man ought to be an end, and at no time simply a means,” has itself 
only an “end” in a society in which men are used by other men simply as means to their ends. In a 
communist society, this possibility disappears and with that goes the necessity of the Kantian 
Programme for the “entire future world history.” What becomes then of this? We have then in the 
future either no Socialism, or no world history to expect. (Kautsky, Ethics and the Materialist 
Conception of History, Charles H. Kerr & Co.,, Chicago, 1906, pg. 57-58) 
                                                 
76 In a similar vein, we can ask whether it is still so easy to accept Eugene Kamenka's 1962 claims that “the 
Marxian picture of an uncontrolled competitive capitalism propelling itself inexorably towards catastrophic 
collapse has proved quite false,” or that “The skilled worker has […] moved slowly but steadily toward a 
middle-class standard of living […]; even the living conditions and purchasing power of the shrinking class of 
unskilled labourers have patently risen and continue to rise” (Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical Foundations of 
Marxism, p.9). 
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In a communist society, treating human beings as ends would already be embedded in social 
practices which had developed in the course of a transition from capitalist to communist society. 
There would then be no need for human beings to bind themselves to a Moral Law which 
contradicted their own interests and desires, as Kant argues the Moral Law must. 
Kantian morality, Marx argues, ignores the ways in which historical, economic, and 
social factors can play a role in determining human consciousness and in particular, the 
formation of their wills. It substitutes the autonomous free will for the concrete and worldly 
human being as a moral agent. On the other hand, Marx also argues that Kantian morality is too 
easily reconciled to powerlessness over reality, making morality out as purely a question of “the 
good will,” which is good without reference to its effects. 
Kautsky articulates a third point of difference between Marxist and Kantian morality: 
because Kant thinks that the Moral Law will always contradict human beings' own interests and 
desires, he does not see morality as a historical phenomenon that can pass away in the course of 
human social development. Kant instead defers the resolution of this contradiction to the “Realm 
of Ends,” which cannot be realized except through God. 
In this subsection, I have attempted to address a few of Marx's most important criticisms 
of Kantian morality and to also address the question of whether Marxism is compatible with 
Kantian morality. I will now turn to Marx's critique of Utilitarianism. 
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2.4.3 Marx on Utilitarianism 
In The German Ideology, Marx dismisses James Mill's moral philosophy as the “complete union 
of the theory of utility with political economy” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:412). He 
addresses Utilitarianism in the thought of Baron d'Holbach, Helvetius, Jeremy Bentham, and 
Mill. However, most of his criticism is aimed specifically at Jeremy Bentham, with whom Mill 
worked closely. In this section, I provide a brief critical reconstruction of Marx's criticisms of 
Utilitarian moral theory. A completely thorough treatment of Marx's analysis of Utilitarianism 
lies beyond the scope of the present work77 and I do not, for instance, evaluate each of the many 
forms of Utilitarianism which have been developed in response to objections sometimes similar 
in spirit to those that Marx raises. I also reserve a treatment of Marx's remarks on the moral 
thought of John Stuart Mill for the third chapter of this study, as those are most fully developed 
in later works such as the Grundrisse and Capital. 
Marx's criticisms of Utilitarianism are twofold. On the one hand, he charges that 
Utilitarianism is incapable of accommodating human individuality in all its concrete aspects, 
instead grasping the human only in one narrow aspect: as a source or beneficiary of utility. And 
on the other hand, Marx argues that Utilitarianism functions to justify existing capitalist society 
(so much the worse, Marx thinks, for Utilitarianism). I will begin by addressing the first of 
Marx's criticisms.   
                                                 
77 An interesting treatment of this subject is to be found in George Brenkert's 1975 paper “Marx and Utilitarianism” 
(Brenkert, Canadian Journal of Philosophy Vol. 5, No. 3 (Nov., 1975), pgs. 421-434). He traces somewhat 
different themes from the ones I focus on here, as the paper is principally aimed against the specific claim that 
Marx actually was himself a Utilitarian. 
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The core of Bentham's Utilitarian theory is what has come to be known as the “Greatest 
Happiness Principle,” the doctrine that a moral action is good or bad according to the extent to 
which it maximizes utility, bringing about the greatest happiness for the greatest number of 
people78. According to Marx, Utilitarianism obliterates the unique aspects of different products 
and different relations between people and reduces them to one thing: utility, or “usefulness”. 
Utilitarianism, he argues, is tailor-made for a society based on capitalist exchange, in which the 
particularity of specific products and of the needs of specific persons is dissolved into one mode 
of expression, that of money.  Marx writes: 
The apparent absurdity of merging all the manifold relationships of people in the one relation of 
usefulness, this apparently metaphysical abstraction arises from the fact that in modern bourgeois 
society all relations are subordinated in practice to the one abstract monetary-commercial relation. 
[…] In Helvétius and Holbach one can already find an idealisation of this doctrine, which fully 
corresponds to the attitude of opposition adopted by the French bourgeoisie before the revolution. 
Holbach depicts the entire activity of individuals in their mutual intercourse, e. g., speech, love, 
etc., as a relation of utility and utilisation. Hence the actual relations that are presupposed here are 
speech, love, definite manifestations of definite qualities of individuals. Now these relations are 
supposed not to have the meaning peculiar to them but to be the expression and manifestation of 
some third relation attributed to them, the relation of utility or utilisation. This paraphrasing 
ceases to be meaningless and arbitrary only when these relations have validity for the individual 
not on their own account, not as spontaneous activity, but rather as disguises, though by no means 
disguises of the category of Utilisation, but of an actual third aim and relation which is called the 
relation of utility. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:409) 
 
As I have discussed earlier in this chapter, on Marx's own moral conception, the highest moral 
aim is the full and free development of rich, “all-sided” individuals. Such individuals have a 
diversity of needs and capacities which are mutually distinct; there is no “third term” through 
                                                 
78  In fact, Bentham eventually abandoned this principle, for reasons we will investigate here shortly. In an 
unpublished essay on Utilitarianism, Bentham wrote: “Greatest happiness of the greatest number. Some years 
have now elapsed since, upon a closer scrutiny, reason, altogether incontestable, was found for discarding this 
appendage. […] Be the community in question what it may, divide it into two unequal parts, call one of them the 
majority, the other minority, lay out of the account the feelings of the minority, include in the account no feelings 
but those of the majority, the result you will find is that of this operation, that to the aggregate stock of the 
happiness of the community, loss not profit is the result of the operation” (Bentham, “The Greatest Good for the 
Greatest Number,” in The Classical Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill, John Troyer (ed.)). Bentham assumes that 
there is a finite amount of happiness to be divided among members of a community. 
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which the desirability of developing an artistic talent, for instance, can be assimilated to or 
compared with the desirability of, say, athletic prowess. But Marx argues that Utilitarianism, 
because it abstracts away from the particularities of real human activities and interactions, is a 
theory that can neither properly account for the existing full range of human activity, nor help to 
explain the goodness of further all-sided development. 
As I have mentioned, Marx also argues that over the course of its development in the 
work of Bentham and Mill, Utilitarianism became “a mere apologia for the existing state of 
affairs, an attempt to prove that under existing conditions the mutual relations of people today 
are the most advantageous and generally useful” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:413-14). The 
attack might seem a bit surprising, given that Bentham was well-known for advocating social 
progress. Bentham argued for a number of social reforms, including increased equality for 
women and an end to slavery. Those who wonder how Marx can accuse Bentham of apologizing 
for the status quo should consider Bentham's Principles of the Civil Code, with its heartfelt cries 
against the evils of appropriating private property for the benefit of the masses: 
[…] the crimes of the popular party in democracies, have always found apologists. “The greater 
part of these large fortunes”, it has been said, “have been founded in injustice and that was only 
restored to the public which had been stolen from the public.” To reason in this manner, is to open 
an unlimited career to tyranny: it is to allow it to presume the crime, instead of proving it. By 
means of this logic, it is impossible to be rich and to be innocent. Ought so grave a punishment as 
confiscation to be inflicted by wholesale, without examination, without detail, without proof? A 
procedure which would be deemed atrocious if it were employed against a single person—does it 
become lawful when employed against an entire class of citizens? Can the evil which is done be 
disregarded, because there is a multitude of sufferers, whose cries are confounded together in their 
common shipwreck? To despoil the great proprietors, upon pretence that some one of their 
ancestors acquired their wealth by unjust methods, is to bombard a city because it is suspected that 
it encloses some thieves. (Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Pt.1, Ch.15, Sect. 4)79 
  
                                                 
79  Jeremy Bentham, Sir John Bowring (ed.), Works of Jeremy Bentham, Vol. 1, Pt. 2, p.320 
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Bentham relies on some curious arithmetic to reach his conclusion that it is never permissible to 
violate the sanctity of private property: 
[…] the profit of a suppressed place is divided among all, whilst the loss presses altogether upon a 
single person. The profit spread among the multitude divides itself into impalpable parts; the 
whole loss is felt by him who supports it alone. The result of the operation is in no respect to 
enrich the party who gains, but to impoverish him who loses. Instead of one place suppressed, 
suppose a thousand, ten thousand, a hundred thousand: the total disadvantage remains the same. 
The spoil taken from thousands of individuals must be divided among millions: your public places 
would every where present you with unfortunate citizens, whom you would have plunged into 
indigence; whilst you would scarcely see a single individual sensibly enriched by these cruel 
operations. The groans of sorrow and the cries of despair would resound on all sides: the shouts of 
joy, if there were any such, would not be the expression of happiness, but of the antipathy which 
rejoices in the misery of its victims80. Ministers of kings and of the people, it is not by the misery 
of individuals that you can procure the happiness of nations: the altar of the public good does not 
demand more barbarous sacrifices than that of the Divinity. (Bentham, Principles of the Civil 
Code, Pt.1, Ch.15, Sect. 6) 
 
If you were not keeping track, you might think that “shouts of joy” emanating from the majority 
of human beings might be as good a sign as any that happiness had been maximized. Bentham is 
on guard against such misconceptions. As he helpfully informs the reader, the joy of the masses 
doesn't count, because it is not real happiness, only the “barbarous,” grasping schadenfreude of 
the have-nots.  Bentham is not yet satisfied, however, that he has done quite enough to impress 
upon the masses the importance of leaving class society just as it is. “I cannot yet quit this 
subject,” he admits, “it appears so essential, for the establishment of the principle of security, to 
trace the error into all its retreats.” 
Who, then, is the greatest egotist---he who desires to preserve what he has? or he who wishes to 
take, and even to seize by force, that which belongs to another? An injury felt, and a benefit not 
felt, such is the result of these fine operations in which the interest of individuals is sacrificed to 
that of the public. (Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Pt.1, Ch.15, Sect. 6)81 
 
                                                 
80 My emphasis. 
81  Ibid. 
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This might all just be evidence that Bentham himself was a hypocrite, rather than telling 
evidence against Benthamite Utilitarianism. But I don't think that is the case. I can only sketch 
here the kind of argument I think Marx might offer as further support for his claim that 
Bentham's Utilitarianism is “a mere apologia for the existing state of affairs.” The sketch is 
inspired by George Brenkert's comment that: 
the Utilitarian principle assumes a cleavage between the individual's interests and the general 
interests. It is for this reason one calculates individual utilities to find what is the greatest good. 
But it is just this cleavage that Marx condemns as characteristic of class society, and particularly 
bourgeois society. For man as man, as a species being, there is a harmony of personal and social 
interests because “he treats himself as the actual living species”. (Brenkert, “Marx and 
Utilitarianism”, pg. 431) 
 
Bentham's method in determining whether or not it would be permissible to appropriate a piece 
of private property is to quantitatively measure the pain caused to the erstwhile property-owner, 
as well as the pleasure brought thereby to the individual members of the public at large. And 
indeed, if his version of Utilitarianism is true, then this is precisely what he should do. But then, 
what matters in the end to the moral right- or wrong-ness of a particular state of affairs is 
something like the question, Just how badly do the people in power want to keep things the way 
that they are and how upset will they be if things are changed? Because if the subjective 
discomfort of those in power is grave enough, then it turns out, just on this basis, that it is 
morally wrong to redistribute private wealth. A social question, of how resources ought to be 
allocated, is neatly converted into a conflict between individual and society. I don't think that 
Bentham is merely hypocritically twisting Utilitarianism to fit his arguments against the evils of 
wealth redistribution. He seems to actually be drawing out the real consequences of a moral 
theory that relies on a frozen snapshot of purely subjective experiences of pleasure or pain.  
Utilitarianism was first developed, by Helvetius and d'Holbach, in something of a democratic 
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spirit. By abstracting away from the particular person and focusing on utility, these authors could 
assert an equality among persons. And as in the quote that Mill attributed to Bentham, 
Utilitarianism was the call for “everybody to count for one, nobody for more than one”82. But 
that same Utilitarian theory turns out to be profoundly undemocratic in practice. 
In this subsection, I have briefly explored Marx's two principal objections to 
Utilitarianism: that it illegitimately reduces a plethora of human social relations to just one 
relation of usefulness, and that it serves all too readily as a moral justification of the existing 
social order. 
In the following section, “Utopianism and Scientific Socialism,” I will discuss Marx's 
and Engels' critiques of a group of philosophers they refer to as the “True Socialists.” Here, I 
have addressed Marx's criticisms of specific moral theories. I will now go on to explain and 
assess Marx's arguments against regarding moral theorizing and argumentation as itself an 
effective means by which to bring about communism. Though morality and other ideological 
forms of thought play an important role in theorizing a historical situation, Marx does not think 
that such intellectual pursuits can take the place of revolutionary political action. 
 
                                                 
82  James Mill, “Utilitarianism”, in The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. X, Essays on Ethics, Religion and 
Society, University of Toronto Press and Routledge & Kegan Paul, Toronto and London 1969, pg. 257. 
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2.5 UTOPIANISM AND SCIENTIFIC SOCIALISM 
In contemporary literature, Marxism is often referred to as a utopian theory. However, both Marx 
and Engels were very vocal about the distinctions between their scientific and revolutionary 
method, and the idealist method of utopian socialism. In the second volume of The German 
Ideology, Marx and Engels criticize a group of philosophers whom they refer to (mockingly) as 
the “True Socialists.” Instead of engaging in political activity and looking to the existing 
economic and social situation to identify which elements in the existing society are in a position 
to change society, utopian socialists depend on the greatness of an idea to compel people to 
action through its own intellectual appeal. As Marx writes in The Communist Manifesto, utopian 
socialists: 
consider themselves far superior to all class antagonisms. They want to improve the condition of 
every member of society, even that of the most favored. Hence, they habitually appeal to society at 
large, without distinction of class; nay, by preference, to the ruling class. For how can people, 
when once they understand their system, fail to see in it the best possible plan of the best possible 
state of society? Hence, they reject all political, and especially all revolutionary, action; they wish 
to attain their ends by peaceful means, and endeavor, by small experiments, necessarily doomed to 
failure, and by the force of example, to pave the way for the new social Gospel. (The Communist 
Manifesto, MECW 6:515) 
  
The “True Socialists” (Karl Grün, Hermann Semmig, Bruno Bauer, and others) are exemplars of 
this sort of utopianism, arguing that the communism of Marx and Engels is inferior to their 
theories because it does not rely solely on moral motivation as a means to bring about 
communism. Semmig, for instance, argues for socialism as an “anarchic system” which would 
rely on “the moral core of mankind,” and accuses communists of having failed to achieve “free 
moral activity.” However, this “moral core of mankind” is left completely unexplained and 
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undefined. How exactly it would bring about communism in a historical situation in which so 
many factors militate against it, is anyone's guess83. 
The appeal to a “moral core” fails to explain the real process through which socialism 
might be achieved. In this way, Semmig's mere moralism provides cover for a lack of political 
clarity. The “free moral activity” that he looks to as a way for human beings to effect the 
transition from class society to socialism is activity undetermined by the real concrete historical 
situation. Semmig “abandons the real behaviour of the individual and takes refuge in his 
indescribable, inaccessible, peculiar nature” (The German Ideology, MECW 5: 465). However, 
while human beings can imagine themselves as totally free, undetermined beings, in fact, they 
act in conditions and in circumstances that do not at all depend on their free choice, and their 
actions are in this way therefore partially determined by external, concrete historical 
circumstances which must be taken into account in any conception of how communism might be 
attained. 
                                                 
83 In addition to their critique of Semmig, Marx and Engels also criticize Karl Grün on the grounds that Grün thinks 
all that is needed to transform human society is for consumers to be educated so as to consume in a “human” 
way (The German Ideology, MECW 5:518). Marx and Engels argue that this “moral postulate of human 
consumption” is insufficient as it does not address the “real conditions of production” and the “productive 
activity of men.” While there are numerous ways in which consumption takes on a distorted character in 
capitalist society, the idea that society can be transformed through simply lecturing people to consume less is 
thoroughly implausible. Furthermore, while consumption can be transformed, there is no need to limit overall 
human consumption because, Marx and Engels argue, production can be improved and revolutionized further so 
that higher, not lower, levels of consumption are possible and usual. This, they argue, would be possible in a 
different economic system that was consciously aimed at the satisfaction of human beings. The development and 
expansion of industry has played an enormously progressive role in human history and brought into existence 
innovations in production that make it possible for the first time in human history to produce enough for all 
human beings.  The problem is not, at least not primarily or fundamentally, that human beings consume 
“inhumanly,” but rather, that production is carried out in a wasteful manner and is not itself carried out with the 
satisfaction of human needs as its organizing principle. Marx and Engels add, “those economists who took 
consumption as their starting-point happened to be reactionary and ignored the revolutionary element in 
competition and large-scale industry” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:519). 
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In his 2002 paper, “Marx’s Critique of the Utopian Socialists,” Roger Paden argues 
against the kind of critique I am attributing to Marx as a successful critique of moralism. Paden 
refers to the view that Marx and Engels criticized the Utopian socialists for indulging in mere 
moralism as the “Strategic Criticism.” Paden writes: 
On this interpretation, the Marxist criticism of the Utopian socialists is based on the idea that, 
while Marx and Engels shared their ends (their vision of the general shape of the ideal society) and 
were, therefore, Utopians themselves, they believed that the means the Utopian socialists proposed 
to attain those ends were insufficient. […] There are a number of problems with this criticism of 
the Utopian socialists. Perhaps most important, it overestimates the possibility that violent 
revolution can produce a truly ideal society, while underestimating the power of moral criticism. 
Moreover, it falsely portrays people as simple victims of the dominant ideology and/or as 
completely controlled by their narrow economic and class interests. However, this rejection of the 
power of moral argument to motivate people has been shown to be false by the history of Marxism 
itself, as it has been moral arguments that have moved many people from a variety of social 
classes to join this cause. It also underrates the ability of Utopian visions--including Marxist 
utopias--to cause people to seek political change. History suggests, therefore, that, although small 
scale utopias are perhaps doomed to failure and although sudden violent revolutions can 
sometimes succeed, there are no good political reasons to reject in principle gradual, morally-
motivated utopianism84. 
 
I will address the problems Paden sees in the criticism of mere moralism as a strategy for 
social change one at a time. Paden’s first objection, that criticizing the Utopian socialists for 
indulging in mere moralism gets things wrong about the relative efficacy of violent revolution 
and moral criticism, has at least two problems as far as I can see. The first is that the 
revolutionary means Marx prefers to mere moralism cannot simply be boiled down to “violent 
revolution.” Paden effectively indulges in a sleight of hand, replacing what is in Marx and 
Engels’ writings a description of a long and difficult process, with the idea of a “sudden violent 
revolution” which Paden invokes as though such an event is to contain within itself all that 
would be required for a transition to communist society. In doing so, Paden dramatically 
                                                 
84  Roger Paden, “Marx’s Critique of the Utopian Socialists”  Utopian Studies, Penn State University Press, Vol. 13, 
No. 2 (2002), pp. 67-91 
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oversimplifies the political program that Marx and Engels promote in their writings and practice 
in their own political activism. This program includes the organization of masses of people to 
enter into a political fight for legal reforms, as well as struggles within the workplace for better 
wages and working conditions, and of course, efforts at political education and the dissemination 
of revolutionary ideas. It is true that it would be a mistake to assume that mere “violent 
revolution” would be any more effective at bringing about communism than issuing moral 
commands to society at large would be, but this is also not what Marx is saying and the 
interpretation on which his critique of Utopianism criticizes the Utopian socialists for their mere 
moralism need not be committed to such a view. 
When Marx and Engels write of the need for revolution, their point is that the radical 
restructuring of society so that communism can be achieved can only be carried out by the 
proletariat. Of course, the proletariat does not currently lead society—and so a revolution would 
be necessary for that class to be in the position of leading humanity. Thus, the argument for 
political revolution—a transfer of political hegemony from one part of society to another—as a 
means to achieve communism is tied together with Marx and Engels’ identification of the 
proletariat as the progressive, existing force within society that can realize communism. Paden 
would be well within his rights to disagree with Marx and Engels that this is true of the 
proletariat, but insofar as he provides no argument to that effect, he does not provide adequate 
support for his decision to dismiss out of hand the idea that revolution might be necessary for 
communism to be realized, and that mere moralism might not do the job. 
Additionally, with respect to Paden’s first objection, Paden seems to overlook that Marx 
and Engels’ belief that revolution may involve violence is based on the fact that the bourgeoisie 
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is quite certain to violently oppose and suppress any attempts to infringe upon private property 
and bourgeois rule. It is not that Marx and Engels think violent revolution, taken abstractly, has 
some inherently progressive potential, considered in isolation from specific historical 
circumstances. (A “violent revolution” undertaken by a small, politically isolated sect would be 
nothing more than romantic adventurism, for example.) Rather, Marx and Engels do both seem 
to think that for the working class to be successful in its revolutionary or often, even in its merely 
reformist aims, it must be prepared to survive the brutally and violently reactionary forces that 
have historically been deployed to defend capital, from the Freikorps in Germany, to the 
Pinkertons in the U.S., to Pinochet’s DINA in Chile. I can see no reason to think it prima facie 
just up for grabs, as Paden seems to, that “the power of moral criticism” might be enough to see 
the working class through such tough times. 
Paden’s second criticism of the kind of view I attribute to Marx and Engels is that it 
wrongly assumes that people’s actions and beliefs are strictly determined by their economic class 
interests. The idea here is, Who’s to say that a member of the bourgeoisie might not be swayed 
by moral argument alone? But I don’t think that reading Marx and Engels as critics of the mere 
moralism of the Utopian socialists in any way commits one to the view that moral argument 
never, in any case, can bring a person to the view that communism is desirable unless she already 
has economic interests that would be served by it. Certainly, Paden is quite right that historically, 
people from a range of social classes have been convinced of the need for communism and 
sometimes through moral argument. And I think Marx and Engels, of all people, were well aware 
that one need not actually be a member of the working class in order to be convinced of the need 
for communism. But Marx and Engels do think it is a mistake to advocate mere appeal to human 
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beings’ moral sentiments without taking into account what their economic interests are and 
whether those interests are better served by the maintenance of the status quo or a transition to a 
different type of society. To interpret Marx and Engels’ critique of mere moralism as a criticism 
of the view that moral argument alone can bring about communism does not require one to show 
that no one ever responds to moral reasons even where they go against one’s self interest. Rather, 
the question is whether mere moralizing alone can ever galvanize the majority of society in the 
way that would be required for a transition to communism, and if Paden thinks that it can, then I 
think he owes us some argument for it. 
Marx distances himself from the issuance of moral injunctions as a way, in and of itself, 
to close the gap between what “is” and what “ought” to be. Because scientific communism is not 
opposed to the needs of individuals, but rather is theorized as a means of recognizing and 
satisfying those needs, and because it identifies as the revolutionary class the class that, because 
of its position in production, is already brought into conflict with the forces of capitalism through 
its struggle for its own continued existence, it does not share the same difficulties as “true” or 
utopian socialism when it comes to the question of rational motivation. This further informs 
Marx's hostility to calls for sacrifice. Calls for sacrifice become necessary for a political theory 
when the link between rational self-interest and the prescribed ends can no longer be 
demonstrated through reason. 
The flourishing, development, and well-being of human individuals guides Marx at every 
stage of his philosophical work and is the basis of his moral outlook. He argues both that it is the 
highest goal for human beings, and that it provides the standard by which other moral theories 
should be judged. When Marx criticizes specific moralities, it is not because he has abandoned 
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any moral conception whatsoever. Rather, Marx argues that a moral state of affairs is a goal to be 
aimed at through practical revolutionary activity, not merely wished for in systems of moral 
injunctions. 
2.6 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER TWO 
In this chapter, I have attempted to explain the basis for Marx's moral theory in his conceptions 
of essential human nature, human individuality, alienation, and historical materialism, and to 
trace these themes throughout his early work. The central question of morality, for Marx, is how 
alienation can be abolished so that there can be a realization of human essence, and a free and 
full development of “rich human beings” with an expanding array of needs and powers to 
interact consciously and purposively with their natural and social environment. With the closure 
of the gap between human existence as it is and human existence as it ought to be, human 
“prehistory”85 would come to an end and there would begin the history of human beings as freely 
active beings who regard human social progress and the further development of their powers as 
their highest aim. 
                                                 
85 Later, in 1859, Marx writes: “Mankind thus inevitably sets itself only such tasks as it is able to solve, since closer 
examination will always show that the problem itself arises only when the material conditions for its solution are 
already present or at least in the course of formation. In broad outline, the Asiatic, ancient, feudal and modern 
bourgeois modes of production may be designated as epochs marking progress in the economic development of 
society. The bourgeois mode of production is the last antagonistic form of the social process of production – 
antagonistic not in the sense of individual antagonism but of an antagonism that emanates from the individuals' 
social conditions of existence – but the productive forces developing within bourgeois society create also the 
material conditions for a solution of this antagonism. The prehistory of human society accordingly closes with 
this social formation” (Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, MECW 29:263-264). 
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Marx first explains his historical materialist approach in The German Ideology. But as 
early as the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, we already see Marx 
combining an understanding that ideas cannot take the place of revolutionary action with an 
appreciation for the role that ideas do play in promoting such action. There, he writes: “The 
weapon of criticism cannot, of course, replace criticism by weapons, material force must be 
overthrown by material force; but theory also becomes a material force as soon as it has gripped 
the masses” (Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University 
Press, 1970, Cambridge  pg. 137). 
Between 1840 and 1847, Marx engages in a number of debates about moral questions, 
including the viability of ethical egoism, the source and nature of rights, and their role in moral 
theory, and debates about specific moral theories such as Kantianism. Additionally, Marx 
engages with utopian socialism's emphasis on moral theory as a force for social change, and 
argues that such a revolutionary element can only be found in a material force: the proletariat, “a 
class with radical chains.” Marx uses this phrase with regard to the working class's role in the 
specific situation of Germany in 1843, but with consequences that extend far beyond that 
particular historical situation. In the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, he posits the 
question “Where, then, is the positive possibility of a German emancipation?”, and answers: 
In the formulation of a class with radical chains, a class of civil society which is not a class of 
civil society, an estate which is the dissolution of all estates, a sphere which has a universal 
character by its universal suffering and claims no particular right because no particular wrong, 
but wrong generally, is perpetuated against it; which can invoke no historical, but only human, 
title; which does not stand in any one-sided antithesis to the consequences but in all-round 
antithesis to the premises of German statehood; a sphere, finally, which cannot emancipate itself 
without emancipating itself from all other spheres of society and thereby emancipating all other 
spheres of society, which, in a word, is the complete loss of man and hence can win itself only 
through the complete re-winning of man. This dissolution of society as a particular estate is the 
proletariat. (Introduction to the Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right, Cambridge University 
Press, 1970, Cambridge  pgs. 141-142) 
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In his writings over the course of his life, Marx continues to work out in greater 
concreteness and detail what this “complete re-winning of man” would consist in, why it is a 
desirable and necessary aim for human beings, and how the proletariat can lead the struggle for 
such a universal human emancipation. In the following chapter, I will examine how these themes 
develop in Marx's work between 1847 and 1857, the period of time after the completion of The 
German Ideology and before Marx's writing of the Grundrisse. 
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3.0  MARX'S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1847 TO 1857 
Morality, for Marx, is based on the specific and concrete question of which actions and which 
social institutions promote the development of the person with an expanding range of capacities 
who is able to freely and consciously direct her own activity; Marx calls this person, “the rich 
human being” (“Private Property and Communism,” Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 
1844, MECW 3:304). This person pursues her own development as an end in itself, seeking out 
new ways in which to express herself in and interact with the natural and social world. In 
“Private Property and Communism,” Marx writes that “The rich human being is simultaneously 
the human being in need of a totality of human manifestations of life – the man in whom his own 
realisation exists as an inner necessity, as need86” (“Private Property and Communism,” 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:304). 
The moral value of a course of action, a theory, or a state of affairs can be determined by 
considering whether and to what extent it will promote or hinder this process of self-realization 
and the production of rich human beings who regard self-realization as a need. This moral 
conception is therefore based upon a particular theory of essential human nature. Such a theory is 
necessary in order to speak sensibly of a realization or flourishing of human beings. For Marx, 
                                                 
86  Marx's emphasis. 
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human beings are essentially natural and social beings who satisfy their needs through labor, 
which is a socially-mediated and conscious teleological interaction with the natural world. In 
satisfying their needs through the labor process, humans also thereby produce their own social 
existence as well as alter the natural world of which they are a part. 
The labor process in its basic form is a constant in all human societies. It is the essence of 
all human activity, although it has taken on a different appearance in different places and at 
different times, giving rise to richly varied social expression (as evidenced in a diversity of 
languages, art forms, cuisines, and so on) and sometimes appearing in a distorted form, as is the 
case in alienated labor. And throughout history, human beings have developed increasingly 
complex and efficient systems for organizing labor (the most sophisticated of which, so far, is 
capitalist production). 
Marx is a moral naturalist in the sense that he believes that an understanding of what 
ought to be can be derived from an analysis of what is, and from the historical processes that 
have given rise to it. As human beings are essentially natural and social beings who produce their 
own existence through the labor process, Marx proceeds from this conception of human nature to 
derive a set of closely related claims about what is morally good or desirable. For Marx, that 
which is morally desirable is that which satisfies human needs, develops human powers, 
promotes consciousness of ourselves as a species (and the ability to use that understanding in 
order to act to promote our own welfare), and abolishes the domination of man over man. Each 
of these are necessary conditions for the abolition of a state of affairs in which human beings are 
alienated from their essence, and for the historical appearance of “rich human beings,” or as 
Marx puts it later on in the Grundrisse, “the full development of the rich individual.” With the 
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production of a fully developed communist society in which human beings appear as “rich 
human beings,” morality would be realized in society's practices and the need for morality as a 
way to theorize the gap between what is and what ought to be would disappear. 
However, the claim that Marx deems moral questions irrelevant in modern-day class 
society, or believes that morality can only serve reactionary ends, proves to be implausible in the 
light of a careful appraisal of Marx's thought. Marx does, as we have seen, devote a great deal of 
attention to criticizing bourgeois morality in its various forms. He also criticizes socialists who 
believe that moral theorizing is the principal means by which to realize socialism. However, it 
would be a mistake to confuse these critiques with a rejection of morality, as such. Rather, Marx 
frequently makes moral criticisms of bourgeois morality and of bourgeois society, itself, 
outlining how they inhibit the development of “rich human beings”. Marx's view that the 
development of rich human beings is the highest aim for human beings, and that it is necessary to 
abolish the alienating conditions of class society and build a society in which human beings 
pursue the free and full development of their individuality, constitutes a specific moral 
conception. It is his answer to the moral question, “How ought humans to live?” 
The claim that there is a sharp break between Marx's early writings such as the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and The Holy Family, and his later writings such as 
Capital, appears far less credible once one appreciates how much continuity there is between 
these two periods and,  significantly, throughout Marx's middle period, consisting of works such 
as The Communist Manifesto, The Poverty of Philosophy, and The Civil War in France. The 
notion, espoused especially in the writings of Louis Althusser, that Marx's magnum opus, 
Capital is a strictly amoral and deterministic work, uninformed by moral philosophy in particular 
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or even by philosophy in general, becomes all the less tenable if we follow the threads of Marx's 
thought from his early writings, throughout his middle period, and finally, to their expression in 
Capital. In the present chapter, I will demonstrate not only that there is a significant continuity 
between the moral commitments of the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 and the 
ideas put forward in writings such as The Communist Manifesto, but also that Marx's moral 
philosophy actually becomes richer throughout the years between 1847 and 1857. As Marx turns 
more directly to economic, political, and historical research, applying the method of historical 
materialism, he is able to become more concrete about such issues as the hypocrisy of bourgeois 
values in an alienating and crisis-ridden society, the historical and anthropological basis for 
rejecting a conception of human beings as essentially isolated and competitive atoms, and the 
question of how, why, and under what circumstances non-workers can come to adopt the class 
standpoint of the proletariat. 
I start out in this chapter by addressing the question of whether ideology is inherently 
reactionary according to Marx. As I have argued before, I do not think that Marx's earlier 
writings support a purely pejorative conception of ideology of the type G. A. Cohen invokes 
when he writes that “We might define ideology as thinking which is not just incorrect but which 
is systematically deflected from truth because of its conformity to the limited vision and 
sectional interests of a particular social class. We could then say that bourgeois ideology is 
thinking deflected from truth because of the service it performs for owners and managers of 
capital”87. Here, I show that The Communist Manifesto provides further evidence to support my 
                                                 
87  G. A. Cohen, “Are Disadvantaged Workers Who Take Hazardous Jobs Forced to Take Hazardous Jobs?”, in 
Gertrude Ezorsky, James W. Nickel (eds.), Moral Rights in the Workplace, SUNY Press, 1987 
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reading of ideology as a neutral concept in Marx's work. Marx believed that ideology would be 
abolished in a fully-developed communist society; however, the existence of ideological forms 
of thought is a necessary feature of any class society and the revolutionary class can and must 
make use of ideology in order to wage its struggle. 
In Section 3.2, I address several of Marx's moral critiques of bourgeois society and of 
bourgeois morality, as well as his defense of the Communist movement against the moral 
criticisms of bourgeois ideologists. A significant portion of this section is devoted to Marx's 
critique of Malthusianism, a theory which captures some of the most hypocritical and reactionary 
elements of bourgeois ideology and was developed in response to more progressive 
Enlightenment trends in bourgeois thought. After the discussion of ideology in general in Section 
3.1, Section 3.2 provides more concrete examples of how Marx specifically addressed bourgeois 
morality. It also provides further evidence against the claim, already addressed in Chapter One, 
that Marx thought it illegitimate to criticize bourgeois society by applying standards that do not 
themselves serve to justify and uphold it. 
Marx's conception of human individuality is what grounds his moral philosophy and his 
critiques of bourgeois society and of bourgeois morality. His approach to individuality is the 
subject of Section 3.3. The theme of essential human nature plays an important role here, as 
Marx's understanding of what human individuality consists in is itself informed by his 
understanding of what human beings essentially are. 
That analysis of human nature in turn informs Marx's conception of alienation, and 
Section 3.4 treats the theme of alienation in Marx's writings between 1847 and 1857. Alienation, 
in these years after the writing of The German Ideology, continues to be an important theme for 
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Marx. I show that even in works such as The Communist Manifesto where Marx does not use the 
word “alienation,” the concept which Marx earlier denoted with that term continues to play a key 
role in his moral thought. For this reason, it is possible to trace the development of the concept of 
alienation throughout Marx's work up through his last writings, as I will continue to demonstrate 
in the next chapter. 
In the penultimate section of the present chapter, titled “Moralism, Sacrifice and Utopia,” 
I focus on Marx and Engels' “Circular Against Kriege,” in which they argue sharply against 
sacrifice as a revolutionary value. The appeal to sacrifice, on their account, represents a failure to 
demonstrate the rationality of revolutionary struggle, and a theoretical step backward from the 
scientific socialism they have developed. Marx's strongly-worded critiques of sacrifice have 
received scant attention, but they are extremely valuable for clarifying his own approach to 
morality. 
In the Conclusion, I review the main themes of this chapter and address how they relate 
to what we have explored in the previous chapter on Marx's early writings, and set the stage for 
the discussion of Marx's later work in the next chapter, which treats Marx's moral philosophy in 
his writings from 1858 to his death in 1883. Such themes as alienation, individuality, sacrifice, 
and a distinction between abstract moralism and genuinely human morality can be traced from 
Marx's earliest works through the whole of his philosophical corpus. The goal of this chapter is 
to further demonstrate the continuity of Marx's moral thought and its development throughout his 
works, as well as to further explore its richness and continuing relevance today. 
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3.1 IDEOLOGY AND MORALITY 
Marx's analysis of the role of ideology is a prominent theme among his earlier works, especially 
in The German Ideology. I have argued that Marx's understanding of ideology is far more 
complex than some commentators have given him credit for. Marx does not dismiss all ideology 
as always upholding and legitimizing the dominance of the ruling class. Instead, Marx 
recognizes that in capitalist society, the bourgeoisie and its class nature play a primary role in 
shaping the ideas of the age. This does not mean, however, that Marx thinks it is either possible 
or desirable to function or to think “non-ideologically” in a class society88. An ideology is 
nothing more and nothing less than a system of ideas developed in order to make sense of social 
contradictions. As such, it is completely necessary that the proletariat develop its own ideology 
and engage with such ideological forms as morality and political theory. In the Manifesto, Marx 
writes that “the proletarian movement is the self-conscious, independent movement of the 
immense majority, in the interest of the immense majority” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
MECW 6:495). For the proletarian movement to be self-conscious is precisely for it to work out, 
ideologically, its present situation, its aims, and the best means by which to attain its ends. 
The question of whether or not Marx eschews ideology altogether is of course of the 
utmost importance to a study of Marx's moral thought. If Marx regards all ideology as inherently 
reactionary, then his theory can hardly be supposed to support the view that morality, which is a 
                                                 
88 This is the view that R. G. Peffer puts forward in his 1990 book, Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice. In Marx 
and Ethics, Philip J. Kain argues, against Althusser, that Marx continues to be a humanist after The German 
Ideology, but defends his view by contending that he does “not think that humanism is ideological” (Kain, Marx 
and Ethics, p. 6). As I will attempt to show over the course of this section, I do not think that Marx espouses 
what would be a premature abolition of ideology, and I do not think that in order to show that an idea or system 
of ideas is progressive, it must be first established that it is non-ideological. 
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species of ideology, can have a revolutionary content. In the current section, I will focus on two 
arguments in defense of ideology. These are both arguments which Marx himself makes in the 
Manifesto, but which received little attention in treatments of this subject. The first argument is 
that ideology has a potentially revolutionary character and can potentially assist even its 
bourgeois practitioners in seeing the need to switch their allegiances to the working class. The 
second argument hangs closely together with the explanation of Marx's historical materialist 
method. Because ideology is the form in which human beings become conscious of “the existing 
conflict between the social productive forces and the relations of production” and “fight it out,” 
(Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, MECW 29:263) it would be 
totally wrongheaded to advocate “non-ideological” modes of thought in a class society. 
Before addressing either of these arguments directly, however, I will first address three 
interrelated questions. These are: What is bourgeois ideology? What is proletarian ideology? 
And, What is the relation between them? 
Put briefly, bourgeois ideology is the view of nature and society from the class standpoint 
of the bourgeoisie. Its specific perspectives on the desirability of existing economic relations, the 
mutability or lack thereof of human characteristics and personality traits, and the best 
explanations of change and development in nature, to name just a few of countless possible 
questions for human beings, are shaped and determined in different ways by the bourgeoisie's 
conception of itself and of bourgeois society as the highest possible form of human social 
development. This is not to say that it is impossible to see from within a bourgeois standpoint 
that there may well be significant room for improvement on existing conditions. However, what 
defines bourgeois ideology and the class standpoint within which it is produced, is a conviction 
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that any further human progress can only be achieved through the leadership of the bourgeois 
class and its institutions, and upon the economic basis of capitalist exchange. 
As Marx writes in 1859, it is human beings' “social existence that determines their 
consciousness” (Preface to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, MECW 
29:263). The economic interests of the capitalist class, together with its actual dominance in 
existing class society, lead its members to confuse wittingly or unwittingly the conditions 
necessary for the promotion of their class's interests with the conditions necessary for the 
advancement of humanity as a whole. This tendency can be overcome with a complete change of 
class allegiance, in which an individual bourgeois or bourgeois ideologist comes to identify with 
the interests of the working class and attempts to theorize from within the proletariat standpoint. 
Such an achievement can take place when there is a great preponderance of evidence telling 
against significant elements of bourgeois ideology together with a personal commitment on the 
part of the individual person to reflect reality in their thinking as faithfully and as clearly as 
possible. 
It is important, when speaking of what Marx refers to as bourgeois ideology, to recognize 
its limits but also to appreciate the huge scope of possible expression within those limits. There 
is a diversity of opinion across the contemporary political spectrum of bourgeois thought, and, as 
it is also important to note, elements of bourgeois ideology can take on a different character at 
different points in history. Thinkers as diverse as John Locke, Maximilien Robespierre, Irving 
Kristol, and Kofi Annan each develop and promote bourgeois ideology, albeit in drastically 
different forms and with fundamental disagreements on key questions. And even a central tenet 
of that ideology, such as that the bourgeoisie represents the interests of humanity and is its 
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rightful leader, was revolutionary and progressive in the 18th Century, and now, Marx would 
argue, deeply conservative, today. 
A key feature of bourgeois ideology and of the bourgeois mode of production at its 
inception, as opposed to the feudal society that it opposed and replaced, was that it gave pride of 
place to science and to materialism. Rationality, materialism, and a scientific worldview free 
from the backwardness and superstition of feudalism facilitated the major advances in production 
that laid the basis for the rise of the bourgeois class. Huge advancements have been made in 
human beings' theoretical understanding of the world and in their capacity to master it and 
subordinate it to their ends, all within an ideology that takes capitalist class society to be the 
highest form of human social organization. As Marx writes in The Communist Manifesto, 
“Whereas past industrial classes depended on maintaining production unchanged, the 
bourgeoisie must constantly revolutionize production and therewith, society” (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:487). And it is capitalism and the need of the bourgeoisie to 
constantly change and revolutionize society which have in turn produced a need for higher levels 
of human consciousness and made it possible for human beings to have a more accurate and 
scientific knowledge of their social existence than was possible in previous class societies. In 
Marx's words, the bourgeoisie has removed the “sentimental halo” from relations of exploitation 
and “Man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real conditions of life, and his 
relations with his kind” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:487).   
However, although that interest in science remains an important part of bourgeois thought 
today, it exists often in a narrow or distorted form, and frequently takes a backseat to this class's 
historical need to compromise with feudal and religious forces and/or to defend itself against 
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working-class challenges to its rule. Whereas opposition to religion was once a defining aspect 
of bourgeois ideology,  religious mysticism now finds itself quite at home within it. The 
Enlightenment ideal which held up science as a form of thought and practice in which the 
deepest and most fundamental questions could be answered through the work and intelligence of 
human beings, has given way to a conception of science as merely the art of manipulation, 
divorced from a deeper inquiry into the nature of reality89. 
Bourgeois ideology is by no means a form of consciousness that exists only among 
members of the bourgeoisie or among its ideologists. As Marx wrote in The Communist 
Manifesto, “The ruling ideas of each age have ever been the ideas of its ruling class,” (Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, MECW 6:503) and not only does the ruling class hold these ideas, but 
throughout the history of a class society, it is usually the case that most of its members also hold 
those ideas. These ideas are developed and promulgated by the ruling class in large part because 
they bolster the reign of that class, and the ruling class has the best infrastructure at its disposal 
to disseminate those ideas. But this alone is not enough to ensure broad assent. In a capitalist 
society, bourgeois consciousness finds widespread acceptance in large part because it actually 
does reflect and explain, if only in a distorted and limited manner, the world in which members 
of that society find themselves. As Marx writes in On the Poverty of Philosophy: 
[S]ocial relations are just as much produced by men as linen, flax, etc. Social relations are closely 
bound up with productive forces. […] The same men who establish their social relations in 
conformity with the material productivity, produce also principles, ideas, and categories, in 
conformity with their social relations. (The Poverty of Philosophy, MECW 6:165-166) 
 
                                                 
89 Georg Lukács illuminates this point in his work, Zur Ontologie des gesellschaftlichen Seins. See the 
Introduction and the section on positivism in Chapter 1, pp. 325-371. 
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To find “proof” that a woman's labor is less valuable than a man's, one need look no further than 
the fact that women earn roughly seventy-six cents on the dollar when compared with men. The 
“evidence” that Blacks are inherently dangerous and must be controlled can be found in the high 
proportion of them who are ensnared in the criminal justice system. Much about the real social 
relations in which human beings stand to one another under capitalism seems to confirm the 
“ruling ideas” of that society, which in turn provide an ideological bulwark for the maintenance 
of those social relations. It is with this in mind that, in The Communist Manifesto, Marx replies to 
the charges of an imagined bourgeois interlocutor: 
But don’t wrangle with us so long as you apply, to our intended abolition of bourgeois property, 
the standard of your bourgeois notions of freedom, culture, law, &c. Your very ideas are but the 
outgrowth of the conditions of your bourgeois production and bourgeois property, just as your 
jurisprudence is but the will of your class made into a law for all, a will whose essential character 
and direction are determined by the economical conditions of existence of your class. (Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, MECW 6:501) 
  
However, within capitalist society, not all ideology is bourgeois ideology. Within class societies 
there exist not only the ideas of the ruling class, but also the ideas of the class that is ruled, but in 
the process of coming to power. In the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the ideas of 
the proletariat are capable of bringing the blurry view of the world through bourgeois ideology 
into sharp focus, revealing what appeared to be the essential and eternal social relations of 
capitalist society, as rather historical, transient, and susceptible to abolition through the active 
intervention of the masses and the production of new economic relations. As Marx writes in On 
the Poverty of Philosophy, continuing the quote cited earlier: 
The same men who establish their social relations in conformity with the material productivity, 
produce also principles, ideas, and categories, in conformity with their social relations. Thus the 
ideas, these categories, are as little eternal as the relations they express. They are historical and 
transitory products. 
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There is a continual movement of growth in productive forces, of destruction in social relations, of 
formation in ideas; the only immutable thing is the abstraction of movement – mors immortalis90. 
(Poverty of Philosophy, MECW 6:166) 
 
Insofar as there is a substantial amount of thought within bourgeois ideology that is 
useful and accurate in reflecting reality, proletarian ideology does not totally discard it and it 
would be mistaken to label the whole of bourgeois ideology throughout its history as worthless. 
The working class is itself a part of bourgeois society and seeks to transform its relations of 
production, building socialism upon a material basis formed by the forces of production 
developed under capitalism. Similarly, proletarian ideology is the attempt to identify and 
preserve what is best in bourgeois thought. Proletarian ideology seeks to transform intellectual 
production so that further progress can be made in developing a theoretical understanding that 
both provides the most accurate possible reflection of reality and the ideal tools necessary for 
human beings to transform nature in accordance with their needs. The transition from bourgeois 
to proletarian ideology is succinctly described by Marx when he writes: 
When people speak of the ideas that revolutionise society, they do but express that fact that within 
the old society the elements of a new one have been created, and that the dissolution of the old 
ideas keeps even pace with the dissolution of the old conditions of existence. (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:503) 
 
We can come now to the first of two principal arguments I will advance in this section 
against understanding all ideology as inherently reactionary: the argument that ideology, as an 
attempt to grapple with the conflicts between the relations of production and the forces of 
production, can play a progressive role in revealing to its practitioners the need for a society led 
by the working class in the interests of humanity. 
                                                 
90 Note from MECW: “Marx quotes these words from the following passage of Lucretius's poem On The Nature of 
Things (Book III, line 869): “mortalem vitam mors cum immortalis ademit” ("when mortal life has been taken 
away by immortal death").” 
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Marx's views with regard to the potentially progressive role of ideology are most clearly 
expressed in his remarks on the phenomenon of bourgeois ideologists who shed their class 
allegiance to the bourgeoisie and join the proletariat in its struggle. As I discussed in the last 
chapter's treatment of the proletarian standpoint, for Marx, the reality of the historical situation 
under capitalism is most clearly appreciated from the point of view of the proletariat, but is by no 
means accessible only to actual proletarians. It is possible in principle for any person to adopt 
this standpoint and to identify with the aims of the working class. In these cases, members of 
other classes, for instance, of the bourgeoisie or petty bourgeoisie, recognize that the proletariat 
is the force in society capable of advancing the interests of humanity as a whole. Marx describes 
this process in the Manifesto: 
Finally, in times when the class struggle nears the decisive hour, the progress of dissolution going 
on within the ruling class, in fact within the whole range of old society, assumes such a violent, 
glaring character, that a small section of the ruling class cuts itself adrift, and joins the 
revolutionary class, the class that holds the future in its hands. Just as, therefore, at an earlier 
period, a section of the nobility went over to the bourgeoisie, so now a portion of the bourgeoisie 
goes over to the proletariat, and in particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists, who have 
raised themselves to the level of comprehending theoretically the historical movement as a whole. 
(Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:494) 
 
As I mentioned earlier in the present section, at least two factors come into place in cases where 
members of the bourgeoisie join the proletariat: 1) a preponderance of evidence emerges which 
throws fundamental tenets of bourgeois ideology into question, and 2) a commitment on the part 
of the individual person to the pursuit of truth and, we can add, to the continued existence and 
development of humanity. Here, both of these factors figure prominently in Marx's description of 
how members of a ruling class may go over to the side of a revolutionary class, and of how such 
defections took place in the conflict between feudal nobility and the bourgeoisie, and now take 
place in the conflict between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. In a time of crisis, bourgeois 
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ideology, and its commitment to the necessary and desirable permanence of capitalist society and 
of the bourgeoisie's leadership of humanity, becomes increasingly difficult to maintain alongside 
a commitment to understanding reality. As the contradictions within capitalist society become 
more “violent” and “glaring,” it becomes easier to see that a continued existence and 
development for human beings will require a fundamentally different type of society in which 
these glaring contradictions have been resolved. 
In this passage then, far from denigrating ideology or assigning it a purely reactionary 
role, Marx expresses the progressive potential of ideology. It should be stressed, however, that it 
is a limited potential—only a “small section of the ruling class” will see the need to support the 
struggle of the revolutionary class. But Marx emphasizes that in the case of bourgeois ideologists 
who side with the working class, it is precisely their ideological accomplishments which allow 
them to see clearly that the proletariat is “the class that holds the future in its hands.” 
Were it the case on Marx's view that ideology is always false consciousness, and always 
obscures reality, it would be impossible to make good sense of Marx's statement that “in 
particular, a portion of the bourgeois ideologists” become radicalized in great part through their 
own theoretical work and ability to capture and reflect a historical moment in which the victory 
of the proletariat is required in order for human progress to continue. Additionally, Marx also 
writes that as members of the bourgeoisie switch allegiances and join the working class, this 
provides the proletariat “with fresh elements of enlightenment and progress” (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:494). This underscores the point that not all bourgeois thought is 
inherently reactionary; rather, what is valuable and progressive in it can be incorporated and 
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further developed in proletarian ideology, and in a socialist society, in a way that is no longer 
possible in a society based on capitalist relations of production. 
This brings us now to the second argument in defense of ideology: because ideology is 
the form in which human beings become conscious of “the existing conflict between the social 
productive forces and the relations of production” and “fight it out,” (Preface to A Contribution 
to the Critique of Political Economy, MECW 29:263) it is simply wrongheaded to expect there to 
be an abolition of ideological modes of thought in a class society, and Marx does not make this 
mistake. 
Famously, Marx envisions a future society in which ideological forms such as morality 
and religion would be abolished. Communism is the theory of the existing elements within 
capitalist society that aim to produce a new society based on democratic control of society's 
resources, the satisfaction of human needs, and the development of human powers. But the 
society aimed at in Communism is not merely a new form of class society with the proletariat as 
the ruling class: rather it is the abolition of class society altogether and with it, class domination 
and class struggle. Communism does not propose for this new society a new moral, political, or 
legal order because these forms of thought have their basis and their application in class society, 
where they express the class struggle and function as ideological weapons with which to wage it. 
For Marx, ideological forms of thought would indeed cease to exist in a fully-developed 
communist society. However, this does not mean that Marx thinks it is either possible or 
desirable to think “non-ideologically” in the present instance. 
At the moment, we still live in class society and the working class must wage its struggle 
within it. Marx does not argue that moral theory, philosophy, political science, and so on are 
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already impotent and outdated. Nothing could be further from the truth, as he himself engages in 
exactly these forms of thought. Moreover, because a transitional socialist society would also be a 
class society, there, too, the working class would use ideology in order to theorize its historical 
situation and to assert its leadership in society91. However, this form of ideology would differ 
greatly from bourgeois ideology. As Marx asks (rhetorically): 
Does it require deep intuition to comprehend that man’s ideas, views, and conception, in one word, 
man’s consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in his 
social relations and in his social life? What else does the history of ideas prove, than that 
intellectual production changes its character in proportion as material production is changed? 
(Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:503) 
 
Proletarian consciousness and socialist consciousness will therefore differ greatly in content 
from bourgeois consciousness. Yet, they will share in common with bourgeois consciousness the 
fact that they are distinctively ideological, because they occur in class societies and reflect an 
ongoing class struggle. 
Now that I have provided the two principal arguments against conceiving of ideology as 
inherently reactionary, I would like to say a bit more about Marx's view that consciousness in a 
fully-developed communist society would be non-ideological, and in particular about his 
rejection of the idea that there are any eternal moral truths. Marx imagines an interlocutor's retort 
to these views: 
“Undoubtedly,” it will be said, “religious, moral, philosophical, and juridical ideas have been 
modified in the course of historical development. But religion, morality, philosophy, political 
science, and law, constantly survived this change. There are, besides, eternal truths, such as 
Freedom, Justice, etc., that are common to all states of society. But Communism abolishes eternal 
                                                 
91 Kai Nielsen, in his 1989 book, Marxism and the Moral Point of View, observes correctly, I think, that morality 
“works to get people to accept the established order or, where it is a revolutionary ideology, to accept a new 
postulated revolutionary social order. It typically serves ruling class interests although sometimes it can also be 
an ideological weapon of a rising class in its struggle with the dominant class” (Nielsen, Marxism and the Moral 
Point of View, p.109). 
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truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it 
therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience.” (Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, MECW 6:504) 
 
This charge provides Marx with an opportunity to counterpose his own historicized 
understanding of morality, et al., to the idea that such forms of thought are ahistorical, eternal, 
and unchanging. That certain moral concepts have been common among various historical 
epochs need not entail that the concepts are valid independently of the historical circumstances 
from which they are drawn or to which they are applied. Marx points out that the “states of 
society” mentioned by his interlocutor have all been marked by the existence of classes and of 
class conflict. It is this class conflict which has made these forms of thought valid as reflections 
of reality or as intellectual tools with which to understand and/or transform it. Marx replies: 
What does this accusation reduce itself to? The history of all past society has consisted in the 
development of class antagonisms, antagonisms that assumed different forms at different epochs. 
But whatever form they may have taken, one fact is common to all past ages, viz., the exploitation 
of one part of society by the other. No wonder, then, that the social consciousness of past ages, 
despite all the multiplicity and variety it displays, moves within certain common forms, or general 
ideas, which cannot completely vanish except with the total disappearance of class antagonisms. 
The Communist revolution is the most radical rupture with traditional property relations; no 
wonder that its development involved the most radical rupture with traditional ideas. (Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, MECW 6:504) 
  
Since social consciousness is determined by historical reality, it is entirely to be expected 
that societies conditioned primarily by class conflict would have certain ideas in common. But 
Communism is a movement which abolishes class society and seeks to produce a new society 
based not on class conflict but on human solidarity. “In place of the old bourgeois society, with 
its classes and class antagonisms,” Marx writes, “we shall have an association, in which the free 
development of each is the condition for the free development of all” (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:506). Marx does not think that a future communist society would 
produce a new moral code since, firstly, it would already be a society based on the needs of 
  134 
human beings and secondly, it would be developed, as Marx argues, out of a long revolutionary 
process in which values such as solidarity would become realized in normal human practice 
through habituation and education. This does not mean that at present, in our class society, there 
is not genuine morality, genuine moral facts of the matter about what human beings ought to do, 
or the resources to make factive moral judgements about existing states of affairs.  A world in 
which class antagonism exists is a world that still has a place for genuine morality. Not only is 
there a role for morality in capitalist society, but Marx also believes there will be a role for 
morality in a transitional socialist society, as well, even as the gap between what is and what 
ought to be grows smaller.  
Marx attempts to expose what he sees as the hypocritical posturings of bourgeois 
morality, as we have seen in the previous chapter and will discuss further later in the present 
chapter. Most of all, he criticizes the tendency of bourgeois morality to justify the existing state 
of affairs as desirable and necessary, and also to see morality itself as fixed and unchanging. Yet, 
Marx shows no sign of shying away from negative moral judgements of bourgeois society. These 
judgements are based on what I argue is the crux of Marx's condemnation of capitalism: that 
capitalism degrades and limits human beings, retards the development of their capacities, fails to 
satisfy their existing needs, and prevents them from producing more sophisticated modes of 
social interaction and metabolism with the natural world that would in turn engender in them 
new needs and lay the material basis for an unlimited human progress and development. 
It should be noted that Marx readily accepts the interlocutor's charge that Communism 
seeks to abolish political science, among other ideological forms of thought. And it goes almost 
without saying that Marx thought it was important to carry out theoretical work in politics as an 
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aid to revolutionary action. The subtle point lies in understanding that one of the goals of 
Communism as a theory and as a movement is to use political means to abolish man as a political 
animal and to abolish the basis for politics altogether. “In the beginning,” Marx writes, “this 
cannot be effected except by means of despotic inroads on the rights of property” (Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, MECW 6:504-5). However, over time, as class distinctions disappear, “the 
public power will lose its political character” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, 6:505) and the 
proletariat will have “abolished its own supremacy as a class.” The desired end is a society 
without politics and class domination. The prescribed means are political organization and what 
Marx refers to as the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat. 
In much the same vein, philosophy is a necessary tool in order to bring about a world in 
which philosophy no longer exists as a separate, specialized enterprise divorced from man's 
everyday existence. And similarly, as long as there is a gap between how human beings ought to 
relate to one another, and how they actually do relate to one another, there will continue to be a 
role for a genuine human morality and for moral theory in working out answers to the questions, 
“What ought we to do?” and “How ought we to live?” The need for this role to be filled can only 
disappear in a future Communist society based on the needs of human beings and in which 
human beings have interactions with one another which are based on relations of human 
solidarity. But at the moment, there is still plenty of need for moral theory. 
In this section, I have used the writings of Marx's middle period, particularly The 
Communist Manifesto and On the Poverty of Philosophy, to further develop and extend a 
treatment of Marx's conception of ideology. In seeking to understand Marx's conception of 
ideology—its origins, its development, and its eventual abolition—it is important to read his 
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comments about ideology in the light of his historical materialist method. Marx sees non-
ideological thought as the desirable product of a fully-developed communist society. However, 
he also shows that such thought can only be produced through a thorough transformation of 
society's relations of production. For his critique of ideology to take the form of a command that 
people think non-ideologically today, in a class society, would be an example of exactly the sort 
of idealist and utopian voluntarism that he rejects. 
I have argued that in the years following the completion of The German Ideology, Marx 
continues to make criticisms of bourgeois society that are part of a moral critique of capitalism 
based on its failure to promote the full and continued development of the human individual. In 
the following section, I will examine these criticisms further and show how they are consistent 
with and further develop Marx's conception of ideology. 
3.2 MARX'S MORAL CRITIQUES OF BOURGEOIS SOCIETY 
AND BOURGEOIS MORALITY 
But capital not only lives upon labour. 
Like a master, at once distinguished and barbarous, 
it drags with it into its grave the corpses of its slaves, 
whole hecatombs of workers, who perish in the crises. 
 
Marx, “Wage Labour and Capital,” 1847 
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I have demonstrated elsewhere that in Marx's earlier work leading up to and through The 
German Ideology, it is impossible to maintain, as for instance Allen Wood does, that Marx 
thought it was always invalid to make moral criticisms of a society according to standards that do 
not serve to uphold that society's economic system or the interests of its ruling class. In The 
Communist Manifesto, Marx continues to make moral criticisms of capitalist society and its 
intrinsic aims, and he does so here on the same basis as before: capitalism degrades the human 
being, limits the satisfaction of his needs, and stunts the development of his powers. The 
question of which things enrich human beings and contribute to the development of their 
capacities as all-sided beings and which things degrade human beings is at the basis of Marx's 
moral outlook. In the Manifesto, and in the documents he produces immediately before it, such 
as the 1847 “Wages,” Marx does not shy away at all from making moral critiques of the 
bourgeoisie's role in society and of bourgeois morality's function in legitimizing that role. 
Marx's criticisms of bourgeois society and of bourgeois morality in the years between 
1847 and 1857 fall into two broad categories. On the one hand, there are Marx's criticisms of 
bourgeois society and of bourgeois morality, proper.  Marx criticizes bourgeois morality on the 
basis that it is tied to the preservation of bourgeois rule and the political and economic status 
quo, and that this status quo is itself immoral insofar as it stunts the development of human 
individuality and the expression of human essence, while it is possible to change this society and 
thereby alleviate the social ills brought about by capitalism. Marx emphasizes that bourgeois 
morality is a particular historical form that will pass away along with the abolition of its material 
basis, the capitalist mode of production. Here, I examine three critiques Marx puts forward of 
bourgeois society and of bourgeois morality. The first is a critique of Malthusianism. The second 
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is Marx's criticism of working conditions under capitalism. And the third is Marx's argument that 
the bourgeoisie is simply unfit to rule based on an objective standard of fitness. 
On the other hand, Marx responds to the moral criticisms that bourgeois ideologists level 
against communism. Those criticisms range from communism's supposed failure to value the 
individual, to its disregard for bourgeois family values. Here, Marx focuses largely on the 
hypocrisy of these charges. 
In addition to these critiques of bourgeois society and bourgeois morality, and his 
refutations of bourgeois moral criticisms of communism, Marx also engages with several 
questions of applied ethics. I will discuss those here and examine the type of reasoning that Marx 
applies to questions such as capital punishment, showing that his reasoning there is a consistent 
application of his moral theory based on human individuality. I will begin by discussing Marx's 
critique of Malthusianism. 
Thomas Robert Malthus's 1798 volume, Essay on the Principle of Population, was 
written as a response to the view held by Enlightenment thinkers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, 
Thomas Godwin, and others, that society and human beings were capable of considerable future 
progress towards a fully rational society. Godwin, one of Malthus's principal targets, opposed the 
idea of a fixed human nature, arguing that with a change in the structure of society, there could 
also be produced significant changes in human beings themselves. Malthus aimed to show that 
such significant progress was impossible, taking aim at Enlightenment aspirations for a better 
and more rational society. Malthus claimed instead that the human population would grow 
exponentially and in doing so, put such strain on humanity's resources that overall, life would 
only become nastier, more brutish, and shorter.  The situation could be ameliorated somewhat, 
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Malthus offered, through abstinence from procreation, especially among the poor. Indeed, 
Malthus claimed that exponential population growth was produced by God so that human beings 
would be forced to learn such virtues as abstinence and restraint. According to him, it would 
always be the case that population growth would outstrip the resources available to satisfy the 
needs of society, and thus it was not possible to improve society by increasing production, since 
the population would always increase to catch up with and eventually outstrip it. 
In “Wages,” Marx targets Malthus's claim that world overpopulation is the cause of 
widespread poverty, as well as the promise of increased wages and marginally improved living 
conditions for the worker, if only the worker will limit his reproduction and cease to add to the 
“oversupply” of labor. Marx attacks what he refers to as the “utter stupidity, baseness92 and 
hypocrisy of this doctrine” (“Wages”, MECW 6:428). Malthusianism's advice to the worker is 
“stupid” because it is so totally impracticable. In fact, Malthus himself admits this and it 
constitutes part of the grounds for his pessimism about the possibility of greatly and permanently 
improving conditions for human beings. 
Malthusianism is also hypocritical because the bourgeoisie cannot possibly desire for the 
working class to become smaller, since, as Marx writes: 
Big industry constantly requires a reserve army of unemployed workers for times of 
overproduction. The main purpose of the bourgeois in relation to the worker is, of course, to have 
the commodity labour as cheaply as possible, which is only possible when the supply of this 
commodity is as large as possible in relation to the demand for it, i.e., when the overpopulation is 
the greatest. (“Wages”, MECW 6:433) 
  
Even if it were the case that unchecked population growth was the cause of poverty, it 
would be impossible to address this effectively in an economic system that relies precisely on 
                                                 
92 “Niederträchtigkeit,” in Marx's German. 
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there being many more workers than there are jobs. It could only be addressed by overthrowing 
that system, but of course, this is not what the bourgeois intends when he adopts Malthusianism 
as an explanation of social woes, neither is it what Malthus himself prescribed, preferring instead 
to lay the blame for this suffering at the feet of the poor and their failure to be more sparing in 
their procreation. 
This leaves us with the question of why Marx finds Malthusianism to be “base.” 
Malthusianism is “base” because it places the moral blame for the worker's miserable condition 
upon the worker himself. If only the worker exerted greater self-control, the Malthusian can 
think, he would not be in such a sorry condition. It gives the bourgeois a license to observe 
widespread privation not as a product of capitalist society which could potentially be done away 
with, but rather as the natural and necessary,  if lamentable, condition of human beings. As Marx 
writes, Malthusianism: 
is the more welcome to the bourgeois as it silences his conscience, makes hard-heartedness into a 
moral duty and the consequences of society into the consequences of nature, and finally gives him 
the opportunity to watch the destruction of the proletariat by starvation as calmly as any other 
natural event without bestirring himself, and, on the other hand, to regard the misery of the 
proletariat as its own fault and to punish it. To be sure, the proletarian can restrain his natural 
instinct by reason, and so, by moral supervision, halt the law of nature in its injurious course of 
development. (“Wages”, 6:433) 
 
To relate this back to one of the main themes of this section, it is important to notice here that 
Marx is more than happy to reject a theory precisely on the basis that it merely serves to justify 
and uphold existing capitalist social arrangements which, in the light of how they needlessly 
damage or destroy a large section of humanity, are unjustifiable. The aim of Malthusianism as a 
doctrine is to lower expectations about what kind of society it is possible for human beings to 
achieve, and to thereby provide justification for the existing society with all of its faults. If the 
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optimism of figures such as Rousseau and Corcoret represented some of the most progressive 
elements of bourgeois ideology, Malthusianism captures its conservative side that has reconciled 
itself to the limits of capitalist production. As Nicholas Churchich writes in his 1994 book, 
Marxism and Morality: 
A movement of thought originating from Darwin's theory of evolution and inspired by writers like 
Malthus and Spencer gradually became a significant intellectual force destined to play a 
considerable role in the second half of the nineteenth century. This movement of thought was 
expressed in Social Darwinism which was essentially an attempt to justify the existing 
individualistic laissez faire and competitive system of class society. Both Marx and Engels reject 
the ideology of Social Darwinism […]. 
Social Darwinism, Marx contends, is characterised by the evils of unrestricted private enterprise. 
Instead of treating society as the organisational means by which men cooperate in the tasks of 
promoting their social and moral ends, Social Darwinists reduce it to the Hobbesian state of 
'bellum omnium contra omnes'. (Churchich, Marxism and Morality, p. 229). 
 
Marx's critique of Malthusianism is no mere historical sidenote. Rather, it provides us 
with an important source of insight into Marx's criticisms of bourgeois morality more generally. 
Marx's principal charge against Malthus is that he exonerates capitalist society in its role in 
producing human misery, and closes the theoretical space for a systematic critique of capitalism 
by putting in its place a set of moral demands aimed at the poor and designed to blame them for 
their own suffering. This tactic is by no means the monopoly of Malthusianism, and in fact Marx 
criticizes Christian morality among other forms of morality for performing the same exculpatory 
task for bourgeois society. Also, Malthusianism is by no means a historical relic, and strong 
echoes of it can be heard today in the rhetoric of welfare reform, in certain corners of the 
environmentalist movement, and in other sectors all across the political spectrum. I will say more 
about Malthusianism in the next chapter, as it is a topic that Marx returns to in later works such 
as Capital. 
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In addition to criticizing the expression of bourgeois morality in theories such as 
Malthusianism, Marx also levels moral criticisms against the capitalist mode of production, 
itself. In The Communist Manifesto, Marx describes the worker's situation under capitalism as a 
type of slavery, crystallizing into one word the extent to which labor under capitalism is a yoke 
and an affront to the worker. He writes: 
Masses of labourers, crowded into the factory, are organised like soldiers. As privates of the 
industrial army they are placed under the command of a perfect hierarchy of officers and 
sergeants. Not only are they slaves of the bourgeois class, and of the bourgeois State; they are 
daily and hourly enslaved by the machine, by the overlooker93, and, above all, by the individual 
bourgeois manufacturer himself. The more openly this despotism proclaims gain to be its end and 
aim, the more petty, the more hateful and the more embittering it is.94 (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:491) 
 
The worker faces the naked domination of capital from its representation in the capitalist 
state all the way down to individual capitalist, a despotism which is “petty, hateful, and 
embittering” because its aim is nothing higher than mere capitalist accumulation—an end that 
cannot justify the injury done to human beings in order to achieve it in a time when, as Marx 
believes, capitalism has outlived its usefulness to humanity and it is now possible to develop a 
more rational society. I do not think we can read Marx's use of the word “hateful” here as 
morally neutral. Marx uses starkly normative language here to drive home how objectionable the 
capitalist system, the capitalist division of labor, and the character of that labor, truly is. 
 Marx goes beyond a mere statement of capitalism's odiousness to provide an 
objective standard of a class's fitness to rule: a standard which capitalism fails to meet. In order 
for a class to be fit to rule, Marx argues, that class's conditions of existence must permit the 
                                                 
93 “Overseer” would be a better translation here. 
94 The statement is no less normative in its original German: “Diese Despotie ist um so kleinlicher, gehässiger, 
erbitterter, je offener sie den Erwerb als ihren Zweck proklamiert.” Historical materialism takes human 
production and the circumstances in which it takes place to be fundamental in conditioning human existence. 
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continued existence of society as a whole. On this standard, the bourgeoisie is unfit to rule 
because it cannot even guarantee to its “slaves” (the proletariat) so much as a continued slavish 
existence. Marx writes: 
[T]he bourgeoisie is unfit any longer to be the ruling class in society, and to impose its conditions 
of existence upon society as an over-riding law. It is unfit to rule because it is incompetent to 
assure an existence to its slave within his slavery, because it cannot help letting him sink into such 
a state, that it has to feed him, instead of being fed by him. Society can no longer live under this 
bourgeoisie, in other words, its existence is no longer compatible with society. (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:495-6) 
 
It follows, then, that the state of alienation that Hegel proposed to solve in an idealist way in his 
dialectic of Lordship and Bondage is no static state, but rather a dynamic one which the slave 
cannot resolve simply by accommodating himself to his situation at an ideal level. For Hegel, the 
slave feels himself alienated in his condition, one in which his labor does not belong to him. He 
eventually comes to understand, however, that the master's existence depends upon him. He 
produces the master, and thereby, produces his own slavery and his own condition. Once the 
slave recognizes that he has produced and is continually producing his master's existence, as well 
as his own, and the relationship between him and his master, he no longer feels alienated, and 
recognizes himself in his situation. However, the actual slave relation remains untouched—all 
that has changed is the slave's ideas about his situation. In reality, however, the worker in his 
modern-day slavery cannot continue his enslaved existence produced by capitalist society, 
however idealistically reconciled he might become to it, because there is a constant downward 
pressure on his standard of living until it ultimately threatens his continued survival. 
Marx observes that in the relationship between bourgeoisie and proletariat, the relations 
do not remain static and tenable, as they are assumed to be in Hegel's dialectic of lordship and 
bondage. Rather, the proletariat constantly sinks deeper and deeper into poverty and loses its 
  144 
ability to maintain its own existence, much less produce the existence of the bourgeoisie. It is 
upon this basis that Marx derives a standard of fitness for a class to rule. Because the 
bourgeoisie's conditions of existence will lead to the disintegration of society altogether, it is 
unfit to rule society. The slave cannot even continue his slavish existence in capitalist society. 
The choice for the proletariat becomes, then, either to overthrow the existing society and to 
impose the working class's conditions of existence—its lack of private property and its 
participation in labor—as a law for society, or to be extinguished in a time of crisis, “dragged 
into the grave” along with his master. 
In addition to criticizing bourgeois morality and bourgeois society themselves, Marx also 
responds to a series of moral charges made against Communism. He does this by exposing the 
hypocrisy of these charges and also by demonstrating how empty the principles they are based 
upon are even within capitalist society. Here I will address just a few of these charges, and 
Marx's responses to them. It should be noted from the start that if Marx eschewed morality as 
such and thought that it was always reactionary, he could have made much quicker work of these 
criticisms. He might have simply said that there is no morality, that nothing is actually morally 
right or wrong, but merely either economically and historically determined or not, and that 
therefore the moral objections are completely without traction. But he does not say this. Instead, 
he shows that bourgeois society itself fails to meet the lofty standards of its own bourgeois 
morality. He goes on to criticize the standards themselves, and in the process he levels moral 
condemnations of bourgeois morality and the role it plays in bolstering the rule of the capitalist 
class. 
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Marx's bourgeois interlocutor argues that the abolition of private property will do away 
with individuality. Marx argues that the bourgeoisie accuses communism of doing away with 
“individuality,” but it can really only mean that communism does away with the bourgeois 
owner of property. In fact, as I already discussed in the previous chapter, the development of 
human individuality is the principal value in Marx's communist theory. So Marx writes: 
From the moment when labour can no longer be converted into capital, money, or rent, into a 
social power capable of being monopolised, i.e., from the moment when individual property can 
no longer be transformed into bourgeois property, into capital, from that moment, you say, 
individuality vanishes. 
You must, therefore, confess that by “individual” you mean no other person than the bourgeois, 
than the middle-class owner of property. This person must, indeed, be swept out of the way, and 
made impossible. (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:500) 
 
“Individualism” may well be a convenient and ubiquitous buzzword in capitalist society, but in 
reality, human beings under capitalism live a limited existence in which their individuality is 
more hampered and stunted rather than it is expressed and developed. Marx writes that “in 
bourgeois society capital is independent and has individuality, while the living person is 
dependent and has no individuality” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:499). The 
bourgeois person, as an owner of capital, is able to have what Marx refers to earlier in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts as the “semblance” of a human existence. Money allows 
him to satisfy his needs and develop his powers, to whatever extent is possible in society under 
capitalism. But as Marx writes, in capitalist society, “private property is already done away with 
for nine-tenths of the population; its existence for the few is solely due to its non-existence in the 
hands of those nine-tenths.” The vast majority of human beings do not have access to capital and 
therefore do not have access to even this semblance of a human existence and a developed 
individuality. For that to happen, Marx argues, would require the abolition of private property 
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and the society that corresponds to it. Then, in a society based on democratic control of society's 
resources, aimed at the development of human beings, it would be possible for human 
individuality to be developed on a society-wide scale. Human individuality would not be 
destroyed, but rather promoted and developed to an extent that is impossible to achieve upon the 
basis of capitalist relations of production. 
Marx deploys an important distinction here between “individual property” and 
“bourgeois property.” Bourgeois property is a form of property in which it is possible for one 
segment of society to enjoy exclusive ownership of resources such as land, fossil fuels, factories, 
etc. which are necessary for the production of goods which satisfy the needs of all human beings 
in the whole society.  Since this type of ownership excludes the majority of society from having 
a share in the forces of production, it compels them to sell what they do own that would be useful 
to the capitalist—their labor—in order to earn the money that would allow them to satisfy their 
needs through purchasing some of the products. It is this system that Marx wants to abolish. 
Individual property, on the other hand, is simply a result of the fact that in performing labor, 
human beings appropriate natural resources. Whereas under capitalism this individual property is 
transformed into capitalist private property, in socialism, as Marx later writes in the first volume 
of Capital, there would be a “transformation of capitalistic private property, already practically 
resting on socialized production, into socialized property” (Capital: MECW 35:751). 
Continuing his defense of communism and exposé of the hypocrisy of bourgeois 
morality, Marx turns to the question of what we might now refer to, albeit somewhat 
anachronistically, as “family values.” Here, he discusses two very closely related bourgeois 
moral criticisms of communism. The first, is that communism would abolish marriage and 
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introduce “community of women.” The second, is that communism would abolish the bourgeois 
family. 
In leveling the first charge, the bourgeois “ridiculously,” Marx says, displays a “virtuous 
indignation” at a supposed “community of women” to be introduced under communism. Again, 
Marx raises a two-pronged attack, criticizing the hypocrisy inherent in the institution of 
bourgeois marriage under capitalism, and going on to show how the charge gets things wrong 
about what life under communism would be like. We can find the origins of this argument in the 
document that The Communist Manifesto was based upon in part: Frederick Engels' “The 
Principles of Communism,” written in 1847 as a draft program for the Communist League95. 
There, Engels suggests an answer to the question, “What will be the influence of communist 
society on the family?” He answers: 
It will make the relation between the sexes a purely private relation which concerns only the 
persons involved, and in which society has no call to interfere. It is able to do this because it 
abolishes private property and educates children communally, thus destroying the twin foundation 
of hitherto existing marriage--the dependence through private property of the wife upon the 
husband and of the children upon the parents. Here also is the answer to the outcry of moralising 
philistines against the communist community of women. Community of women is a relationship 
that belongs altogether to bourgeois society and is completely realised today in prostitution. But 
prostitution is rooted in private property and falls with it. Thus instead of introducing the 
community of women, communist organisation puts an end to it. (Engels, Principles of 
Communism, MECW 6:354) 
 
 Engels' insights are further developed in The Communist Manifesto, where we find the 
following passage about marriage and the status of women: 
But you Communists would introduce community of women, screams the bourgeoisie in chorus. 
[...] [N]othing is more ridiculous than the virtuous indignation of our bourgeois at the community 
of women which, they pretend, is to be openly and officially established by the Communists. […] 
Bourgeois marriage is, in reality, a system of wives in common and thus, at the most, what the 
Communists might possibly be reproached with is that they desire to introduce, in substitution for 
a hypocritically concealed, an openly legalised community of women. For the rest, it is self-
                                                 
95  This was the first international communist organization. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels were both members. 
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evident that the abolition of the present system of production must bring with it the abolition of the 
community of women springing from that system, i.e., of prostitution both public and private. 
(Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:502) 
 
It is entirely misguided, as I hope will be only more obvious to readers today, to suppose 
that in a transition to communism, women would simply be socialized right along with the rest of 
private property. The charge itself reveals to what extent women are treated as, thought to be, 
and to an extent under capitalism actually are, objects to be owned. By assuring that every 
person's needs are satisfied and thereby eliminating the dependence of women upon men, 
communism would actually dissolve social relations in which women become objects of private 
property. This is especially apparent in that the whole social and economic basis for prostitution, 
an institution in which human beings but particularly women are bought and sold, would be 
abolished, whereas it flourishes today in capitalist society. Here, too, Marx and Engels show that 
bourgeois society fails to realize the principles and standards it sets for itself, that its ideologists 
engage in further hypocrisy when they accuse communism of failures which belong rather to 
bourgeois society, and that communism would for the first time realize such aims as the full 
emancipation of women. 
In response to the second charge, that communism will abolish the bourgeois family, 
Marx responds: 
 
The bourgeois clap-trap about the family and education, about the hallowed co-relation of parent 
and child, becomes all the more disgusting, the more, by the action of Modern Industry, all the 
family ties among the proletarians are torn asunder, and their children transformed into simple 
articles of commerce and instruments of labour. (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 
6:502) 
 
In other words, communism could hardly do more to destroy the sanctity of family relationships 
than is already done in capitalist society. For all the paeans sung to the institution of the family 
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under capitalism, the family is very often the site of abuse and petty tyranny (today, three million 
reports of child abuse are made in the United States each year96). As Marx writes in the 1845 
document, “Peuchet: On Suicide”: 
The most cowardly, unresisting people become implacable as soon as they can exercise their 
absolute parental authority. The abuse of this authority is, as it were, a crude compensation97 for 
all the submissiveness and dependence to which they abase themselves willy-nilly in bourgeois 
society. (Peuchet: On Suicide, MECW 4:605) 
  
And in addition to all this, stretched to the limit by long hours and grueling working 
conditions, many parents are deprived of time and energy to devote to building better family 
relationships and closer ties to one another and to their children, even if they wanted to. Because 
of this, whatever feelings of sympathy and care they might have towards the members of their 
families can find little expression. 
So bourgeois society fails to realize its own principle of upholding and supporting the 
institution of the family. On the other hand, communist society would remove the extreme 
dependence of child upon parent by providing social resources for the care and education of 
children, thereby decreasing the vulnerability of children to abuse. Parents themselves would be 
under significantly less pressure, insofar as their own needs would be met and the character of 
work would be radically transformed, and would have greater time and resources to devote to 
their children. Such features of communist society would make it more possible for there to be 
familial bonds based on love rather than on abject dependence and the treatment of children (and 
wives) as pieces of private property. 
                                                 
96 Statistic from http://www.childhelp.org/pages/statistics 
97 Marx's emphasis throughout this citation. 
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To avoid the conclusion that fundamentally different relations of production would be 
required in order to remedy the ills produced by capitalist society, some suggest that perhaps 
what is most needed is greater and improved education of the masses98. Marx critically evaluates 
this suggestion in the 1847 document, “Wages”: 
2. Another suggestion, very popular with the bourgeoisie, is education, especially comprehensive 
industrial education. 
We shall not draw attention to the trite contradiction which lies in the fact that modern industry 
replaces compound labour more and more with simple labour which requires no education; we 
shall not draw attention to the fact that it throws more and more children from the age of seven 
upwards behind the machine and turns them into a source of income not only for the bourgeois 
class but for their own proletarian parents; the factory system frustrates the school laws, example 
Prussia; nor shall we draw attention to the fact that the education of the mind, if the worker had 
such an education, has no direct effect at all on his wages, that education is altogether dependent 
on the conditions of life, and that by moral education the bourgeois understands indoctrination 
with bourgeois principles, and that, finally, the bourgeois class neither has the means, nor if it had 
them would it use them, to offer the people a real education. (“Wages”, MECW 6:427) 
 
Capitalism, as Marx writes later in The Communist Manifesto, must educate the worker in order 
to prepare her for the tasks of industrial production. However, there is another tendency under 
capitalism with regard to education that exists in contradiction to the need for better-educated 
workers. As production becomes more complex and more sophisticated, the division of labor 
intensifies. Tasks to be performed become increasingly one-sided and therefore so does the type 
of education necessary for a worker to perform them. This decreases the bourgeoisie's incentive 
to educate workers, as doing so becomes increasingly superfluous to capitalist production and the 
accumulation of profit. (Consider for a moment the 2009 Chronicle of Higher Education titled, 
“Are Too Many Students Going to College?” First of all, it is telling that such a question could 
even come up in a society at our stage of development. It is even more telling that several 
respondents—all professionals in higher education—answered this question in the affirmative. In 
                                                 
98 Think here of John Dewey or Maria Montessori. 
  151 
one particularly startling case, Bryan Caplan, an associate professor of economics at George 
Mason University, supported his affirmative reply with the observation that college attendance 
“deprives the economy of millions of man-years of output.”)99 
 Education as a cure-all for social ills is indeed a chimera in bourgeois society, as 
education itself is subject to, and developed and provided in accordance with, the needs of 
capitalist production. Marx underscores this point with the claim that “by moral education the 
bourgeois understands indoctrination with bourgeois principles.” The social problems inherent in 
capitalist society will not be corrected through its system of education, bringing us back to the 
point that for such moral ideals as the emancipation of women or loving family relationships to 
be realized, would require a transformation of society itself through a change in the relations of 
production. 
 As we have seen thus far in this section, Marx does engage in immanent critique of 
bourgeois society and bourgeois morality, aiming to show that these institutions fail even by their 
own standards. However, it would be wrong to suggest that Marx in any way limits himself to 
immanent critique. As seen in his critique of Malthusianism, Marx is perfectly happy to criticize 
the standards themselves and to criticize moral theories specifically because they do simply serve 
to uphold bourgeois society and to obscure its inherent faults and limitations. 
 In The Communist Manifesto, while Marx devotes a great deal of attention to specific 
bourgeois moral criticisms of communism, he also in the end assumes a dismissive posture, 
writing that “The charges against Communism made from a religious, a philosophical, and 
                                                 
99 http://chronicle.com/article/Are-Too-Many-Students-Going-to/49039 
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generally, from an ideological standpoint, are not deserving of serious examination” (Manifesto 
of the Communist Party, MECW 6:503). According to Marx, they are not deserving of serious 
examination because it is so obvious that “man's ideas, views and conceptions, in one word, 
man's consciousness, changes with every change in the conditions of his material existence, in 
his social relations and in his social life.” I would like to point out that it does not in any way 
follow from this that Marx thinks philosophy and ideology are inherently wrong or worthless. 
Rather, the point he is making here is that at the end of the day, bourgeois ideology is tied to 
bourgeois interests and it would be a mistake not to understand the historical, social, and 
economic basis from which these ideas are developed. And as I have shown, while Marx might 
not think these charges are deserving of serious examination, still he provides them with serious 
examination, because they cannot simply be ignored if one is to make the case for communism 
to persons living in a capitalist society and influenced by bourgeois consciousness. 
 As Marx continues to turn his attention more directly to practical concerns in history and 
politics in the years following the completion of The German Ideology, we see that he outlines 
positions on specific moral problems such as capital punishment and slavery. Here, I will attempt 
to show the kind of moral reasoning that Marx employs in discussing these issues, focusing here 
on the example of capital punishment. This will shed further light upon Marx's moral philosophy. 
3.2.1 Marx on Capital Punishment 
In his article, “Capital Punishment,” written in 1853 for the New York Daily Tribune, Marx 
criticizes the practice of capital punishment in England, writing that  “it would be very difficult, 
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if not altogether impossible, to establish any principle upon which the justice or expediency of 
capital punishment could be founded, in a society glorying in its civilization.” (Capital 
Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-Regulations of the Bank of England, MECW 11:496) In 
building his argument for this claim, Marx appeals to several of the principles which I have 
argued form the basis of his moral philosophy. In particular, his critique of capital punishment 
centers largely around a conception of the human individual as a multi-faceted being that ought 
to be dealt with not just in terms of one side or aspect of its existence, but as an organic whole100. 
 Marx considers three arguments advanced in favor of capital punishment. These are the 
argument from amelioration, the argument from deterrence and the argument from retribution. 
Marx begins by assessing the arguments from amelioration and deterrence together. He describes 
these arguments briefly as follows: “Punishment in general has been defended as a means either 
of ameliorating or of intimidating.” (Capital Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-Regulations 
of the Bank of England, MECW 11:496) The argument from amelioration holds that punishment 
is justified as a means to comfort other persons who may have been hurt or disturbed by the 
crime of the accused. The argument from deterrence holds that punishment is justified in virtue 
of its effectiveness in discouraging other would-be criminals from breaking the law. Such would-
be criminals, it is supposed, would be deterred from crime out of the fear that they may become 
subject to the same sort of treatment as the person who has been convicted and punished. Marx's 
                                                 
100 It is important to note that although Marx argued here against the practice of capital punishment, he did not at 
any point renounce revolutionary violence. As I mentioned earlier in Section 2.5, in my treatment of Marx's 
critique of Utopianism, Marx argues that in pursuing their aims, the proletariat will at times be met with 
reactionary violence on the part of the bourgeoisie and will have to defend itself against this violence, sometimes 
through violent means. It must be kept in mind the context in which Marx published this argument against 
capital punishment. It is a polemical meant for a popular audience and aimed specifically at capital punishment 
as an institution used to bolster the status quo of capitalist society and bourgeois rule. 
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first criticism of both arguments is based on the failure of such justifications to respect the status 
of the accused as an individual. He writes, “Now what right have you to punish me for the 
amelioration or intimidation of others?” (Capital Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-
Regulations of the Bank of England, MECW 11:496) A harm done to the convicted criminal, 
Marx states, cannot be justified on the basis of some effect it would have upon others. 
 Marx's refutation of the argument from retribution is laid out in greater detail, and 
demonstrates the connections among metaphysics, rights theory, and questions of applied ethics. 
Marx considers Hegel's argument that punishment is justified because the criminal has a right to 
it and is the author of his own punishment: 
Punishment is the right of the criminal. It is an act of his own will. The violation of right has been 
proclaimed by the criminal as his own right. His crime is the negation of right. Punishment is the 
negation of this negation, and consequently an affirmation of right, solicited and forced upon the 
criminal by himself.101 (This is Marx’s description of Hegel’s argument from the Philosophy of 
Right. It appears in Capital Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-Regulations of the Bank of 
England, MECW 11:496.) 
 
Marx responds that “German idealism here, as in most other instances, has but given a 
transcendental sanction to the rules of existng society.” 
Is it not a delusion to substitute for the individual with his real motives, with multifarious social 
circumstances pressing upon him, the abstraction of “free-will” — one among the many qualities 
of man for man himself! This theory, considering punishment as the result of the criminal’s own 
will, is only a metaphysical expression for the old “jus talionis” (the right of retaliation by 
inflicting punishment of the same kind) eye against eye, tooth against tooth, blood against blood. 
(Capital Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-Regulations of the Bank of England, MECW 
11:496) 
 
                                                 
101  In The Philosophy of Right, Hegel argues that “The injury which the criminal experiences is inherently just 
because it expresses his own inherent will, is a visible proof of his freedom and is his right. But more than that, 
the injury is a right of the criminal himself, and is implied in his realized will or act. In his act, the act of a 
rational being, is involved a universal element, which by the act is set up as a law. This law he has recognized in 
his act, and has consented to be placed under it as under his right” (G. W. Hegel, S. W. Dyde (tr.) The Philosophy 
of Right, Cosimo, Inc., 2008 p.37). 
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Like the argument from amelioration and like the argument from deterrence, according to Marx, 
the argument from retribution also fails to take into account the criminal as a whole, multi-sided, 
concretely existing individual. Instead of considering the criminal as an “individual with real 
motives” and with “multifarious social circumstances pressing upon him”102, that is, as a real 
individual living in society and subject to a range of drives, pressures, and influences which play 
a role in the commission of his crime, the argument from retribution abstracts away from that 
real existing individual and puts in its place an abstraction of one of the countless qualities that a 
person has. 
For Marx, the argument from retribution fails as a justification not just for capital 
punishment but for punishment of any type, because where it ought to explain why it is justified 
to punish a real concrete individual, the argument from retribution instead changes the subject, 
providing a theory rather of how it can be justified to punish an “abstraction of free will.” The 
argument from retribution, then, functions according to Marx as a metaphysical sleight of hand, 
invoking the abstract free will to justify jus talionis, when in fact it is not the “free will” that acts, 
unburdened by social circumstances or “real motives,” but the specific concrete individual who 
acts within a sphere of freedom that is shaped and circumscribed by a host of social factors. Any 
satisfactory justification of punishment, then, must take this type of real actor into account. 
Marx goes on to explain what he takes to be the real role of legal punishment in general 
and capital punishment in particular, quite apart from the arguments often made to justify the 
practices: “Plainly speaking, and dispensing with all paraphrases, punishment is nothing but a 
                                                 
102 As Marx later writes in an 1859 article Population - Crime - and Pauperism for the New York Daily Tribune, 
MECW 16:489, “There must be something rotten in the very core of a social system which increases its wealth 
without diminishing its misery, and increases in crimes even more rapidly than in numbers.” 
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means of society to defend itself against the infraction of its vital conditions, whatever may be 
their character” (Capital Punishment:-Mr. Cobden's Pamphlet:-Regulations of the Bank of 
England, MECW 11:497). 
Marx's critique of capital punishment provides us with an example of how he thought his 
moral philosophy could be applied to specific moral questions. We see that his arguments against 
capital punishment each relate to how the individuality of a human person is to be understood 
and respected. 
3.2.2 Conclusion of section on Marx's moral critiques of bourgeois society and bourgeois 
morality 
In this section, we have discussed Marx's critiques of bourgeois society, his critiques of 
bourgeois morality, his refutation of bourgeois moral criticisms against communism, and the 
application of Marx's moral philosophy to a specific problem such as the question of capital 
punishment. I have attempted to demonstrate that Marx is deeply involved with moral questions 
and that as I argued in the earlier section on Marx's conception of ideology, he recognizes that 
engagement in ideological forms of thought is a necessary part of class struggle. 
In Marx's earlier writings, it was always his contention that mere abstract moralizing and 
mere ideal criticism of existing society are not enough. Any claims about how society ought to 
be organized and how human beings ought to live must be grounded in an accurate appraisal of 
what human beings essentially are and how human society has developed throughout history. 
Without such a scientific understanding of human beings and of human history, any claims about 
what ought to be can only be abstract moral pronouncements divorced from a conception of how 
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such aims can be realized. In Marx's writings after The German Ideology, we see that Marx 
becomes increasingly interested in anthropology, economics and politics. But he does not, in 
doing so, reject his earlier concerns with moral philosophy. Instead, he becomes more concrete 
in investigating and explaining how human beings, who have so far produced their social being 
but have done so mostly unconsciously, can come to produce society consciously, and with the 
development of the human being as its guiding principle. For Marx, this human development 
continues to be a development of the human being as an all-sided individual, capable of 
satisfying an expanding array of needs and developing an expanding array of powers. Thus, the 
development of concrete or, as Marx puts it, of “rich” individuality, the full flourishing of the 
individual human being in the external world, and the active appropriation of that world in order 
to satisfy human ends, continues to appear as a moral end for human beings. As Marx argues, 
this end can be realized not through pious “sacrifice” or any other utopian means, but rather only 
through the production of a society in which human beings control their own labor and regard 
“man as the highest being for man.” 
In the following section, I will show how in his later works, Marx continues to theorize 
the distinction between concrete individuality and abstract individualism, as well as this 
distinction's relevance to the question of how best to understand human nature. I will also 
explore further what consequences this latter question has for our understanding of what type of 
society is best suited to human beings, as well as the relevance and importance of each of these 
themes to the discussion of morality in Marx's work. 
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3.3 INDIVIDUALS AND INDIVIDUALITY 
The question of how best to understand human individuality, as I have argued in the previous 
chapter, is a key element of Marx's moral philosophy. Marx's conception of individuality 
represents a significant point of departure from the abstract, atomized individual of liberal 
theory. Instead, Marx proceeds from an understanding of human beings as concrete “social 
individuals” and looks to the results of natural and social science to form the basis of his 
theorizing about how human beings ought to live. Instead of the liberal picture of human beings 
as competitive individuals who produce society in order to satisfy their egoistic wants, Marx 
presents human beings as essentially social and social from the time they first appear on the 
evolutionary scene as "herd animals,” to use Marx's words, and as “tribal beings.” For human 
beings to individuate themselves, to devote time and resources to needs that are not the strictly 
biological needs of a mammal in the species Homo sapiens, and to develop capacities beyond 
those narrowly suited to satisfying biological needs, is only possible through the labor process 
and at a point in human history when social production has begun to reach a degree of 
complexity and sophistication such as to support such individuation. Of course, this no doubt 
began to happen quite early in human history. However, the fact of human individuality is not a 
timeless truth about human nature, but rather a historically emergent phenomenon produced by 
essentially social beings through the labor process. 
In the years between 1847 and 1857 (and later, as we will see in the next chapter), Marx 
continues to contrast his own conception of a concrete and all-sided human individuality to the 
notion of abstract individualism which is prominent in liberal thought. In 1857, Marx reflects 
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upon this abstract individualism in the Grundrisse, writing that it is “stupid” for a conception of 
human beings to take “the isolated man as its starting-point.” Marx continues: 
Man becomes individualised only through the process of history. Originally he is a species being, 
a tribal being, a herd animal--though by no means as a  ζωον πολιτικον  in the political sense. 
Exchange itself is a major agent of this individuation. It makes herd-like existence superfluous and 
dissolves it. (Grundrisse: Section Two: Circulation Process of Capital, MECW: 28:420) 
 
It is not possible to have a fully accurate understanding of human individuality without also 
understanding the essence of human beings as beings who produce their needs and transform 
their natures through social labor. Therefore, not only are the concepts of individuality, 
essential human nature, and labor interrelated, but their interrelation suggests the method that is 
best suited to successful inquiry into each of them. That method is the one that Marx describes in 
The German Ideology under the name, "historical materialism." Historical materialism takes 
human production and the circumstances in which it takes place to be fundamental in 
conditioning human existence. The historical materialist method is the most appropriate method 
here because humans are essentially natural and social beings, in whom the character of their 
social relations is produced and determined through their interactions with nature and with one 
another through the labor process. In understanding labor as a process in which human beings 
interact with nature both as part of it and as distinct from it, it is possible to see how human 
existence becomes increasingly sophisticated and also to see how the history of human 
development is also the history of the emergence and development of distinct human 
personalities and what Marx later terms “rich individuality.” 
The development of the rich individuality of human beings is a process already occurring 
throughout human history. And in determining what is the highest aim and best course of action 
for human beings, Marx does not simply conjure up the end and the means abstractly out of 
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thought. Rather, he looks to the most progressive trends already existing within human history 
and asks how these may be promoted and developed further based on the social forces that also 
already exist. In much the same way that communism is “the real movement which abolishes the 
present state of things,” as Marx writes in The German Ideology, and “not a state of affairs 
which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself,” (The German 
Ideology, MECW 5:49) the transformation from human beings as more or less interchangeable 
instances of the species into distinct and developed individuals is a historical process that has 
taken place for the most part without being consciously aimed at by human beings. It has been, 
as it were, the necessary byproduct of progress and development in human social production. 
This is not to say that there have not been persons or movements along the way who have put 
forward such human development as the rightful principal aim of human society. However, such 
ideas have been utopian, in societies in which it was not yet possible to satisfy the needs and 
develop the powers of all human beings, or, they have remained exceptional and marginalized in 
a society aimed at profit and not at the development of human beings.. What remains now is to 
make this development the conscious aim of social production, and to build a society in which it 
is promoted and impediments to it are swept away. 
The capitalist mode of production in particular has contributed greatly to making it 
possible for there to be more highly developed individuals than existed in feudal society or in 
any other previous societies. One of the most important ways in which it does this is through the 
process of globalization, one of the most progressive aspects of capitalism, which, by its very 
nature, must constantly seek out new markets for the commodities it produces as well as new 
sources of raw materials and fresh labor. As Marx writes, the capitalist system must “nestle 
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everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connections everywhere” (Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, MECW 6:487). This expansionist aspect of capitalism plays two roles that are each 
important here for our discussion of the development of human individuality. First, capitalism as 
an economic system tends to spread to more and more parts of the globe, revolutionizing society 
whereever it goes. Second, capitalism brings people from disparate parts of the globe into contact 
with and interdependence upon one another. There is precious little production carried out today 
that uses resources or labor that only exist within the borders of one nation. In order to do so 
much as cook a dinner, we purchase spices from one country, vegetables from another, cookware 
from a third and sit down to eat it at a table made in a fourth, while wearing clothing made in a 
fifth. Marx writes, “In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find 
new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes”(Manifesto of 
the Communist Party, MECW 6:488). And, he adds: 
as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations 
become common property. National one-sidedness and narrow-mindedness become more and 
more impossible, and from the numerous national and local literatures, there arises a world 
literature. (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:488) 
 
These “wants” build and strengthen the connections among disparate parts of the globe and make 
a world culture possible. They lay down the basis for the sort of global cooperation which would 
be necessary to build communism as an economic system. More directly relevant for the topic of 
this section, they take the narrow, provincial person of feudal society and transform her into the 
more well-rounded and worldly person of bourgeois society. They make a new wealth and 
diversity of human experiences and activities into live options for the individual person. 
A concern with the flourishing of individual human beings continues to form the basis of 
Marx's normative condemnation of bourgeois society and his arguments for the creation of a new 
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society based on human needs, throughout his work. Marx writes in the Manifesto that in 
bourgeois society, “capital is independent and has individuality [ist persönlich], while the living 
person is dependent and has no individuality [ist unpersönlich]” (Manifesto of the Communist 
Party, MECW 6:499). On the other hand, in communist society, accumulated labor is “a means 
to widen, to enrich, to promote the existence of the labourer” (Manifesto of the Communist Party, 
MECW 6:499). To promote the “existence” of the worker and, more broadly, of the human 
being, is to make it possible for this person to interact with the world outside of herself through a 
wide and expanding array of activities. Under communism, production will be carried out 
towards the end of promoting this increased development of human beings' capacities and 
satisfaction of their needs. 
In the present section, I begin by presenting two of the most significant features of Marx's 
statement that the development of “rich individuality” is the highest aim for human beings. First, 
Marx observes that the creation of the material basis for such an individuality already exists as an 
ongoing and developing process in human history. Rich individuality as the full development and 
proliferation of human capacities, and as the production of the human as an all-sided being rather 
than as a limited and degraded being, can only be realized by means of advances in society. It 
depends upon increased efficiency and complexity in social production and the social existence 
of human beings. The history of human social development is intimately and necessarily 
connected with the history of the emergence and further development of human individuality. In 
fact, they are two moments of the same historical process. In positing the development of rich 
individuality as the highest aim for human beings, Marx does not simply conjure up a moral 
command out of whole cloth, but rather argues that human beings must work consciously to 
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promote a process that is already developing in human history, but whose continued 
development depends entirely upon whether or not human beings will build a society with such 
human development as its guiding principle. 
Second, an understanding of human beings as concrete, specific, and potentially “rich” 
and fully social individuals is superior to liberal political philosophy's conception of the human 
person as an isolated atom. It better captures the reality of what it is to be a human being and is 
more consonant with the results of anthropology which reveal individuality to be a product of 
social labor and a historically emergent phenomenon. This conception of concrete human 
individuality has greater explanatory power in analyzing how societies and individual human 
beings grow and develop, and it is able to make sense of individuality not as a timeless and 
ahistorical fact, but rather as a result of human activity, first as an unintended consequence of 
social production and then, with the transition to socialist relations of production, consciously 
promoted as the highest aim of social production. 
After addressing Marx's justifications for positing an all-sided development of “rich” 
human beings as the highest aim for humanity, I address two objections to this view. The first, is 
the objection that Marx's argument that promoting the existence and full realization of human 
beings means subordinating all social production to an all-sided human development is not 
enough—that we are still owed an explanation for why the promotion of human existence and 
human development should be considered a valuable thing at all. The second objection is that 
Marx's picture of all-sided development is hopelessly naive and overly optimistic about the range 
of activities that human beings are capable of taking part in, or that it requires too much of 
human beings. 
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Marx has several reasons for positing the full development of rich individuality as the 
highest aim for human beings. First, as I have already mentioned, is the fact that throughout 
human history, social and economic progress have allowed for a type of human being who would 
have increasingly many capacities. Capitalism, while it tends to narrow the worker to one 
specific task, also encourages her to be capable of changing tasks and quickly developing new 
abilities because of the casual and unreliable nature of employment. And across present-day 
capitalist society taken as a whole, we see human beings engaging in countless different forms of 
human activity. Marx argues that this shows what a wide range of activities human beings are 
capable of engaging in. However, while at present these activities are carried out by society as a 
whole, it is not the case that individual persons are in general provided with the means to engage 
in a wide and expanding array of activities. Communism, in making such development the 
highest aim of society, rather than the mere byproduct of profiteering, would organize society in 
such a way as to make this more possible. 
Secondly, human beings already attempt to be active in different spheres, in spite of the 
fact that even while capitalism produces the material basis for such diverse activity, it also places 
real limits on the ability of the individual person to engage in it. For evidence of how human 
beings seek to develop their range of capabilities, I do not think we would need to look very far. 
Even in our society, people adopt new hobbies, develop talents that do not relate directly to their 
primary employment, engage in social activities such as volunteering or singing in a choir that 
they do not receive remuneration for, and embark on quests of "lifelong learning," picking up 
new languages, enrolling into a course about art history, and so on. By developing new modes of 
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activity in the world and by interacting with other human beings in new and challenging ways, 
humans express themselves in the world and thereby achieve a more full existence. 
The first objection I will address here is whether Marx now owes us a further justification 
of the claim that human existence ought to be preserved and promoted. I think that he would 
regard such a question as already proceeding from a highly alienated and un-human perspective, 
and therefore would deny that he owes any answer to the question on its own terms. Marx writes 
that "man is the highest being for man," but aside from this he does not have any special answer 
to give to the question, Why should we promote the continuation and further development of 
human existence? I share Marx's diagnosis of such a question. Because value itself is a human 
product whose content derives, at bottom, from an assessment of how human needs can be 
satisfied, there is something deeply misguided about adopting any other standard for morality 
aside from its suitability as an aid to satisfying human needs. Morality can only be derived from 
a human standpoint and on the basis of a scientific worldview, assuming human beings and their 
needs as our standard of value. 
The second objection to Marx's conception of an all-sided development of human beings 
which I will treat here, is that it is somehow naively utopian or hopelessly over-optimistic to 
suppose that human beings could or would engage in such a wide array of pursuits. While of 
course both Marx and Engels would like to see human beings develop as many new capacities as 
possible, they do not mean to raise dilettantism to a virtue, or to send human beings running 
frantically from activity to activity in some exhausting quest for well-roundedness. Rather, they 
seek to help build a society in which human beings have means to make effective choices for 
themselves about which activities they will pursue, and are therefore never confined to one 
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narrow range of activity and are able to develop as many of their talents and powers as is 
possible for beings such as ourselves. Because it is now for the first time in history possible for 
all human beings to devote a vanishingly small amount of time to socially necessary labor, a 
society can be produced in which human beings would be allowed to pursue their interests free 
from the financial and social pressures which inhibit humans from doing so today. 
In the following section, I will focus on Marx's development of the concept of alienation 
in his works written between 1847 and 1857. But if we are to properly understand how certain 
aspects of human beings' existence are cut off and denied to them in the phenomenon of 
alienation, we must also understand what human beings essentially are and what, based on that 
essential nature, they could potentially become. As I discussed in the Introduction to this study, 
human beings are essentially natural and social beings who satisfy their needs through the labor 
process. However, whereas labor ought to be a development of human essence and a 
confirmation of the human being in her effects upon nature and upon her fellow human beings, 
in class society, it is converted into an oppressive denial of that kind of fulfilling and satisfying 
relationship with the natural world and with the species. 
3.4 ALIENATION 
As I discussed in the previous section, Marx's conceptions of human nature and of individuality 
relate closely to the concept of alienation in his work. In Chapter One, I devoted significant 
space to the explication of the concept of alienation in Marx. Here, my aim is primarily to show 
that while the word “alienation” (“Entfremdung” or “Entäußerung” in Marx's German) does not 
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appear in The Communist Manifesto or in Marx's other major works between 1847 and 1857, 
alienation as a phenomenon and as a problem continues to play a central theoretical role in 
Marx's thought. 
A number of commentators103 have taken the absence of the word “alienation” in most of 
the works of this period to suggest that Marx jettisoned the concept, perhaps because he found it 
to be incompatible with historical materialism as that method is outlined in The German 
Ideology. The claim that Marx jettisons the alienation concept is also part of the argument that 
there might be a moral dimension to Marx's earlier work written prior to The German Ideology, 
but that this aspect of Marx's thought is purged in a turn towards economic determinism that is 
alleged to take place in that work. The rationale for interpreting Marx in this way is that the 
moral outlook of Marx's earlier work is based upon the abolition of alienation in human life. And 
so, these commentators argue, with the alleged rejection of the alienation concept in Marx's later 
works, so the basis for any moral critique in Marx's thought disappears, as well. I find this 
interpretation unconvincing for several reasons. First, as I have attempted to demonstrate 
throughout this chapter, Marx continues to engage in moral theorizing consistently throughout 
his works. Secondly, while Marx does not often mention “alienation” by name, he does at many 
points between the years 1847 and 1857 describe the character of labor in terms almost identical 
to those he uses earlier when he calls that character “alienated.” The principal aim of this section 
is to show that Marx deployed the same conception of alienation even though he did not always 
deploy the same terminology to refer to the phenomenon of alienation, and that he used this 
                                                 
103  Althusser’s reading of Marx has been influential in this regard. Allen Wood, in his book, Karl Marx, also takes 
this view. 
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conception of alienation consistently to explain and to characterize the ways in which human 
beings under capitalism are denied from pursuing an all-sided development of their nature104. As 
Marx's understanding of the relationship between alienation and human nature remains 
consistent, so does the moral critique of class society that emerges from it. I will demonstrate this 
primarily through comparison of passages from Marx's early writings and from the writings of 
the years just before and after the Manifesto. I focus particularly upon the remarks Marx makes 
about labor in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, the 1847 document “Wage 
Labour and Capital,” and The Communist Manifesto. 
The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 contains some of Marx's clearest 
treatments of alienation in his early work. In the manuscript titled “Estranged Labour,” for 
instance, we learn that the alienation of labor is constituted by at least three things. First, the 
worker does not experience her work as an expression of herself. It is rather the activity in which 
the worker feels least like herself. Since, as I wrote in the Introduction to this study, for Marx, 
the labor process is the essence of human existence, this phenomenon of experiencing one's own 
work as foreign amounts to experiencing oneself—one's own active essence—as foreign. It is 
also a phenomenon in which one's relationship to the external world is disturbed. This is because 
the labor process is a process in which the human being realizes herself as distinct from nature, 
and yet a part of it; she appropriates natural resources and transforms them into extended parts of 
herself and means by which to realize her agency. 
                                                 
104 For a detailed, book-length treatment of the continuity in Marx's concept of alienation, see Istvan Meszaros, 
Marx's Theory of Alienation. Also, in Lawrence Wilde's 1998 book on Marxism and morality, Wilde argues that 
in The German Ideology, Marx “affirms his adherence to his earlier position in which communism was 
conceived as a struggle for the appropriation of the human essence” (Wilde, Ethical Marxism and its Radical 
Critics, p.22). 
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Second, her labor is not an end which she pursues for its own sake, but rather merely the 
means to other ends. This second aspect of alienated labor is meant to follow from the first: 
because work appears so hateful to the worker, she would not perform it unless absolutely 
compelled to do so. As Marx later puts it in the 1875 “Critique of the Gotha Programme,” labor 
appears as “a means to life,” rather than as “life's prime want” (Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, MECW 24:87). In capitalist society, because the worker has nothing to sell but her 
own labor-power, and must sell something if she is to have money to eat, house herself, and to 
afford all the rest of life's necessities, she is then compelled to sell her labor-power. She therefore 
enters into a contract with an employer and transfers the ownership of her labor-power from 
herself to another person in exchange for money. 
As a result of this sale, there arises the third condition that is part of the alienation of 
labor: the labor that the worker performs is not her own, but belongs instead to another person. It 
is not the worker who teleologically posits ends which are to be realized through her labor, but 
rather, the employer. This real separation of the worker from her labor and therefore, from her 
essence as a consciously producing human being serves as the material basis for, and the 
confirmation of, her experience of that labor as a denial of herself rather than as an expression of 
herself. It is this phenomenon of the self-denying character of labor under capitalism that leads 
Marx to describe this alienated labor as “self-sacrifice” or as “mortification”. He consciously 
chooses religious language to describe alienated labor, thereby emphasizing the similarities 
between them, and how in both of these phenomena, the “spontaneous activity” of human beings 
falsely appears to operate independently of them. In the “Estranged Labour” manuscript, Marx 
writes: 
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What, then, constitutes the alienation of labor? 
First, the fact that labor is external to the worker, i.e., it does not belong to his intrinsic nature; that 
in his work, therefore, he does not affirm himself but denies himself, does not feel content but 
unhappy, does not develop freely his physical and mental energy but mortifies his body and ruins 
his mind. The worker therefore only feels himself outside his work, and in his work feels outside 
himself. He feels at home when he is not working, and when he is working he does not feel at 
home. His labor is therefore not voluntary, but coerced; it is forced labor. It is therefore not the 
satisfaction of a need; it is merely a means to satisfy needs external to it. Its alien character 
emerges clearly in the fact that as soon as no physical or other compulsion exists, labor is shunned 
like the plague. External labor, labor in which man alienates himself, is a labor of self-sacrifice, of 
mortification. Lastly, the external character of labor for the worker appears in the fact that it is not 
his own, but someone else’s, that it does not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, 
but to another. Just as in religion the spontaneous activity of the human imagination, of the human 
brain and the human heart, operates on the individual independently of him – that is, operates as 
an alien, divine or diabolical activity – so is the worker’s activity not his spontaneous activity. It 
belongs to another; it is the loss of his self. (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 
MECW 3:274)  
  
In this passage, Marx outlines each of the aspects of alienated labor which I have 
discussed above. I argue that Marx continues to theorize alienated labor after The German 
Ideology, which is the text in which he is supposed to have abandoned alienation as a concept 
with which to describe and explain the character of human existence in class society. For 
instance, in the 1844 passage from “Estranged Labour” which I have quoted above, Marx writes 
that the worker's labor-power “belongs, not to himself, but to another.” In the 1847 “Wage 
Labour and Capital,” Marx writes that the worker's labor-power is part of his life activity which 
“he sells to another person” and that, “It is a commodity that he has auctioned off to another.” 
(Wage Labour and Capital, MECW 9:202) In both passages, Marx describes a condition in 
which a part of the worker's life activity has come to belong to an external person, who is not 
himself. This condition is realized through a sale of the worker's labor-power. In “Wage Labour 
and Capital,” Marx writes that 
labour-power is a commodity which its possessor, the wage-worker, sells to the capitalist. Why 
does he sell it? It is in order to live. 
But the putting of labour-power into action – i.e., the work – is the active expression of the 
labourer's own life. And this life activity he sells to another person in order to secure the necessary 
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means of life. His life-activity, therefore, is but a means of securing his own existence. He works 
that he may keep alive. He does not count the labour itself as a part of his life; it is rather a 
sacrifice of his life. It is a commodity that he has auctioned off to another. (“Wage Labour and 
Capital”, MECW 9:202) 
 
Here, just as in the earlier “Estranged Labour,” work is not an end in itself, but a means 
by which to achieve ends which are external to it (namely here, staying alive). The worker sells 
his labor-power to the capitalist and thereby makes “a sacrifice of his life.” I think the strong 
parallels between this work, written after The German Ideology, and Marx's early writings in the 
Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts, are quite clear. In the 1844 passage, Marx calls this sale 
of the worker's labor-power a “self-sacrifice”, a “mortification” and “the loss of his self,” and in 
1847, he calls it “a sacrifice of his life.” (And in both cases, the word “sacrifice” is used in an 
unmistakably purely pejorative sense.) In 1844, “the worker's activity is not his spontaneous 
activity” and “belongs to another,” and in 1847, the worker “does not count the labour itself as a 
part of his life.” 
Although labor-power in action is life activity itself, for the worker, the exercise of that 
labor-power comes not to be experienced or regarded as part of his life and it comes to seem to 
the worker that it is the enjoyment of creature comforts that constitutes his “real life.” In this 
sense, the alienation of labor also mirrors religious alienation, as in both cases, consciousness of 
reality tends to get things upside down, if only because that consciousness is also a reflection of 
an inverted reality. Just as in religion, human beings believe that it is their own intellectual 
creations which have actually produced material reality, so when labor is alienated, human 
beings experience themselves as most themselves and most human in precisely those activities in 
which they are least themselves and least human. And why shouldn't they, when the character of 
work itself is often so odious and mind-numbing that it fails to develop the worker as a full 
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human being, and rather converts him into little more than a part of a machine? Marx refers to 
this phenomenon in “Estranged Labour,” and he refers to it again in “Wage Labour and Capital”: 
And the worker, who for twelve hours weaves, spins, drills, turns, builds, shovels, breaks stones, 
carries loads, etc.--does he consider this twelve hours' weaving, spinning, drilling, turning, 
building, shovelling, stone-breaking as a manifestation of his life, as life? On the contrary, life 
begins for him where this activity ceases, at table, in the public house, in bed. The twelve hours' 
labour, on the other hand, has no meaning for him as weaving, spinning, drilling, etc., but as 
earnings, which bring him to the table, to the public house, into bed. If the silkworm were to spin 
in order to continue its existence as a caterpillar, it would be a complete wage-worker. (Wage 
Labour and Capital, MECW 9:203) 
 
Labor is so boring, so stultifying, so one-sided that while it is in reality the most human 
of activities, it is converted into machine- or animal-like activity. As Marx writes in The 
Communist Manifesto: 
Owing to the extensive use of machinery, and to the division of labour, the work of the 
proletarians has lost all individual character, and, consequently, all charm for the workman. He 
becomes an appendage of the machine, and it is only the most simple, most monotonous, and most 
easily acquired knack, that is required of him. (Manifesto of the Communist Party, MECW 6:490) 
 
As a result, the only activities in which the worker truly does feel alive and “freely active” are in 
those activities which are not uniquely human at all, but which he shares with animals: eating, 
drinking, and procreating. And in “Wage Labour and Capital,” Marx has a specific animal in 
mind: the silkworm, if a silkworm spun silk just in order to continue its worm-like existence. 
While Marx does not use the word “alienation” in works such as the Manifesto or “Wage 
Labour and Capital,” in continuing to refer to the worker's separation from his own labor as a 
“sacrifice,” he does establish a clear terminological continuity between the two descriptions. I 
think there are also enough key similarities among Marx's description of labor in works before 
and after The German Ideology to bring into serious doubt whether it might be reasonably 
maintained that Marx jettisons the alienation concept after The German Ideology. It is far more 
likely that Marx made a terminological shift to avoid the possibility of his view being confused 
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with those of others who were also using the term “alienation” (“Entfremdung” or 
“Entäußerung”) at the time. 
For Marx, the alienation that typifies class society can only be abolished once workers 
overthrow the existing relations of production, in which workers are compelled to “sacrifice” 
their labor-power and to place it under the control of the capitalist class. In the place of capitalist 
production, Marx argues for a system in which workers would exercise democratic control over 
their own labor and regard labor itself as “life's prime want”--a realization of their essence rather 
than an affront to it. In the next section, “Moralism, Sacrifice and Utopia,” I will address rival 
utopian solutions to the problem of alienation, and Marx's grounds for rejecting them in favor of 
a revolutionary socialist program. 
3.5 MORALISM, SACRIFICE AND UTOPIA 
In his writings after The German Ideology, Marx continues to draw the distinction between a 
rational assessment of how the needs of human beings can best be satisfied, and a moralistic call 
for self-sacrifice. As I will argue in the present section, one of the most important aspects of this 
distinction is how the two approaches must rely on different modes of motivation. The scientific 
communism developed by Marx depends on a correct assessment of the real needs of existing 
persons, and aims to show rationally how the needs of people can be satisfied through effective 
political action and revolutionary activity. On the other hand, utopianism relies upon mere 
moralism—emotional appeals designed to make up for the fact that utopianism lacks the 
resources to have motivational force on a rational basis. Critiques of moralism play a key role in 
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Marx's arguments against the “True Socialists,” utopian socialists who rely upon the 
pronouncement of moral edicts to make up for their lack of a concrete political program by 
means of which socialism could be realized. This distinction between scientific communism—a 
theory derived using the method of historical materialism—and Utopianism  is brought to bear 
most clearly in a document that Marx wrote with Engels, titled “Circular against Kriege,” which 
is a critique of the practices of Hermann Kriege, a member of the International Workingmen's 
Association. Here, I will explain Marx and Engels' criticisms of Kriege, and how these criticisms 
shed light upon Marx's approach to morality. 
Hermann Kriege was the editor of a German-language journal titled Der Volks-Tribun. 
Der Volks-Tribun was produced and distributed in New York, with the aim of representing the 
principles of the International Workingmen's Association (now widely referred to as “The First 
International”) to communists in the United States. Under Kriege's tenure as editor, the line of 
the journal began to deviate away from scientific communism and towards utopianism and 
moralism, making irrational appeals to emotion in order to convince readers to take up the cause 
of communism. Finally, the editorial line of Der Volks-Tribun veered so sharply away from the 
principles of the organization it was supposed to represent, that Marx and Engels introduced a set 
of resolutions to a meeting of the First International, denouncing Kriege for what they referred to 
as the “fantastic emotionalism” he put forward under the guise of communism. These resolutions 
constitute the aforementioned circular. 
A particularly important piece of evidence in their case against Kriege is Kriege's 
enthusiastic promotion of self-sacrifice as a value for communists (“Circular Against Kriege”, 
MECW 6:45). Instead of arguing for the coincidence of every person's self-interest with the 
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interest of humanity, Kriege posits a moral sacrifice of setting one's own interests aside for the 
good of “others” who will benefit from a transition to socialism. This notion of sacrifice, of 
setting one's own interests aside, is totally at odds with Marxism, which argues that all human 
beings have an objective interest in the realization of a communist society. Kriege argues for 
communism not as an answer to the problems that are facing human beings, but rather as a moral 
imperative to be realized out of a sense of one's duty to humanity. It does precisely what, as we 
saw in the previous chapter, critics such as Max Stirner accused communism of doing—it posits 
“the common good,” or “humanity” as an abstraction that demands sacrifices from real, concrete, 
human individuals, and thereby only replicates alienation in a different form, rather than 
abolishing it. 
The argument becomes yet clearer when Marx and Engels strike their final blow against 
the “sacrificing” Kriege (“Circular Against Kriege”, MECW 6:49). Marx criticizes Kriege 
because he expects to be praised for sacrificing himself for the good of others, instead of seeing 
revolutionary activity as something that he carries out for his own benefit as well as that of 
others. As Kriege writes to the reader of Der Volks-Tribun, “We have other things to do than 
worry about our miserable selves, we belong to mankind.” Marx replies: 
With this shameful and nauseating grovelling before a “mankind” that is separate and distinct from 
the “self “ and which is therefore a metaphysical and in his case even a religious fiction, with what 
is indeed the most utterly “miserable” slavish self-abasement, this religion ends up like any other. 
Such a doctrine, preaching the voluptuous pleasure of cringing and self-contempt, is entirely 
suited to valiant — monks, but never to men of action, least of all in a time of struggle. It only 
remains for these valiant monks to castrate their “miserable selves” and thereby provide sufficient 
proof of their confidence in the ability of “mankind” to reproduce itself! — If Kriege has nothing 
better to offer than these sentimentalities in pitiful style, it would indeed be wiser for him to 
translate his “Père Lamennais” again and again in each issue of the Volks-Tribun. (“Circular 
Against Kriege”, MECW 6:49) 
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Marx and Engels accuse Kriege of misrepresenting communism as “a religion of love” 
(“Circular Against Kriege”, MECW 6:46), rather than presenting it as a science of human 
progress and development, because to follow Kriege's reasoning would be essentially to take up 
a religious attitude towards humanity as a new god rendered into pseudo-materialist terms. We 
do not “belong to mankind,” to which we must constantly sacrifice our individual self-interest. 
One should be “worried about oneself”--it is in fact this concern with oneself and one's own 
circumstances that can be linked together with an argument for rational social control over 
society's resources. There is no need for a moral leap across some perceived gap between one's 
self-interest and the general interest of society. 
Marx and Engels are quite clear in separating their own theory from Kriege's moralistic 
grandstanding. The point of communism is not for people to stop “worrying about themselves.” 
Although Marx does not refer to “alienation” here, his comments here on sacrifice relate directly 
to the problem of alienation. To sacrifice oneself, after all, is to alienate oneself from oneself, to 
give oneself over to a being that is separate, for the satisfaction of aims that are considered more 
important than one's own. Marx does not think human progress can be aided by human beings 
denying themselves, but rather, by human beings seeking their satisfaction and fulfillment. So 
what Kriege presents is not communist practice, but rather, as Marx and Engels call it, “a 
religion of love,” an irrational and emotionalist call to self-alienation. Without a material link 
between self-interest and the general interest, Kriege retreats to an irrational appeal to emotion to 
make individuals do what is necessary for “society,” an entity whose interests are imagined to be 
opposed to their own. 
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Sacrifice appears in Marx's work as an important theme as early as The Holy Family, and 
shows up again in his polemic against Max Stirner which makes up the bulk of The German 
Ideology. There, Marx responds to Stirner's charge that communism is a so-called “good cause,” 
requiring human beings to sacrifice for a “greater good”. Marx argues that far from requiring 
individuals to engage in sacrifice or altruism, his theory of communism is based on the needs and 
interests of people, and seeks to develop, confirm, and realize human individuals, not to promote 
sacrifice and self-renunciation. As Marx writes, Stirner's mistake in his critique of communism is 
in thinking that: 
the communists want to “make sacrifices” for “society”, when they want at most to sacrifice 
existing society; in this case he should describe their consciousness that their struggle is the 
common cause of all people who have outgrown the bourgeois system as a sacrifice that they 
make to themselves. (The German Ideology, MECW 5:213) 
  
As we saw also in the previous section on alienation in Marx's work between 1847 and 
1857, Marx rejects sacrifice as a part of his communist theory.  Therefore, Marx argues that 
Stirner is mistaken in his understanding of communism as a call to sacrifice, and that Hermann 
Kriege is mistaken in urging workers not to “worry about themselves.” Marx has no need to urge 
the proletariat on with romantic appeals to sacrifice because he proposes a course of action that is 
consonant with people's interests, rather than at odds with them. 
In Marx's private letters, he sometimes does praise the “sacrifice” of members of the 
Paris Commune and of other revolutionary struggles. And he is perfectly aware that 
revolutionaries often do their work at great personal cost to themselves. Nothing in his 
arguments against Kriege or the Utopian Socialists can be taken to imply that Marx is unaware of 
the courage and dedication of such people, or that he is somehow stinting in his praise of them. 
  178 
I think in attacking Kriege's “groveling” “self-sacrifice” and “religion of love,” Marx's 
point is to thoroughly reject and distance himself from the moralism implicit in them. For 
Kriege, revolutionaries ought to act out of a sense of duty to mankind, before which they are 
“nothing.” This is anathema to Marx, and it is not what he is praising in the revolutionaries who 
endure great risk and hardship to carry out their work. 
In the following section, the conclusion of this chapter, I will draw together the themes of 
the present chapter and set the stage for the following one, a discussion of moral philosophy in 
Marx's works from 1858 to his death in 1883. 
3.6 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER THREE 
Rather than shying away from philosophical themes, Marx continues to engage with them in the 
period between The German Ideology and the publication of the first volume of Capital. Here, I 
have focused on how Marx's treatment of ideology, bourgeois morality, individuality, alienation 
and sacrifice are developed throughout this period, and how each of these themes relates to the 
others as part of Marx's developing conception of morality. Tracing Marx's treatment of these 
themes between the years 1847 and 1857 will make it clearer to see the philosophical continuity 
between Marx's work in the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts and the three volumes of 
Capital. 
Understanding how Marx's historical materialist method informs his understanding of 
ideology is crucial in order to avoid mistaking Marx's critiques of the reactionary aspects of 
bourgeois ideology for a premature rejection of ideology, as such. Ideology is a necessary feature 
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of class society and can play a progressive role, as it did for the bourgeoisie in its struggle 
against feudalism, and does for the proletariat in its struggles. This approach to ideology, 
understanding it as potentially reactionary and as potentially progressive, and as indispensable to 
class struggle, allows Marx to continue to develop a substantive moral critique of bourgeois 
society and of bourgeois morality. 
A particular conception of human nature and of human individuality forms the basis of 
Marx's moral outlook, and I have examined how in The Communist Manifesto and elsewhere, 
Marx continues to develop the concept of a rich, concrete individuality in opposition to the 
abstract individualism of bourgeois theory. Marx continues to develop his view that the 
development of human individuality is the highest aim for human beings, and the analysis of 
how he does this is then useful for taking a closer look at Marx's critique of alienation, as 
alienation for Marx is a condition in which human beings are prohibited from satisfying their 
needs and developing their capacities (and thereby, from developing their individuality and from 
realizing their essence as human beings). 
Others have argued that Marx rejects the alienation concept after The German Ideology, 
but I have demonstrated in this chapter that although Marx uses different terminology during this 
period of his work, the concept of alienation is readily identifiable in his writings and continues 
to play an important role in his thought. The words “sacrifice” or “self-sacrifice” frequently 
appear as ways to refer to the phenomenon of alienation, and I have attempted to show this, as 
well as to discuss how Marx's rejection of sacrifice ties together with his rejection of “utopian” 
socialism and abstract moralizing. 
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At several points throughout this chapter, I have laid particular emphasis upon The 
Communist Manifesto. Far from being “merely political,” that is to say, far from being an 
abandonment of philosophy, The Communist Manifesto is in fact a philosophically rich text and 
presents a marriage of theory with practical program. I have attempted to show that while Marx 
turns more directly to political and economic analyses of capitalism, he does not abandon the 
moral conception that first emerges in his earlier works, but rather continues to develop it and to 
determine how a society in which “man is the highest being for man” could be finally realized. In 
the following chapter, I will conduct a similar treatment of Marx's works between 1858 and 
1883, including the Grundrisse and Capital, showing how Marx's moral philosophy continues to 
deepen and develop in this later period. 
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4.0  MARX'S MORAL THOUGHT IN HIS WRITINGS FROM 1858 TO 1883 
This chapter treats Marx's later writings, including the Grundrisse, Capital, and other works such 
as Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme and The Civil War in France. During this period, 
Marx turns more directly to economics and to a thorough critique of political economy. 
However, he never turns away from the philosophical commitments of earlier writings such as 
the Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844. Rather, he enriches that philosophical 
conception with a more concrete economic and historical foundation. Here, Marx's explorations 
of such themes as human individuality, social progress and development, and alienation only 
deepen, becoming richer and more complex. 
The first section of this chapter, Section 4.1, addresses the question of economic 
determinism in Marx's mature work. A careful reading of these texts reveals the absurdity of 
separating Marx's opus into two parts: the earlier, “humanist” work, and the later, “economic 
determinist” work. Marx always understands that it is human beings who make history, but they 
do so within constraints from objective limits in the world and in the society around them. As a 
thinker deeply concerned with the realization and expansion of human freedom, Marx asks how 
those objective limits—when taken together, he often refers to these as a “boundary” of “natural 
necessity”—can be "pushed back” so that human beings may exercise more conscious, rational 
control in more areas of their existence, and realize human flourishing. 
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 Marx argues that the highest aim for human beings is the production and development of 
rich individuality: the satisfaction of expanding needs and the open-ended development of 
productive capacities. It is this full and free human development that constitutes the principal and 
highest aim for human beings, and the basis of the thoroughly humanist moral philosophy that 
Marx develops throughout his work. 
Section 4.2 specifically addresses the theme of individuality as it plays out in Marx's later 
work and particularly in the Grundrisse and in Capital. Not only does Marx derive his concept of 
alienation using the method of historical materialism, but the concept of alienation and the 
concept of the rich individual also go hand in hand. For it is understanding the historical 
development of alienation and its sharpening under capitalism that allows Marx to see what the 
worker's struggle and the strivings against alienating conditions are struggles for and strivings 
toward. Understanding the essence of human social existence as the labor process, and 
examining how that process is disrupted and distorted in class society and particularly under 
capitalism, provides a basis for understanding how the transformation of labor from a mere 
means to life into “life's prime want,” the establishment of a condition in which human beings 
would regard labor not as a hostile necessity but rather as human activity itself and the free 
development of the human essence, is both possible and desirable. 
In Section 4.3, I discuss the theme of alienation and its abolition. As I have explained in 
the last chapter, alienation remains a crucial concept for Marx throughout his career. Here, I 
examine the role it plays in these later works and argue that Marx is deploying the same concept 
in his later works that he uses in earlier writings such as the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844. 
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Section 4.4 focuses on Marx's critiques of bourgeois rights, freedom, and equality. The 
fact that Marx is skeptical of each of these has been interpreted to mean that he regards morality 
itself as illusory or inherently reactionary. This section explains the flaws in this view, which can 
only be maintained if it is assumed that bourgeois rights, freedom and equality can form the only 
plausible basis for a coherent moral theory. I also address Marx's return to the subject of 
Utilitarianism, as he revisits this issue in Capital, formulating new critiques of Jeremy Bentham's 
Utilitarianism and addressing John Stuart Mill, as well. 
In Section 4.5, which is the conclusion of this chapter, I return to the question of 
economic determinism and show the relationship of Marx's conceptions of human freedom and 
of rich individuality to his approach to morality. I also argue that, in light of the treatment 
offered in this chapter, it would be thoroughly incorrect to suppose that Marx's later works are in 
any sense “amoral” or that he abandons his interest in philosophical questions. 
4.1 THE QUESTION OF ECONOMIC DETERMINISM 
IN MARX'S MATURE WORK 
Marx speaks, especially in Capital, of the capitalist as “capital personified and endowed with 
consciousness and a will” (Capital, MECW 35:164), a person who acts in a manner that is to a 
great extent determined by economic laws which guide the movement of the capital she 
possesses. He also speaks, in Capital and elsewhere, of the actions of the proletariat understood 
in terms of what it is as a class and what, by virtue of that nature, it will be compelled to do. 
Numerous authors have taken this strand in Marx's thought to indicate a crude economic 
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determinism on which human actions are one-sidedly determined by economic laws that operate 
beyond their control. Karl Popper, for instance, whose influence in the Anglophone reception of 
Marx has, I think, been more influential than some would care to admit, writes that Marx 
adhered “to the false belief that a rigidly scientific method must be based on a rigid 
determinism”105. Indeed, it has become something like conventional wisdom that Marx 
subscribed to a crude economic determinism that would make human freedom unintelligible, and 
thereby rule out or at least render incoherent and unintelligible any genuinely moral content in 
his work. Hence, a recently published work in micro-economics could claim that Marx's 
“economic determinism had consequences for the picture of human beings in Marxist theory, and 
for the freedom of action of economically acting individuals. They have no autonomy of action, 
they only carry out economic laws”106. And Jules Townshend in his 1996 book, The politics of 
Marxism: the critical debates, could write: 
a potential conflict arose between Marx's economic determinism and his idea of human agency, 
which allowed individuals, and particularly classes, a certain autonomy of action, through 
'practical-critical' activity. Marx's idea that communism was inevitable permitted him to avoid the 
question of whether it was morally desirable. […] Yet what if the determinist theory, upon which 
this 'inevitability' rested, was flawed? Would this not then put the moral appeal of socialism centre 
stage?107 
 
Eugene Kamenka, in The Ethical Foundations of Marxism, argued that Marx did not see 
the proletariat as an active force in society and instead 
stuck to his negative view of the proletariat as the most suffering class […] Marx chose to rely on 
'history', to hold out to the proletariat the vision of a classless society made safe for goods, where 
enterprise and freedom would be guaranteed by the economic foundations of society itself, where 
freedom would not lie in struggle, but follow from mere existence. 
                                                 
105 Karl Popper, The Open Society and its Enemies, Psychology Press 2003 p. 93. 
106 My translation. Adelheid Biesecker and Stefan Kesting, Mikroökonomik: Eine Einführung aus Sozial-
ökologischer Perspektive Oldenbourg Wissenschaftsverlag, 2003, p.75. 
107 Jules Townshend, The politics of Marxism: the critical debates, pg. 19. 
  185 
 
Kamenka writes that this conception had a “servile character,” and that in following Marx, 
“Marxists were upholding a servile and unfree morality” (Eugene Kamenka, The Ethical 
Foundations of Marxism, pp.164-5). Willis H. Truitt, in his 2005 book, Marxist Ethics: a short 
exposition, wittily describes this state of affairs regarding the critical reception of Marx's 
historical materialism,  remarking, “it is odd that the issue of determinism in Marx should be 
brought up at this late stage of the development of Marxist thought. One might even suspect that 
all these years of academic anti-Marxist indoctrination which teaches that historical materialism 
is a deterministic system has worked”108. However, it is an oversimplification to understand 
Marx's comments about the role of economic laws in shaping the prospects for and likelihood of 
communism as though they simply, with greater or lesser success, take part in a balancing act 
between the twin poles of deterministic inevitability and abstract moralistic voluntarism. 
What Marx describes when he addresses the way in which economic laws play a role in 
determining the actions of human beings, are tendencies of members of various social groups to 
act in circumstances shaped through those laws, and not iron-clad predictions for particular 
individuals. Howard Sherman, in his 1981 paper, “Marx and Determinism,” puts this point very 
nicely when he writes: 
Marx pointed out that one can find regularities of human behavior, that on the average we do 
behave in certain predictable ways. This behavior also changes in systematic ways, with 
predictable trends, in association with changes in our technological and social environments. At a 
simpler level, the regularities of human behavior are obvious in the fairly constant annual numbers 
of suicides and divorces (although these also show systematic trends). If humans did not, 
generally, behave in fairly predictable ways, not only social scientists but also insurance 
companies would have gone out of business long ago. Any particular individual may make any 
particular choice, but if we know the social composition of a group, we can predict, in general, 
what it will do. Thus, on the average, most large owners of stock will vote in favor of preferential 
                                                 
108 Willis H. Truitt, Marxist Ethics: a short exposition, International Publishers Co, 2005, p. 32 
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tax rates for capital gains; most farmers will favor laws that they believe to be in the interest of 
farmers109. 
 
As a rule, a capitalist will tend to maximize his profit irrespective of the social repercussions. A 
bourgeois intellectual will tend to develop theoretical justifications for the continuation of 
capitalism, often in spite of the glaring social contradictions. 
Within what Marx would call a bourgeois standpoint, that is to say, even while 
continuing to support the bourgeoisie as the class most suited to lead humanity economically, 
politically, and otherwise, it is possible for certain members of this class to develop a keen 
understanding of the social contradictions produced by class society and in some cases, even a 
real commitment to human development or to the eradication of such ills as global poverty or 
unfolding ecological destruction. Marx recognizes this phenomenon. For instance, in Capital, 
Marx notes that the capitalist “Robert Owen, soon after 1810, not only maintained the necessity 
of a limitation of the working-day in theory, but actually introduced the 10 hours’ day into his 
factory at New Lanark,” even though “this was laughed at as a communistic Utopia” (Capital, 
MECW 35:304 Note 222). 
Marx even goes on to credit Owen with developing an approach to education that could 
serve as an early model for education in a communist society: 
From the Factory system budded, as Robert Owen has shown us in detail, the germ of the 
education of the future, an education that will, in the case of every child over a given age, combine 
productive labour with instruction and gymnastics, not only as one of the methods of adding to the 
efficiency of production, but as the only method of producing fully developed human beings. 
(Capital, MECW 35:486) 
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According to Marx, the progressive aspects of Owen's thought were, in the end, limited 
by his failure to recognize the proletariat as the class best suited to lead humanity out of the 
contradictions produced by class society. However, while a bourgeois class position and 
standpoint tend to limit the range of actions and opinions we are likely to see even from a 
reformer such as Owen, it would be wrong to ignore that within that position and perspective 
there remains a wide array of open choices for individual actors and they may formulate insights 
and opinions that, inasmuch as they strive to faithfully reflect reality and even to progressively 
transform it, point beyond that bourgeois perspective. 
Another example of this can be found in the work of Nineteenth Century French novelist 
and playwright, Honoré de Balzac. Balzac of course had not bourgeois, but actually royalist 
sympathies, and was opposed to the bourgeoisie at a time when it played a historically 
progressive role. Yet, he was one of Marx's favorite authors, an artist whom Marx describes in 
Capital as “generally remarkable for his profound grasp of reality” (Capital, MECW 37:44). 
In an 1888 letter, Frederich Engels further elucidates the genius of Balzac's realism. 
Engels writes the letter in response to a request that he review a novel written by a socialist 
author; he concludes that the novel is not very good, criticizing it particularly for being 
unrealistic in its depiction of the working class as a passive mass. Engels goes on to illustrate his 
point with a discussion of the realism to be found in Balzac's work, a realism which is achieved 
in spite of his royalist sympathies: 
Balzac was politically a Legitimist; his great work is a constant elegy on the inevitable decay of 
good society, his sympathies are all with the class doomed to extinction. But for all that his satire 
is never keener, his irony never bitterer, than when he sets in motion the very men and women 
with whom he sympathizes most deeply - the nobles. And the only men of whom he always speaks 
with undisguised admiration, are his bitterest political antagonists, the republican heroes of the 
Cloître Saint-Méry, the men, who at that time (1830-6) were indeed the representatives of the 
popular masses. That Balzac thus was compelled to go against his own class sympathies and 
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political prejudices, that he saw the necessity of the downfall of his favourite nobles, and 
described them as people deserving no better fate; and that he saw the real men of the future 
where, for the time being, they alone were to be found - that I consider one of the greatest 
triumphs of Realism, and one of the grandest features in old Balzac. (Engels to Margaret Harkness 
in London; April, 1888, MECW 48:168) 
 
Figures such as Robert Owen and, I might add, Carl Sagan or Emile Zola, demonstrate 
some of the most progressive viewpoints possible within a bourgeois perspective. In addition to 
them, there are of course persons such as John D. Rockefeller or John F. Kennedy who simply 
seek mostly to rationally advance the interests of their class (I am speaking of course of a 
narrowly instrumental “rationality” in these cases). 
Additionally, there are individuals such as Charles or David Koch, Joseph McCarthy, or 
Father Charles Coughlin, who actively promote the most brazenly reactionary tendencies of their 
class. Marx would argue that across this range of bourgeois actors, their identifications with that 
class inhibit them, so long as they maintain those identifications, from fully recognizing the 
progressive role of the proletariat and its fitness to lead society, or from fully embracing the 
historical materialist perspective developed in Marx's thought. However, within that bourgeois 
perspective and bourgeois class identification, a wide range of thought and action is possible and 
the charge of crude economic determinism does not recognize this, as Marx does. Furthermore, 
not only is a wide range of action possible within a bourgeois class identification, but it is 
possible for individuals to choose to renounce that identification entirely. Already in The 
Communist Manifesto, Marx explains that confronted by the immense contradictions of capitalist 
society, increasingly many individual members of the bourgeoisie or the petty bourgeoisie may 
switch their class allegiance entirely to the camp of the proletariat, coming to the view that it is 
only the victory of the working class, leading a movement towards communism, that can 
safeguard the continued existence and development of humanity. Of course, one need look no 
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further than Marx's collaborator, Frederick Engels, for an example of a bourgeois who chooses 
this course. However, it would be deeply misguided to develop a theory of and a program for 
social and economic development that relied heavily on such occasional changes of camp, when 
in a society based on profit, it is the profit motive, by and large, that dominates in the decision-
making of capitalists, just as it is the conscious or unconscious struggle against the inhuman 
aspects of labor under capitalism that dominates in the decision-making of workers. 
Marx argues that economic relations determine human action to a significant extent, but 
this by no means licenses interpreters to dub him a strict economic determinist who sees no room 
for freedom of human action. He is able to describe and account for a wide range of human 
action, even as he sees that action being constrained by economic factors. Marx's theory, as a 
theory of the emancipation of the human species through the self-emancipation of the working 
class, depends precisely on the struggle of human beings to realize themselves as free and 
conscious human actors, and to be more than “appendages to machines” or mere subjects of 
economic and social relations that dominate them instead of being directed by them. 
In Capital, Marx discusses the economic trends which prepare the way for a fully human 
existence, but critics who accuse Marx of seeing communism as a matter of deterministic 
historical inevitability fail to appreciate that he also discusses how capitalism inhibits and retards 
that human progress and unchecked, would render it ultimately impossible. In the first volume of 
Capital, Marx writes: 
Capital that has such good reasons for denying the sufferings of the legions of workers that 
surround it, is in practice moved as much and as little by the sight of the coming degradation and 
final depopulation of the human race, as by the probable fall of the earth into the sun. In every 
stockjobbing swindle every one knows that some time or other the crash must come, but every one 
hopes that it may fall on the head of his neighbour, after he himself has caught the shower of gold 
and placed it in safety. Après moi le déluge! [After me, the flood] is the watchword of every 
capitalist and of every capitalist nation. Hence Capital is reckless of the health or length of life of 
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the labourer, unless under compulsion from society. To the out-cry as to the physical and mental 
degradation, the premature death, the torture of over-work, it answers: Ought these to trouble us 
since they increase our profits? But looking at things as a whole, all this does not, indeed, depend 
on the good or ill will of the individual capitalist. Free competition brings out the inherent laws of 
capitalist production, in the shape of external coercive laws having power over every individual 
capitalist. (Capital, MECW 35:275-276) 
  
Several important themes are expressed in this passage. First, far from leading inexorably 
toward a communist future, capital—and of course, the capitalists, taken as a whole—looks 
impassively at the “coming degradation and final depopulation of the human race” as though it 
were merely some regrettable but ultimately unalterable natural certainty. (Relating this to the 
contemporary situation, we can consider the baleful shoulder-shrugging that typifies the attitudes 
of many of today's world governments towards impending, or I should rather say, already-
unfolding catastrophes such as global warming.) 
It is only under “compulsion from society” that humanity can be taken off of its collision 
course with the destructive effects of capitalism. The conscious and active intervention of the 
masses into politics and into world history is, in the final analysis, all that stands between us and 
this “final depopulation.” How much Marx thought this, we can see from his own political 
engagement, not to mention his lifelong dedication to investigating how the social and economic 
gains of capitalism can be preserved and subsumed in a higher stage of social development, and 
his conviction that just this ought to be done and could only be done by the active masses, the 
majority of society acting in the interest of the majority of society. 
Second, we see mentioned in this passage the way in which the “free competition” of 
capitalist society reveals itself to be unfreedom in practice, taking on the “shape of external 
coercive laws having power over every individual capitalist.” One important question to be asked 
of those who see here some ground to label Marx a crude economic determinist and therefore an 
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amoralist, is whether they can really doubt that capitalists do in general act in ways designed to 
preserve and multiply their capital. “Looking at things as a whole,” the capitalist, no matter how 
noble he might be in his heart of hearts, whether his will be “good or ill,” must extract as much 
labor as possible, at as little cost to himself as possible, if he wishes to compete in the 
marketplace and to remain a capitalist, at all. It is this general tendency of people in capitalist 
society to defend their economic interests that makes it possible to predict that class struggle 
between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, whose interests are in conflict with one another, will 
take place. However, it does not by any means guarantee which side will win out in the conflict. 
It is true that there are numerous occasions on which Marx expresses his conviction that 
human beings would achieve a communist society. I happen to think this view was reasonable, 
based on the historical vantage point available to Marx at the time. However, as Sherman writes 
in his 1981 paper, “Marx and Determinism”: 
Human beings are free to make (or not make) a revolution, but our actions are predictable by a 
knowledge of present and previous conditions, including our psychologies, and the laws or 
regularities of human behavior under these conditions. “To say that the revolution is inevitable is 
simply (in Marx's scheme) to say that it will occur. And it will occur . . . not in spite of any choices 
we might make, but because of choices we will make”110. The prediction of socialist revolution, 
however, must be expressed as a probability rather than a certainty because of our limited 
knowledge of the conditions and the laws. 
 
Under capitalism, the range of actions available to people are narrowed, and within that narrow 
range, people are most likely, “as a whole,” to take the actions which defend their economic 
interests. In other words, as Marx puts it elsewhere in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, “Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not 
make it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly found, 
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given and transmitted from the past”111. It is not possible to have a correct understanding of 
capitalist society without understanding the extent to which many factors, including economic 
laws, do delimit the range of actions available to people under capitalism and do make some 
actions more likely to be taken than some other ones. 
Though it is certain that under capitalism, workers will struggle against their conditions, 
it is by no means simply necessary or historically determined that their struggles will be 
victorious or that communism will be achieved. It is not necessary that workers will recognize 
their class interests, will gain a theoretical understanding of the nature of capitalism, will 
organize themselves politically in such a way as to effectively promote their interests, or will 
recognize human development and “rich individuality” as the highest aim for human beings, and 
even if they achieve all these things, I would like to emphasize that from our historical vantage 
point today, it is plain to see that it is by no means necessary that they will do it before the 
spoliation of the Earth under the capitalist mode of production is too far gone for us to avert a 
premature “final depopulation” of the human race. Whether any of these things do take place, 
and in a timely way, depends in great part upon the actions of what Marx refers to as the most 
conscious elements of society in putting forward a political direction and theoretical context for 
the struggles that emerge, and when they do so, they do so not merely as patients subject to 
inexorable economic laws, but as historical agents who through their activity assist their fellows 
in realizing their historical agency as well. Marx recognizes that there is a space for free and 
conscious intervention even under capitalism, but also recognizes that this scope is limited. One 
of the goals of a communist movement, then, is to intervene consciously into human history in 
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the ways that are currently possible, and to expand the sphere of free action and push necessity 
back to its furthest possible limit. 
Of course none of this is to negate the extent to which economic processes in class 
society, which are the result of human actions but which have developed spontaneously, without 
conscious human planning or direction, have led to a historical development that points toward 
communism and provides the material basis for communism. For instance, as Marx points out, 
the forces of production are increasingly socialized even if the relations of production are not. It 
is for this reason that Marx could write in The German Ideology that “Communism is for us not a 
state of affairs which is to be established, an ideal to which reality [will] have to adjust itself. We 
call communism the real movement which abolishes the present state of things. The conditions 
of this movement result from the now existing premise.” (The German Ideology, MECW 5:49). 
The whole development of human history is a movement towards a point at which the choices 
for humanity become increasingly clear: “given and transmitted from the past,” they boil down 
to the choice to either build a movement to preserve and develop the positive contributions of 
class society as the historical and material basis for a society based on human needs, or to allow 
the destructive aspects of capitalism to simply play themselves out, dragging human culture back 
to a state of barbarism (think here, for instance of fascism and its historical appearance where 
capitalism has fallen into decay and the workers' movement has not been able to seize power) 
and most likely, a hastened extinction as a result of ecological crisis. 
Because of the ways in which capitalism has revolutionized production, it is possible for 
human beings to devote a vanishingly small amount of time to satisfying their biological needs, 
and to devote the majority of their lives instead to the intellectual, cultural, and artistic pursuits 
  194 
which enrich the social existence of humanity and develop its existence well beyond the merely 
biological. To use Marx's terminology, it is possible for human beings to free themselves in great 
part from the narrow requirements of “natural necessity.” The capitalist mode of production is 
especially contradictory in this respect insofar as through the drive of capitalists to revolutionize 
the forces of production in order to relentlessly increase efficiency and profits, it has become 
possible to produce enough to satisfy a wide and expanding array of human needs, and with a 
minimum of human labor. Under class society, however, the economic basis of society places 
great limits on that human development. As Marx writes in the first book of Capital: 
all methods for raising the social productiveness of labour are brought about at the cost of the 
individual labourer; all means for the development of production transform themselves into means 
of domination over, and exploitation of, the producers; they mutilate the labourer into a fragment 
of a man, degrade him to the level of an appendage of a machine, destroy every remnant of charm 
in his work and turn it into a hated toil; they estrange from him the intellectual potentialities of the 
labour process in the same proportion as science is incorporated in it as an independent power; 
they distort the conditions under which he works, subject him during the labour process to a 
despotism the more hateful for its meanness; they transform his life-time into working-time, and 
drag his wife and child beneath the wheels of the Juggernaut of capital. […] It establishes an 
accumulation of misery, corresponding with accumulation of capital. Accumulation of wealth at 
one pole is, therefore, at the same time accumulation of misery, agony of toil slavery, ignorance, 
brutality, mental degradation, at the opposite pole, i.e., on the side of the class that produces its 
own product in the form of capital. (Capital, MECW 35:619) 
 
At the heart of capitalist production, then, lies a contradiction between the immense 
wealth produced by this economic system, and the immense privation and subjection also 
produced by it. This passage above puts forward the moral critique of capitalism which Marx 
levels against capitalism throughout his work. Capitalism produces all manner of human 
degradation, reducing the human being to the mere “appendage of a machine” and grinding 
down his intellectual and fully human potential. But at the same time that capitalism degrades the 
human being, it is also capitalism that produces the material basis for the “rich individuality” 
which forms the basis of Marx's moral outlook. 
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 Marx's moral outlook and his approach to understanding human individuality are based in 
the historical materialist method that he first outlined in The German Ideology, but already 
employed well before that. The Grundrisse opens with the line, “To begin with, the subject to be 
discussed is material production” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:17) How humans produce in the 
natural world in order to satisfy their needs is the basis for any scientific understanding of human 
beings. Marx goes on to write that socially determined production of individuals is the starting-
point for inquiry. Marx's conception of the individual, which plays a significant role throughout 
his work, takes on a more robust and concrete character in his later writings, beginning 
especially with the Grundrisse, as a result of the fact that here Marx brings the results of 
anthropology to bear more directly and to a greater extent than in his early work. Indeed, at the 
end of his life, Marx became interested in the work of American anthropologist Lewis Henry 
Morgan and intended to write a treatment of Morgan's writings. Marx died before he could 
complete that project, a work Engels later took up and carried out, publishing it as Origin of the 
Family, Private Property, and the State. Although Marx had of course not done this work at the 
time of the Grundrisse, the fact that he later took it up gives us an indication of how Marx 
attempted to base his understanding of the individual on the results of science, so that he could 
theorize concrete individuality based on the lived experiences of existing human beings, rather 
than the abstract, one-sided individual who, he charged, forms the subject of 18th century 
philosophy (this is a theme to be taken up more fully in the next section of this chapter, “Marx 
and Individuality”). 
 In the Afterword to the second German edition of Capital, Marx describes his method of 
historical materialism: 
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My dialectic method is not only different from the Hegelian, but is its direct opposite. To Hegel, 
the life process of the human brain, i.e., the process of thinking, which, under the name of “the 
Idea,” he even transforms into an independent subject, is the demiurgos of the real world, and the 
real world is only the external, phenomenal form of “the Idea.” With me, on the contrary, the ideal 
is nothing else than the material world reflected by the human mind, and translated into forms of 
thought. […] The mystification which dialectic suffers in Hegel’s hands, by no means prevents 
him from being the first to present its general form of working in a comprehensive and conscious 
manner. With him it is standing on its head. It  must be turned right side up again, if you would 
discover the rational kernel within the mystical shell. 
In its mystified form, dialectic became the fashion in Germany, because it seemed to transfigure 
and to glorify the existing state of things. In its rational form it is a scandal and abomination to 
bourgeoisdom and its doctrinaire professors, because it includes in its comprehension an 
affirmative recognition of the existing state of things, at the same time also, the recognition of the 
negation of that state, of its inevitable breaking up; because it regards every historically developed 
social form as in fluid movement, and therefore takes into account its transient nature not less than 
its momentary existence; because it lets nothing impose upon it, and is in its essence critical and 
revolutionary. (Capital, MECW 35:19-20) 
 
 The critics who charge Marx with economic determinism attack him, by and large, for 
failing to conjure up in thought what does not already exist in reality—a world of human beings 
who act entirely freely and in ways undetermined by narrow economic pressures and interests. 
While Marx does not offer that illusion, he does say that the “existing state of things” will pass 
away, and does suggest how, if human society continues to exist and to develop (and that is an 
increasingly big “if”), it will be replaced by a stage of society in which such fully free human 
actors would exist. None of this, however, makes Marx into a thinker who is unable to account 
for or to theorize human freedom, much less morality. 
 What is necessary and inevitable is the impermanence of the existing state of things, but 
not what will replace it, assuming that human society actually does continue to exist and develop 
in the long term (and of course, it might not). But already to suggest that capitalism cannot go on 
forever is itself “critical and revolutionary,” as Marx points out. It holds out the possibility that 
the existing state of things might be cast away in favor of something new, and for human 
intervention into the “fluid movement” of history. It is the certainty of such movement that 
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allows Marx to conceive of a further development of the human individual, because such a 
development can only occur upon an economic basis that has not yet been developed, just as the 
full freedom of the human person also can only exist in a society in which “the free development 
of each is the condition for the free development of all”--a society which has not yet been 
produced. In reading Marx as a crude economic determinist who cannot account for human 
freedom, his critics reveal how little they are able to comprehend the complexity of his thought, 
for even while he refuses to attribute a range of freedom to human beings that does not yet exist 
in capitalist society, he sees how that sphere of freedom can be expanded upon a new economic 
base brought about by the activity of conscious human actors who leverage existing social 
processes to achieve their goal. 
4.2 MARX AND INDIVIDUALITY 
Marx contrasts his “dialectic method,” as he calls it in the Grundrisse, and his focus on the 
socially determined production of human individuals in the natural world, with the work of 
economists such as Adam Smith and Ricardo who, he charges, rely on a conception of human 
nature given to them by 18th century philosophers who take the individual in the society of “free 
competition,” the person who appears to be freed from any natural or social bonds, as the basis 
of their theorizing. Instead of understanding this type of person as a particular historical 
development, they understand the essence of this type of person as the essence of human nature 
itself and project it backward into the past, confusing a social phenomenon at a particular 
historical moment for a natural and stable feature of mankind. 
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But according to Marx, this method of abstracting away from a contemporary appearance 
and mistaking it for a stable essence obscures the fact that if we examine the anthropological 
record and attempt to understand scientifically what human beings have been over the course of 
their existence, we do not end up with a picture of human beings as essentially the atomized, 
isolated, competitive individuals of bourgeois society. Instead, “The further back we go in 
history, the more does the individual, and accordingly also the producing individual, appear to be 
dependent and belonging to a larger whole” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:18). 
Marx engages a concretely historical and anthropologically based approach to further 
support his arguments that the atomistic individual of bourgeois ideology is little more than a 
chimera, an abstract, ideal construction that does not correspond to the reality of human 
existence, and therefore is a poor basis upon which to develop an understanding of human beings 
or to do moral and political theorizing apart from that which can simply endorse the actual as 
natural, necessary, and appropriate to (what turns out to be a mistaken  and untenable view of) 
human nature. 
Whereas theorists such as Thomas Hobbes or John Locke imagine that human existence 
in the so-called “State of Nature” would be a clash of competing individuals (although both 
thinkers, of course, acknowledge that there is little reason to suspect such a state of nature ever 
existed), individuated persons are themselves a product of historical and social development. 
Indeed, the whole notion of a “presocial” condition of human beings is little more than an ideal 
fantasy with no basis in anthropology, as most scientists agree it is likely that the immediate 
evolutionary predecessors of Homo sapiens already possessed a social character, although of 
course one that appears quite rudimentary when compared with the sociality of human beings 
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and the role of human labor in that sociality. There is no scientific basis upon which to suppose 
that human beings may have sprung into existence already at one another's throats. What we 
find, instead of that collection of competitive individuals pursuing narrowly egoistic interests, is 
that human beings exist and produce first and foremost as social beings, which brings us back of 
course to Marx's observation that socially determined production is the natural starting-point for 
any inquiry into human existence112. 
Labor, as I have mentioned before, especially in the introduction to this study, is the 
essence of human social being. In the first volume of Capital, Marx has this to say on the 
subject: 
The labour process [...] is human action with a view to the production of use values, appropriation 
of natural substances to human requirements; it is the necessary condition for effecting exchange 
of matter between man and Nature; it is the everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human 
existence, and therefore is independent of every social phase of that existence, or rather, is 
common to every such phase. (Capital, MECW 35:194) 
  
While the notion of human beings as essentially atomized and competitive turns out to be 
little more than an unjustified generalization and consecration of conditions which are specific to 
a particular phase of human history, the conception of humans as essentially laboring beings is 
one that holds up in every phase of human existence. And furthermore, Marx writes, that labor-
process is essentially social. 
Marx argues that to suppose that it is possible for human beings to have produced as 
“isolated beings apart from society”, is as much of an absurdity as the development of speech 
without individuals living and speaking together. Production, he says, is always the production of 
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“social individuals”, and all production is the appropriation of nature by the individual within a 
particular form of society113. As he writes in the introduction to the Grundrisse: 
The further back we go in history, the more does the individual, and accordingly also the 
producing individual, appear to be dependent and belonging to a larger whole. At first, he is still in 
a quite natural manner part of the family, and of the family expanded into the tribe; later he is part 
of a community, of one of the different forms of community which arise from the conflict and the 
merging of tribes. It is not until the 18th century, in "bourgeois society", that the various forms of 
the social nexus confront the individual as merely a means towards his private ends, as external 
necessity. But the epoch which produces this standpoint, that of the isolated individual, is precisely 
the epoch of the hitherto most highly developed social (according to this standpoint, general) 
relations. Man is a ζωον πολιτικον in the most literal sense: he is not only a social animal, but an 
animal that can isolate itself only within society. Production by an isolated individual outside 
society--something rare, which might occur when a civilised person already dynamically in 
possession of the social forces is accidentally cast into the wilderness--is just as preposterous as 
the development of language without individuals who live together and speak to one another. 
(Grundrisse, MECW 28:18) 
 
Later in the Grundrisse, Marx reiterates these ideas when he argues that “human beings become 
individuals only through the process of history,” and that “exchange itself is a major agent of this 
individuation.” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:420). It is only in and through society that the human 
being becomes individualized, and so the existence of the human being as an individualized 
animal is one that is historically arisen and socially produced. As opposed to the picture of the 
human being as an essentially atomized or essentially individual being, “The human being is. . . 
an animal that can only individuate itself in society.” Individuation, Marx argues, is a process 
that takes place only within society and only at a certain stage of social and economic 
development. Marx himself does not flesh out this claim in great detail, but it is possible to 
reconstruct the story, nonetheless. For human beings to appear as individuals, and not merely as 
biological specimens of a certain type, requires that productive forces be developed such that the 
human being does not need to spend her entire waking life satisfying her merely biological needs 
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for food, water, shelter and the like. Such a level of development in the forces of production is 
simply too great and complicated a task to be carried out by a single person. It is an inherently 
social project in that it requires a number of people, working together, communicating with one 
another, and developing increasingly complex ways of organizing and dividing their labor. 
Hence, sociality is prior to any individuation that takes part in human beings. That process of 
individuation is also a mark of how far human social development has progressed. The more 
efficiently a society satisfies biological human needs, and the more productive it is, creating new 
resources to satisfy the historically emergent needs that arise in an increasingly complex society, 
the more that its members are able to pursue activities determined more by their own expanding 
array of interests and less by mere biological necessity. In a phrase, we begin to see an 
emergence of the “rich individuality” which Marx regards as the highest aim for human beings. 
 However, not only is it the case that human beings appear more social the further in the 
past we look, but it is also true that if we take a clear look at human beings living today, we find 
that it also makes little sense to think of existing society as a mere aggregate of isolated 
individuals. Thus, Marx argues that “Society does not consist of individuals, but expresses the 
sum of the relationships and conditions in which these individuals stand to one another” 
(Grundrisse, MECW 28:195). Marx sometimes uses the phrase, “social individuals”; this is very 
apt to describing the types of actors we find in society and captures the dual aspects of human 
nature as inherently social and potentially “richly” individual. 
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4.2.1 The Development of “Rich individuality” 
In the Grundrisse, we find the clearest description of what I have referred to previously in this 
study as “human flourishing,” which forms the basis of Marx's ethics. In keeping with the 
terminology Marx uses in the Grundrisse  and Capital, we can now speak of this concept using 
the phrase, “rich individuality.” 
Capitalism produces the alienation of the human being from her labor and from other 
human beings—in short, produces the alienation of the human being from herself, as the essence 
of human existence is social labor. However, capitalism, at the same time that it heightens and 
develops alienation to its full expression, also produces for the first time in history the resources 
necessary for that alienation to be overcome, and for human beings to expand beyond their 
narrow, limited existence and to develop in an “all-sided” manner. It was not possible, in earlier 
epochs, for every human being to be afforded the possibility of developing his or her own 
capacities in a full and rounded way and in the manner that he or she saw fit. Such a possibility 
could only arise when production was sufficiently developed so as to minimize the labor time 
necessary to satisfy the needs of the human species. 
Because in the capitalist mode of production, capitalists' profit is based on driving down 
as far as possible the amount of labor necessary to satisfy the basic reproductive needs of their 
workers, capitalism has massively reduced, through the division of labor and the 
industrialization, mechanization, and rationalization of production, the labor necessary to satisfy 
human needs, thereby potentially freeing up the majority of human beings' hours for the pursuit 
of tasks not narrowly subordinated to the reproduction of the species. In this sense, it is 
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capitalism that has produced the “material elements for the development of rich individuality.” 
As Marx writes in the Grundrisse, capitalist production provides: 
the material elements for the development of the rich individuality, which is as varied and 
comprehensive in its production as it is in its consumption, and whose labour therefore no longer 
appears as labour but as the full development of activity itself, in which natural necessity has 
disappeared in its immediate form; because natural need has been replaced by historically 
produced need. (Grundrisse, MECW 28:251) 
 
At the same time, however, that capitalism provides the potential for such development, it fails to 
realize that potential. The ability to minimize socially necessary labor is expressed as a lifetime 
of increasingly backbreaking and alienating labor for the many, and leisure and profit for the 
few. To realize the promise of the capitalist mode of production, it is necessary to bring about a 
new socialist mode of production in which socially necessary labor would be rationally 
distributed among all members of the society who are capable of performing socially necessary 
labor, and organized in a manner aimed at satisfying the needs of human beings rather than the 
mere production of surplus value for its own sake. 
Marx goes on to specify the features of the “rich individuality” that he sees as the highest 
aim for human beings. He writes that this individuality would be “as all-sided in its production as 
it is in its consumption.” Capitalism already tends in this direction, as it seeks to make labor 
increasingly productive and “drives labour beyond the limits of its natural paltriness.” Instead of 
human activity being constrained to narrow tasks in the division of labor, human beings could 
participate in a wide variety of activities, developing an array of capacities in different areas, just 
as human beings consume a range of social products and would consume still more in a society 
that made these more readily available to them. 
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Marx writes that labor would not appear as labor, but rather “as the full development of 
activity itself.” It would lose its character as a necessary evil, an unfortunate means to human 
existence. There would no longer be a distinction between labor time and leisure time. Labor as 
it appears in capitalist society would give way to labor as the expression and realization of 
human existence as such. 
With the appearance of rich individuality, natural necessity in its immediate form would 
disappear and the sphere of human freedom would increase. In the place of natural, biological 
needs, there would be historically arisen needs—needs that are not the mere biological needs of 
the species, but the historically produced wants of social beings. Human freedom, as the full 
expression of developing human beings, would finally be really possible. Of course, the 
biological needs do not entirely vanish—they form the basis for and set the limits of any 
historically produced, social needs. But the need for shelter, for example, no longer appears as 
the bare need for the delicate human flesh to be shielded from the elements, but rather as the 
need for a comfortable home, with the modern amenities, areas suitable to a range of tasks, and 
so on. It becomes a need that reflects the state of historical progress which society has reached. 
Capitalism, in its drive to increase profits and productivity, revolutionizes and advances 
the capacity of society to satisfy a wide and expanding range of human needs. It thereby makes it 
possible for there to be a transition to a society in which rich individuality would be the “ruling 
principle” of the society, recognized as the highest good for human beings. As Marx says of the 
capitalist in the first volume of Capital: 
Fanatically bent on making value expand itself, he ruthlessly forces the human race to produce for 
production’s sake; he thus forces the development of the productive powers of society, and creates 
those material conditions, which alone can form the real basis of a higher form of society, a 
society in which the full and free development of every individual forms the ruling principle. 
(Capital, MECW 35:588) 
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The question that may be asked here, of course, is whether human flourishing—the development 
of “rich individuality”—really is the highest aim for human beings and whether it really can play 
the role of a supreme moral principle in any moral theory worth the name. A further question is 
whether building a movement for communism really is the best way to realize this aim. I will 
treat the three questions separately, although as I will show they are closely related. 
I will do my best to motivate the first question, which more bluntly stated, is this: What is 
so good, anyway, about satisfying human needs and developing human capacities? Why should 
that be the basis of our moral theory? Why not maximizing happiness? Or instantiating the 
virtues? Or following divine commands, for that matter? 
The answer, though some will find it unsatisfying, is that we should care about the full 
flourishing of human beings because they're us. And we are more than just happiness-
experiencing blobs; we are capable of a vast array of activities and experiences and it is only 
through the full exploration of these that we can realize our human essence as social individuals 
in a productive engagement with the world around us. 
I think Marx would argue that the question, Why promote human flourishing?, doesn't 
arise unless a person already has such an alienated and un-human perspective on her own species 
and on the world that for her, knowing that some path of action is most likely to preserve the 
continued existence of human beings and to further their full development in the natural world is 
not enough to answer the question, Ought this path to be taken? And of course, there are people 
like these. The religious-minded, for instance, may think that the this-worldly orientation of rich 
individuality is misguided, and that the existence of man as an essentially spiritual being is to be 
realized through the glorification of God and an eventual assumption into Heaven. Or, in a more 
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mundane spin on skepticism about human flourishing in the natural world as a moral end, there 
is the tendency among members of the animal rights movement to regard human beings as just 
another type of animal among many animals, all of (at least) relatively equal moral worth. Marx, 
after all, is the consummate “speciesist,” insisting that value of any kind only comes onto the 
scene once human beings start producing in order to satisfy their needs. And this, I believe 
provides a significant part of Marx's answer to these types of criticisms. The mistake that these 
sorts of critics make is similar to the mistake made by the person who wants to know the answer 
to the theological question, “Why is there something rather than nothing?” to whom Marx 
replies: 
since for the socialist man the entire so-called history of the world is nothing but the creation of 
man through human labour, nothing but the emergence of nature for man, so he has the visible, 
irrefutable proof of his birth through himself, of his genesis. Since the real existence of man and 
nature has become evident in practice, through sense experience, because man has thus become 
evident for man as the being of nature, and nature for man as the being of man, the question about 
an alien being, about a being above nature and man--a question which implies the admission of the 
unreality of nature and of man--has become impossible in practice. (Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844, MECW 3:305-306) 
 
This line of thought can be applied to the question of whether or not “man is the highest being 
for man,” as Marx says, which expresses the same idea as the statement that the development of 
rich individuality is the highest moral aim. It is incoherent, and incommensurate with our 
scientific knowledge, to talk about value in a way that does not assume human beings and their 
productive activity as the source and ontological basis of all value in the world. 
Of course, in suggesting that in the absence of a greatly disturbed relationship to the 
human species and to the natural world, there can be no doubt that human flourishing as Marx 
describes it is the highest goal for human beings, I have relied heavily on a conception of just 
what human beings are, exactly. As I have alluded to above, species of Utilitarianism fail as 
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moral theories because they construe human beings too narrowly. In the place of the real human 
being himself, stands the human being's capacity to experience happiness, to avoid suffering, 
etc., abstracted away from the real human being. We are promised a theory about human beings, 
and instead we get a theory about sensitive blobs—and worse yet, blobs that are sensitive to only 
one type of experience, of happiness, or of suffering. A wide range of human social relations are 
reduced to just one relation of usefulness. 
Kantianism suffers similar problems, in that it is a moral theory based on the free will, 
which is itself an abstraction away from the human being. As long as the free will is properly 
constituted, it matters not what the effects of that will are in the material world. It is a theory 
unsuited to address the questions which face human beings as, precisely, natural and social 
beings whose essence is a metabolism with the natural world through the labor process. 
Throughout the various forms and appearances that human life has taken throughout 
history and across different societies, what remains the same is that human beings must 
constantly interact with the natural world in order to produce their own existence, and that in so 
doing, they produce new, historically arisen needs which are also then fulfilled through the labor 
process, a “metabolism” with the natural world which lays the basis for a continued course of 
change, progress, and development. As Marx writes in Capital: 
The labour process, resolved as above into its simple elementary factors, is human action with a 
view to the production of use values, appropriation of natural substances to human requirements; it 
is the necessary condition for effecting exchange of matter between man and Nature; it is the 
everlasting Nature-imposed condition of human existence, and therefore is independent of every 
social phase of that existence, or rather, is common to every such phase. (Capital, MECW 35:194) 
  
Of course, Marx is not entirely unique in putting forward the idea of the development of 
the well-rounded human being, active in a wide and expanding sphere, as a goal for human 
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beings. Already in the 14th and 15th centuries, Renaissance humanists such as Leonardo da Vinci 
and Leon Battista Alberti developed and strove to embody the ideal of the “Universal Man,” a 
person who developed expertise in a wide range of pursuits, as suggested in Alberti's remark that 
“a man can do all things if he will.” But none of them were communists. So why should even 
agreeing about the desirability of rich individuality incline us to accept Marx's ideas about how 
the economic structure of society ought to be transformed? 
In the 15th Century, the call to embody the “Universal Man” ideal could be, at best, good 
advice to the lucky few, as only a lucky few had time and resources enough to pursue it. The 
ability to make such a pursuit the general condition of human existence, and to pursue such 
development not merely as an individual but also within a social context in which the social 
individual develops greater solidarity with others and takes part in widespread cooperation and 
democratic problem-solving, could only arise upon the economic basis produced by capitalism. 
However, a contradiction between the immense forces of production on the one hand, and the 
relations of production on the other, makes it the case that the majority of the Earth's population 
do not have access to the resources that would be required in order to further develop their full 
range of capacities, including the capacity for greater and more fulfilling social involvements, 
which remains stunted in our society. That can only be the case in a society in which the full and 
free development of the human being becomes the guiding principle of society. 
Some critics, such as Allen Wood in his book, Karl Marx, have argued that Marx cannot 
be said to have a moral philosophy since he appears to be concerned primarily with non-moral 
goods. His theory aims at the satisfaction of human needs and not at abstract moral ends such as 
the Good, or the Just. But I think this line of argument assumes a certain robust thesis about 
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morality, namely, that moral naturalism is false, and this is a thesis that is by no means 
universally accepted. Moreover, I take it to be a very standard understanding of morality that 
morality addresses the question of how human beings should live, and of measuring and learning 
how to close the gap between human life as it is and human life as it ought to be. Marx's 
conception of “rich individuality” certainly addresses each of these distinctly moral questions. 
As I have already alluded to in this section, Marx's concepts of alienation and rich 
individuality are intimately connected, and just as Marx's description of human flourishing as 
“rich individuality” finds its most concretely developed expression in his later work, so the 
theme of alienation continues to be of central importance to Marx's critique of capitalism. In the 
following section, I will discuss Marx's treatment of alienation in his mature writings and show 
how they relate to his understanding of morality. 
4.3 ALIENATION 
In prioritizing production for its own sake over human beings, modern society gets things 
backward, and this is one of the senses in which it is an alienating society. If consciousness can 
only be consciousness of social being, as Marx argues, then we can understand how in a society 
organized on the basis of production for its own sake, even at the expense of human beings, 
certain absurdities become intelligible or even, common-sense and “obvious”: for instance, that 
hundreds of workers should be condemned to misery and starvation because the factory can't use 
them any more. Capitalist society is alienating in that it deprives human beings of a correct 
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understanding of their own place in the world and obscures the fact that “man is the highest 
being for man.” 
In the Grundrisse, Marx argues that in the ancient world, human beings were taken to be 
the aim of production. “The enquiry,” Marx argues, “is always about which form of property 
creates the best citizens.” In the modern world, this relation has been reversed (Grundrisse, 
MECW 28:411). Human life, that is to say, human labor, human creativity, ingenuity, sociality, 
etc., are all instrumentalized and treated as means to production. “Production for production's 
sake,” as Marx puts it in Capital, but more precisely, the creation of surplus value, of profit, 
become the organizing principle of modern society (Capital, MECW 35:591). 
However, it must be emphasized that this “production for production's sake” is not all 
bad, since it is that relentless drive toward production that has revolutionized society's forces of 
production to an extent not even imaginable under previous economic systems, and made it 
possible for alienation, which has been a feature of human existence long before capitalism, to 
finally be abolished. It is possible again to have a society in which production is carried out in 
order to satisfy the needs of human beings, and one in which not merely a narrow band of the 
lucky and the well-born would enjoy some semblance of a human existence, but rather, this 
genuinely human existence would be possible for all human beings. Hence, it would be a mistake 
to simply long romantically for a return to the productive relations of ancient society. As Marx 
writes in the Grundrisse: 
the old view according to which man always appears in however narrowly national, religious or 
political a determination as the end of production, seems very exalted when set against the modern 
world, in which production is the end of man, and wealth the end of production. IN FACT, 
however, if the narrow bourgeois form is peeled off, what is wealth if not the universality of the 
individual's needs, capacities, enjoyments, productive forces, etc., produced in universal exchange; 
what is it if not the full development of human control over the forces of nature--over the forces of 
so-called Nature, as well as those of his own nature? What is wealth if not the absolute unfolding 
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of man's creative abilities, without any precondition other than the preceding historical 
development, which makes the totality of this development --i. e. the development of all human 
powers as such, not measured by any previously given yardstick--an end-in-itself, through which 
he does not reproduce himself in any specific character, but produces his totality, and does not 
seek to remain something he has already become, but is in the absolute movement of becoming? 
In the bourgeois economy--and in the epoch of production to which it corresponds--this complete 
unfolding of man's inner potentiality turns into his total emptying-out. His universal objectification 
becomes his total alienation, and the demolition of all determined one-sided aims becomes the 
sacrifice of the [human] end-in-itself to a wholly external purpose. That is why, on the one hand, 
the childish world of antiquity appears as something superior. On the other hand, it is superior, 
wherever fixed shape, form and established limits are being looked for. It is satisfaction from a 
narrow standpoint; while the modern world leaves us unsatisfied or, where it does appear to be 
satisfied with itself, is merely vulgar. (Grundrisse, MECW 411-412) 
 
To address the limiting and alienating aspects of production under capitalism, it would be 
insufficient to advocate a return to antiquity or to understand the good human life as one that 
instantiates the virtues of a privileged class within an economic form that no longer exists. 
Rather, we must comprehend the lack of a “predetermined yardstick” for human development as 
what it is: a condition in which it has become possible to see that human development is 
potentially open-ended and limitless, and not as cause to abandon the notion of the human being 
and of human development as an end in itself. 
As we also see in the passage above, closely related to the failure of modern society to 
recognize the human development as an end in itself is its inability to allow, on a general scale, 
individuals to engage in an expansive and expanding array of activities. Across the whole 
society, taken as a whole, and in the many different types of human pursuits we can detect, 
overall, what Marx calls the “absolute working-out” of man's “creative potentialities.” Yet, the 
individual worker simply “reproduces himself in one specificity,” performing some particular 
task in the division of labor while his capacity for other activities atrophies and withers away. In 
the first volume of Capital, Marx describes this tendency in arrestingly vivid terms when he 
writes that capitalism 
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converts the labourer into a crippled monstrosity, by forcing his detailed dexterity at the expense 
of a world of productive capabilities and instincts; just as in the States of La Plata they butcher a 
whole beast for the sake of his hide or his tallow. (Capital, MECW 35:365) 
 
This is another aspect of alienation: individuals' scope of possible activity is narrowed under 
capitalism, and unnecessarily and wastefully so. The machinery developed in capitalist society's 
relentless push for production and wealth reduces socially necessary labor to a minimum, thereby 
creating the conditions for the emancipation of labor (Grundrisse, MECW 29:87). However, 
instead of being liberated through this more efficient production, the worker becomes a mere 
accessory to the productive process and to the machine, so that objectified labor, in the form of 
capital, confronts living labor, in the form of the worker, as the power which rules it. “The 
activity of the worker, restricted to a mere abstraction of activity,” Marx writes, “is determined 
and governed in every respect by the movement of the machinery, not vice versa” (Grundrisse, 
MECW 29:82-83). 
This form of alienation is also described elsewhere in Capital: 
At the same time that factory work exhausts the nervous system to the uttermost, it does away 
with the many-sided play of the muscles, and confiscates every atom of freedom, both in bodily 
and intellectual activity. The lightening of the labour, even, becomes a sort of torture, since the 
machine does not free the labourer from work, but deprives the work of all interest. Every kind of 
capitalist production, in so far as it is not only a labour-process, but also a process of creating 
surplus value, has this in common, that it is not the workman that employs the instruments of 
labour, but the instruments of labour that employ the workman. (Capital, MECW 35:425-426) 
  
In his book, Karl Marx, Allen Wood suggests that Marx's thought on alienation undergoes a shift 
between his earlier and later work: namely, that in the earlier work, alienation is an “explanatory 
concept,” and that in the later writings it functions only as a “descriptive concept.” Wood writes: 
we should look on alienation in Marx's mature thought not as an explanatory concept but as a 
descriptive or diagnostic one [and] view it as describing the condition of a person who lacks a 
sense of self-worth or of meaning in life, or else preserves such a sense only by being the victim of 
illusions or false consciousness. (Wood, Karl Marx, p.44) 
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To be fair, Wood clarifies that this is only a “provisional” suggestion, but it is worth 
mentioning all the same that Marx in no way psychologizes alienation in the way that Wood 
suggests he does. Although alienation often does involve or lead to a sense of personal ennui, the 
concept of alienation in Marx's later work is by no means simply a description of a psychological 
state. It describes the real position of the human being with relation to the forces of production in 
a capitalist society, and plays an explanatory role insofar as it is impossible to understand, in 
Marx's theory, how the human being is stunted and diminished without deploying it. 
With regard to this question, I am in wholehearted agreement with Eugene Kamenka, 
who writes: 
[I]n the economic magnum opus of his mature period—Das Kapital—he does not rely on the term 
'alienation' at all. Was it, then, one of the casualties of his tendency toward economic 
reductionism? Had it been dropped as a 'philosophic' or 'ethical' concept having no place in his 
new objective and scientific historical materialism? 
The answer is no. The positive content which Marx gave to the term 'alienation' remains central to 
the position he is expounding in Capital. The mental process of objectifying one's own product 
and allowing it to dominate one Marx now calls the fetishism of commodities; it remains the same 
process. Man's loss of control over his labour power Marx calls his dehumanisation; it, too, is the 
same process—a process which for Marx remains of central importance to the understanding of 
capitalism. Man's loss of control over the product of his work Marx now calls exploitation; a term 
which does not mean that Marx thinks the capitalist is getting too much—more than is 
'reasonable', but which underlines his insistence that what belongs to one man, or to men in 
general, is being appropriated by others, or by some men in particular. Exploitation is made 
possible by the creation of surplus value; but its basic ground for Marx remains the alienation of 
man from his labour power, the fact that man's activity becomes a commodity. In the German 
Ideology and in Marx's economic notes and drafts made between 1850 and 1859 the connexion of 
all this with the term 'alienation' is made specific. But we do not need to have the connexion made 
specific, to have the actual term flourished in the text, to see precisely the same theme in Wage 
Labour and Capital, the Critique of Political Economy and Capital itself. (Eugene Kamenka, The 
Ethical Foundations of Marxism, pp.144-5) 
 
I do not think it is possible to seriously maintain that the concept of alienation undergoes 
any significant revisions at least from the time it appears in the Economic and Philosophic 
Manuscripts of 1844 and through the rest of Marx's works following the Manuscripts, and I 
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certainly do not think it is correct to maintain that Marx abandons the concept altogether. 
Consider the following passage: 
On the one hand, the process of production incessantly converts material wealth into capital, into 
means of creating more wealth and means of enjoyment for the capitalist. On the other hand, the 
labourer, on quitting the process, is what he was on entering it, a source of wealth, but devoid of 
all means of making that wealth his own. Since, before entering on the process, his own labour has 
already been alienated from himself by the sale of his labour-power, has been appropriated by the 
capitalist and incorporated with capital, it must, during the process, be realised in a product that 
does not belong to him. Since the process of production is also the process by which the capitalist 
consumes labour-power, the product of the labourer is incessantly converted, not only into 
commodities, but into capital, into value that sucks up the value-creating power, into means of 
subsistence that buy the person of the labourer, into means of production that command the 
producers. The labourer therefore constantly produces material, objective wealth, but in the form 
of capital, of an alien power that dominates and exploits him; and the capitalist as constantly 
produces labour-power, but in the form of a subjective source of wealth, separated from the 
objects in and by which it can alone be realised; in short he produces the labourer, but as a wage 
labourer114. This incessant reproduction, this perpetuation of the labourer, is the sine quâ non of 
capitalist production. (Capital, MECW 35:570) 
 
This is remarkably close in content to passages about alienation that already appear in the 
1844 manuscript, “Estranged Labor.” What remains here, is to understand more specifically how 
the phenomenon of alienation also relates to the inversion of bourgeois ideals and their 
conversion into their opposites, as when Marx writes in the Grundrisse that the worker: 
sells himself as an effect. He is absorbed into the body of capital as a cause, as activity. Thus the 
exchange turns into its opposite, and the laws of private property -- liberty, equality, property -- 
property in one's own labour, and free disposition over it -- turn into the worker's propertylessness, 
and the dispossession [Entäusserung] of his labour, [i.e.] the fact that he relates to it as alien 
property and vice versa. (Grundrisse, MECW 29:64) 
 
To understand more fully what Marx means in statements such as this one is the work of the 
following section, in which Marx's critiques of the limitations and hypocrisy of bourgeois 
morality are explored. 
                                                 
114 My emphasis. 
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4.4 MARX'S CRITIQUE OF BOURGEOIS NOTIONS OF RIGHTS, FREEDOM, 
AND EQUALITY 
The civilization and justice of bourgeois order 
comes out in its lurid light whenever  
the slaves and drudges of that order 
rise against their masters. 
 
Then this civilization and justice stand forth 
as undisguised savagery and lawless revenge115. 
 
 
In earlier chapters, I have detailed and explicated Marx's normative condemnations of bourgeois 
society and of bourgeois morality and argued that not only are these frequently and incisively 
made throughout Marx's writings, but that they also fit into a coherent moral philosophy in 
which the free and full development of the “rich individuality” of the human person figures as a 
standard against which to judge all social institutions and social relations. This is no less the case 
in Marx's later work. In writings such as the Grundrisse, Capital, and Critique of the Gotha 
Programme, such criticisms frequently take the form of critiques of bourgeois rights and 
bourgeois conceptions of freedom and equality. Marx also continues to develop the criticisms of 
Utilitarianism that he raised in earlier works, and I will discuss those criticisms in this section, as 
                                                 
115  Karl Marx, The Civil War in France, MECW 22:348. 
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well, as they provide us continued guidance in understanding Marx's own approach to moral 
questions. 
Marx argues that bourgeois freedom, equality, and property only retain their validity 
within a specific form of activity under capitalism—the exchange of commodities and in 
particular, the sale and purchase of labor-power. Abstracting away from the rest of social 
existence under capitalism, it is possible to believe that the worker is truly free, because he is 
able to make his will effective through contract, truly equal, because he receives in exchange for 
his labor-power a wage of equivalent value, and truly in possession of the rights of property, 
because he is able to dispose of his belongings—and of course in his case we are speaking 
chiefly of his own labor-power—as he wills. 
In the first volume of Capital, Marx writes: 
[The sphere] within whose boundaries the sale and purchase of labour-power goes on, is in fact a 
very Eden of the innate rights of man. There alone rule Freedom, Equality, Property and Bentham. 
Freedom, because both buyer and seller of a commodity, say of labour-power, are constrained only 
by their own free will. They contract as free agents, and the agreement they come to, is but the 
form in which they give legal expression to their common will. Equality, because each enters into 
relation with the other, as with a simple owner of commodities, and they exchange equivalent for 
equivalent. Property, because each disposes only of what is his own. And Bentham, because each 
looks only to himself. The only force that brings them together and puts them in relation with each 
other, is the selfishness, the gain and the private interests of each. Each looks to himself only, and 
no one troubles himself about the rest, and just because they do so, do they all, in accordance with 
the pre-established harmony of things, or under the auspices of an all-shrewd providence, work 
together to their mutual advantage, for the common weal and in the interest of all. (Capital, 
MECW 35:186) 
 
But as soon as we leave this realm of abstraction and see, for instance, that the worker is denied 
access to the means of production, it becomes possible to notice that he is not truly free to 
dispose of his labor-power as he wills, but rather compelled to sell it that he might continue to 
live. These illusions of bourgeois morality become less and less tenable, the more concretely we 
understand the real situation of the worker and the real economic relations of capitalist society. 
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The “Benthamite” notion that out of mere selfishness and private interest, the general 
commonwealth can be safeguarded, becomes harder to believe and the hypocrisy and 
contradictions of capitalist society become clearer to see. 
In the Grundrisse, Marx discusses the nature of freedom and equality in bourgeois 
society, and addresses the limitations of the goals of the French Revolution. His comments on 
those themes in these notebooks provide an early look at arguments about the insufficiency of 
bourgeois ideals that are later discussed in greater detail in Marx's Critique of the Gotha 
Program and in Capital. 
Marx argues that socialism cannot be conceived of as simply a realization of bourgeois 
ideals such as freedom, equality, and justice, because bourgeois freedom, bourgeois equality and 
bourgeois justice are already realized in bourgeois society. The French socialists are foolish, he 
writes, “who wish to prove socialism to be the realisation of the ideas of bourgeois society 
enunciated by the French Revolution” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:180).  It is “utopian” to suppose 
that the 
inevitable difference between the real and ideal shape of bourgeois society, and the consequent 
desire to undertake the superfluous task of changing the ideal expression itself back into reality, 
whereas it is in fact merely the photographic image [Lichtbild] of this reality. (Grundrisse, MECW 
28:180) 
 
Once realized, bourgeois equality and freedom are proven to be inequality and unfreedom. 
Bourgeois freedom is the freedom of the atomistic, individual agent to buy or sell a commodity, 
and bourgeois equality is the formal equality of individuals who expect to receive remuneration 
equivalent to the value of the commodities they enter into exchange. The worker and the 
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capitalist already confront one another as formally free and equal in this manner116. It is precisely 
this formal universal freedom and equality which forms the basis for the capitalist mode of 
production and which gives rise to the widespread de facto bondage of workers and the de facto 
social and economic inequality so characteristic of capitalist society. 
Although in capitalist society free competition is taken to be individual freedom, “free 
competition is the free development of the mode of production based upon capital; the free 
development of its conditions and of its process as constantly reproducing these conditions. In 
free competition, it is capital that is set free, not the individuals” (A Contribution to the Critique 
of Political Economy, MECW 20:38). Although capitalist exchange gives rise to freedom and 
equality, it obscures the fact that the individual, even the capitalist individual, is not totally free 
because he must produce in accordance with laws that operate independently of him and which 
dominate him. Marx writes: 
This type of individual freedom is therefore, at the same time, the most sweeping abolition of all 
individual freedom and the complete subjugation of individuality to social conditions which 
assume the form of objective powers, indeed of overpowering objects--objects independent of the 
individuals relating to one another. (Grundrisse, MECW 29:40) 
 
Therefore, what is necessary now in order to promote the further development of a free human 
individuality is not for bourgeois freedom and equality to be realized, but rather for these to be 
practically superseded by higher forms of freedom and equality, with substantive freedom and 
equality created in the place of merely formal freedom and equality. 
Hence, in the preamble to The Programme of the French Workers' Party, Marx writes 
that “the producers cannot be free unless they are in possession of the means of production” 
                                                 
116 “[...]as far as the individual, real person is concerned, a wide field of choice, caprice and therefore of formal 
freedom is left to him.” (Grundrisse, MECW 28:392) 
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(Preamble to the Programme of the French Workers' Party, MECW 24:340). This type of 
freedom, the freedom of the majority of society to appropriate the means of production, is of 
course not a realization of bourgeois freedom at all, but rather a distinctly socialist freedom in 
which workers would exercise direct control over the raw materials, tools, machinery, 
infrastructure, and so on that are required in order for production to be carried out at the level of 
efficiency to which it has been developed under capitalism. This substantive freedom would be 
directly at odds with the capitalist mode of production that depends on the forcible separation of 
the producers from the means of production (cf. Marx's discussion of primitive accumulation in 
the first volume of Capital). 
The implementation of such a genuine, substantive freedom of course would require 
“despotic inroads117 on the rights of property, and on the conditions of bourgeois production,” 
something Marx already wrote earlier, in The Communist Manifesto (Manifesto of the 
Communist Party, MECW 6:504). It would neither be a realization of bourgeois freedom nor 
would it even be commensurate with, or justifiable on the basis of, bourgeois freedom and 
equality, even as it is bourgeois production which makes this substantive freedom first possible. 
In the reformist struggles of workers under capitalism, we see a first inkling of how this 
genuine, substantive freedom comes into conflict with formal, bourgeois freedom. In the first 
volume of Capital, Marx writes: 
It must be acknowledged that our labourer comes out of the process of production other than he 
entered. In the market he stood as owner of the commodity “labour-power” face to face with other 
owners of commodities, dealer against dealer. The contract by which he sold to the capitalist his 
labour-power proved, so to say, in black and white that he disposed of himself freely. The bargain 
concluded, it is discovered that he was no “free agent,” that the time for which he is free to sell his 
labour-power is the time for which he is forced to sell it, that in fact the vampire will not lose its 
                                                 
117 Emphasis mine. 
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hold on him “so long as there is a muscle, a nerve, a drop of blood to be exploited.” For 
“protection” against “the serpent of their agonies,” the labourers must put their heads together, 
and, as a class, compel the passing of a law, an all-powerful social barrier that shall prevent the 
very workers from selling. by voluntary contract with capital, themselves and their families into 
slavery and death. In place of the pompous catalogue of the “inalienable rights of man” comes the 
modest Magna Charta of a legally limited working day, which shall make clear “when the time 
which the worker sells is ended, and when his own begins.” Quantum mutatus ab illo! [What a 
great change from that time! – Virgil]. (Capital, MECW 35:306) 
 
In Capital, as in the Grundrisse, we see that the worker's freedom to enter into a contract and to 
dispose of his labor-power as he wills is only an illusory freedom, and that he was never in this 
transaction a totally “free agent” at all because he is not simply free to sell his labor-power or 
not, but rather is compelled to sell it if he wishes to live. That compulsion makes the worker 
susceptible to the most brutal working conditions. Thus, the first step in bringing about 
substantive freedom from oppressive working conditions and exploitative relations of production 
is for workers to combine together and push for laws that actually curtail the abstract freedom 
granted to them in bourgeois society. These measures on the part of workers are vehemently 
opposed by the bourgeoisie: 
The same bourgeois mind which praises division of labour in the workshop, life-long annexation 
of the labourer to a partial operation, and his complete subjection to capital, as being an 
organisation of labour that increases its productiveness, that same bourgeois mind denounces with 
equal vigour every conscious attempt to socially control and regulate the process of production, as 
an inroad upon such sacred things as the rights of property, freedom and unrestricted play for the 
bent of the individual capitalist. (Capital, MECW 35:361) 
 
As an illustration, Marx describes how in the French Revolution, the rights which could aid 
workers, such as the right of association, were subordinated in practice to the right of bourgeois 
property: 
During the very first storms of the revolution, the French bourgeoisie dared to take away from the 
workers the right of association but just acquired. By a decree of June 14, 1791, they declared all 
coalition of the workers as “an attempt against liberty and the declaration of the rights of man,” 
punishable by a fine of 500 livres, together with deprivation of the rights of an active citizen for 
one year. This law which, by means of State compulsion, confined the struggle between capital 
and labour within limits comfortable for capital, has outlived revolutions and changes of dynasties. 
Even the Reign of Terror left it untouched. It was but quite recently struck out of the Penal Code. 
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Nothing is more characteristic than the pretext for this bourgeois coup d’état. “Granting,” says 
Chapelier, the reporter of the Select Committee on this law, “that wages ought to be a little higher 
than they are, ... that they ought to be high enough for him that receives them, to be free from that 
state of absolute dependence due to the want of the necessaries of life, and which is almost that of 
slavery,” yet the workers must not be allowed to come to any understanding about their own 
interests, nor to act in common and thereby lessen their “absolute dependence, which is almost 
that of slavery;” because, forsooth, in doing this they injure “the freedom of their cidevant masters, 
the present entrepreneurs,” and because a coalition against the despotism of the quondam masters 
of the corporations is – guess what! – is a restoration of the corporations abolished by the French 
constitution. (Capital, MECW 35:730-731) 
 
Bourgeois opposition to the attempts of workers to exert social control on production 
further reveals the practical contradiction between formal bourgeois freedom and the real 
freedom workers struggle for within capitalism, in struggles that necessarily point beyond 
capitalism for just this reason. While the capitalist defends “sacred” bourgeois freedom, he is at 
the same time also perfectly willing to defend the real unfreedom of the worker, the “complete 
subjection” of the laborer to capital. 
In Capital, Marx lays out more specifically the inherent limits of rights talk as an aid to 
revolutionary and emancipatory politics, and why any gains made by the worker must be the 
result of struggle: 
the nature of the exchange of commodities itself imposes no limit to the working day, no limit to 
surplus labour. The capitalist maintains his rights as a purchaser when he tries to make the 
working day as long as possible, and to make, whenever possible, two working days out of one. 
On the other hand, the peculiar nature of the commodity sold implies a limit to its consumption by 
the purchaser, and the labourer maintains his right as seller when he wishes to reduce the working 
day to one of definite normal duration. There is here, therefore, an antinomy, right against right, 
both equally bearing the seal of the law of exchanges. Between equal rights force decides. Hence 
is it that in the history of capitalist production, the determination of what is a working day, 
presents itself as the result of a struggle, a struggle between collective capital, i.e., the class of 
capitalists, and collective labour, i.e., the working-class. (Capital, MECW 35:243) 
  
Marx's approach to rights and justice is similar to his approach to freedom and equality, 
insofar as bourgeois rights and bourgeois justice are also inadequate as theoretical resources to 
justify the substantive gains made by workers. However, capitalism does develop productive 
capacities which would make it possible to realize a higher form of justice, but one that can only 
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be effectively realized with a revolution in the relations of production. In this sense, Marx's 
attitudes toward rights and justice strongly echo his comments elsewhere that “the producers can 
be free only when they are in possession of the means of production.” (Preamble to the 
Programme of the French Workers' Party, MECW 24:340) 
However, Marx's approach to rights has been largely oversimplified and misunderstood. 
For instance, Allen Wood, in his influential book titled, Karl Marx, claims that “Marx positively 
denies that capitalist exploitation does the workers any injustice” (AWKM:127). Instead, 
according to Wood, Marx argues that any appeal to a notion of justice on the part of workers 
would be fundamentally misguided. Wood reads Marx as ruling out as invalid any moral critique 
of a society that does not appeal to standards that are in line with the existing economic system 
and serve to uphold it. 
Wood believes that a section from Marx's Critique of the Gotha Programme supports his 
argument that Marx believes there is no right or justice beyond that which supports and belongs 
to the existing economic system. Therefore, I will start there in explaining how this reading of 
Marx is so misguided. Just as Marx argues for a higher form of socialist freedom which cannot 
simply be reduced to or understood as the realization of bourgeois freedom, so Marx argues for a 
higher and more substantive theory of human rights which would supersede bourgeois rights, 
subsuming what is best in them but ultimately supplanting them and not being merely reducible 
to them or understood simply as a realization of bourgeois right. 
Wood quotes a single sentence from Marx's argument against the Gotha Programme's call 
for workers' “equal rights” to the surplus value and goods created by capitalist production: 
“Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its cultural development 
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which this determines.” (Critique of the Gotha Programme, MECW 24:87) Marx's remarks, 
specifically directed at a draft political program for the United Worker's Party of Germany, are 
quoted out of all context in Wood's account, where Wood supposes that Marx's objection to the 
Gotha Programme is that it refers to rights at all. 
Marx's objection to the Gotha Programme's call for equal rights is not that it appeals to 
the concept of rights, but that it calls for the same sort of limited formal equality which is 
entirely consistent with bourgeois ideology and bourgeois society and which fails to address the 
needs of human beings as individuals with individual requirements. The Gotha Programme's 
calls for an equal distribution is a step forward, but not a step far enough, since in fact, merely to 
provide each person with an equal share of society's products would give rise to an effective 
inequality. Since each person has different needs unique to his or her condition, merely to give 
every person an equal share would result in some people having more than they can use, some 
having just enough, and some having not enough at all. 
To avoid this absurd result, “equal right” would have to be applied in such a way as to 
account for the differences among individuals and their specific needs. It would have to be 
“unequal” in its content and practical application. Equal right must actually be overcome in a 
socialist society and replaced with unequal right to the products of society. 
It is worth reproducing the passage in its entirety: 
Right by its nature can exist only as the application of an equal standard; but unequal individuals 
(and they would not be different individuals, if they were not unequal) are measurable by an equal 
standard only insofar as they are made subject to an equal criterion, are taken from a certain side 
only, for instance, in the present case, are regarded only as workers and nothing more is seen in 
them, everything else being ignored. Besides, one worker is married, another not; one has more 
children than another, etc., etc. Thus, given an equal amount of work done, and hence an equal 
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share in the social consumption fund, one will in fact receive more than another, one will be richer 
than another, etc. To avoid all these defects, right would have to be unequal rather than equal.118 
 But these defects are inevitable in the first phase of communist society as it is when it has 
just emerged after prolonged birth-pangs from capitalist society. Right can never be higher than 
the economic structure of society and its cultural development which this determines. 
 In a higher phase of communist society, after the enslaving subordination of the 
individual to the division of labour, and thereby also the antithesis between mental and physical 
labour, has vanished; after labour has become not only a means of life but life's prime want; after 
the productive forces have also increased with the all-round development of the individual, and all 
the springs of common wealth flow more abundantly—only then can the narrow horizon of 
bourgeois right be crossed in its entirety and society inscribe on its banners: From each according 
to his abilities, to each according to his needs! (Critique of the Gotha Programme, MECW 24:87) 
 
This is the context in which Marx's comment that “Right can never be higher than the economic 
structure of society and its cultural development which this determines” appears, and it is 
impossible to understand this comment correctly without also considering this passage as a 
whole. Marx argues that the first phase of communist society would bear certain “defects” with 
regard to rights as a result of having been born of capitalism. He further refers to the “narrow 
horizon of bourgeois right” which only a “higher phase of communist society” can cross. Not 
only this, but Marx also has a conception in mind of what standard can replace that of bourgeois 
right: that standard is, famously, “From each according to his abilities, to each according to his 
needs.” This connects up with earlier criticisms of right in On the Jewish Question and A 
Contribution to a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right. In those texts, Marx stresses the 
lineage of bourgeois right in a system of feudal privilege, and the status of the right to private 
property as the sine qua non of bourgeois right as a whole. That right to private property as the 
jus utendi et abutendi, the right to use or misuse an item irrespective of the interests of others, is 
inherently antisocial, the right of an atomized individual who seeks only to have his private 
sphere of influence protected against incursions from others or from society as a whole. As such 
                                                 
118 Emphasis mine. 
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it would have no place in the social life of a system based on such principles as solidarity and 
communal democratic control over all of humanity's resources. 
While Marx certainly does believe that it is not possible to realize a given rights schema 
unless the appropriate material basis exists to support it, Wood is simply wrong when he takes 
this to also mean that it is not possible to criticize an existing society by appeal to a rights 
schema that does not uphold and legitimize the society in question. Indeed, the crux of Marx's 
criticism of capitalist society in his Critique of the Gotha Programme seems to be exactly this: 
that bourgeois right is narrow and defective when compared to the standard that would be 
realized in a communist society. 
A further example of Marx's willingness to critique capitalist justice is found in the first 
volume of Capital, where Marx describes a scheme to reimburse landowners for the 
expropriation of their private property: 
 
Admire this capitalistic justice! The owner of land, of houses, the businessman, when expropriated 
by “improvements” such as railroads, the building of new streets, &c., not only receives full 
indemnity. He must, according to law, human and divine, be comforted for his enforced 
“abstinence” over and above this by a thumping profit. The labourer, with his wife and child and 
chattels, is thrown out into the street, and – if he crowds in too large numbers towards quarters of 
the town where the vestries insist on decency, he is prosecuted in the name of sanitation! (MECW 
35:654) 
  
Wood argues that for Marx, “a higher mode of production is not 'more just' than a lower 
one; it is only just in its own way.” Certainly, Marx might agree that capitalism is “just in its own 
way.” However, not only can Wood's reading not account for the biting sarcasm with which 
Marx speaks of such “capitalist justice,” but it cannot make good sense of Marx's indictment of 
bourgeois right as defective and narrow when compared with the “unequal” rights of a 
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transitional socialist society or with the conception of right that would be instantiated in an 
abundantly productive communist society. 
I have mentioned already in earlier sections that Marx's theory of alienation is closely 
connected to his critique of bourgeois rights. We see this connection spelled out quite explicitly 
in the following passage from the first volume of Capital: 
At first the rights of property seemed to us to be based on a man’s own labour. At least, some such 
assumption was necessary since only commodity-owners with equal rights confronted each other, 
and the sole means by which a man could become possessed of the commodities of others, was by 
alienating his own commodities; and these could be replaced by labour alone. Now, however, 
property turns out to be the right, on the part of the capitalist, to appropriate the unpaid labour of 
others or its product, and to be the impossibility, on the part of the labourer, of appropriating his 
own product. The separation of property from labour has become the necessary consequence of a 
law that apparently originated in their identity. (Capital, MECW 35:583) 
 
Alienation is the natural outcome of a society in which human labor-power itself is a commodity 
to be bought and sold: a society in which one is compelled by economic considerations to sell off 
the essential aspect of one's human being—one's capacity to produce—and make it the property 
of an entity that stands outside of and against oneself. 
4.4.1 Marx on Utilitarianism 
In Chapter One, I addressed Marx's critiques of Utilitarianism, especially as expressed in the 
work of James Mill and Jeremy Bentham. Marx returns to this theme in Capital, here expanding 
his critique to the moral philosophy of John Stuart Mill, as well. Whereas Marx's earlier critique 
of Utilitarianism focused on its reduction of diverse human social relations to one relation of 
usefulness or utility, Marx's later critiques are informed by the economic investigations he has 
carried out in the intervening years and focus more on the specific economic assumptions made 
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by the Utilitarian thinkers he engages with. 
In The German Ideology, Marx is highly critical of Jeremy Bentham. At the writing of 
Capital, it would be fair to say that his opinion of Bentham has not improved. Marx's later 
criticisms of Bentham go beyond his critique of Benthamite Utilitarianism which he put forward 
in his earlier work, and are here twofold: first, Bentham's moral theory is justified by a “dogma” 
that social wealth is finite, and second, Bentham illegitimately universalizes and essentializes the 
existence of “the modern shopkeeper” as though it were obviously right to assume that what is 
useful to this type of person is also useful to other people in different economic positions and at 
all historical times. 
What Marx diagnoses as Bentham's “dogmatism,” he also sees in the work of Thomas 
Malthus119 and James Mill. These writers assume that social productivity will remain at much 
the same level that it is now, or in any case, that it will not be possible to develop production so 
that it is possible to attain an abundance of products for human beings. The acceptance of this 
dogma gives rise then to the question of how to distribute social goods, assuming scarcity. Marx 
minces no words in his appraisal of this approach. He writes: 
Classical economy always loved to conceive social capital as a fixed magnitude of a fixed degree 
of efficiency. But this prejudice was first established as a dogma by the arch-Philistine, Jeremy 
Bentham, that insipid, pedantic, leather-tongued oracle of the ordinary bourgeois intelligence of 
the 19th century. […] In the light of his dogma the commonest phenomena of the process of 
production, as, e.g., its sudden expansions and contractions, nay, even accumulation itself, become 
perfectly inconceivable. The dogma was used by Bentham himself, as well as by Malthus, James 
Mill, MacCulloch, etc., for an apologetic purpose, and especially in order to represent one part of 
capital, namely, variable capital, or that part convertible into labour-power, as a fixed magnitude. 
(Capital, MECW 35:605) 
 
                                                 
119 Of course, I don't mean to imply here that it is quite right to think of Malthus as a Utilitarian. I don't think that 
Marx is doing this, either. 
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This way of representing social wealth, Marx argues, leads to the notion that it is not possible to 
increase the portion of social wealth that is devoted to workers. Social production is conceived as 
fixed, when in fact it actually expands and contracts. Of course the relevant question is whether 
production can ever expand enough to lead to an abundance of social wealth such that workers' 
living standards can be improved. But this is exactly the point Marx wants to emphasize: that it is 
illegitimate to simply assume a negative answer to this question and then to go on to theorize on 
the basis of that negative answer. To do so, Marx charges, is to lapse into dogmatic repetition of 
an economic truism that has not been demonstrated. Marx continues: 
The facts that lie at the bottom of this dogma are these: on the one hand, the labourer has no right 
to interfere in the division of social wealth into means of enjoyment for the non-labourer and 
means of production. On the other hand, only in favourable and exceptional cases, has he the 
power to enlarge the so-called labour fund at the expense of the “revenue” of the wealthy. 
(Capital, MECW 35:606) 
 
We see these “facts” reflected in Bentham's writings, which I discussed in the treatment of 
Utilitarianism in Chapter One. In arguing against the appropriation of private property for public 
use, Bentham seems to assume that it is not possible to increase production so that everyone has 
access to the resources they need to live rich and satisfying lives. This assumption allows him to 
cast any act of socializing private property as a misguided injury of the few, to no great benefit 
for the many. So Bentham writes that “The profit spread among the multitude divides itself into 
impalpable parts; the whole loss is felt by him who supports it alone. The result of the operation 
is in no respect to enrich the party who gains, but to impoverish him who loses”120. Bentham 
seems to assume that it is not possible to increase social wealth and that all that can be done is to 
distribute relatively finite wealth in different ways, in which case, Bentham argues, it can only 
                                                 
120  Bentham, Principles of the Civil Code, Pt.1, Ch.15, Sect. 6. 
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seem arbitrary or cruel to diminish a few persons' utility and divide that utility up among a mass 
of people, each of whom will only benefit to a very limited extent as a result of it121. For Marx, 
on the other hand, the socialization of wealth is not simply evaluated as an end in itself, which 
would simply be realized on the basis of existing production. Rather, it is conceived as one 
necessary part of a transition to an economic system in which production could be further 
advanced and a condition of abundance could be achieved, which would allow for a widespread, 
significant, and continuing improvement of living standards. H. L. A. Hart, in his 1973 article, 
“Bentham and the Demystification of the Law,” succinctly and accurately describes the 
disagreement between Bentham and Marx on this question when he writes: 
Bentham was a sober reformer who examined society with the eye of a business efficiency or cost-
benefit expert on the grand scale, and condemned the society of his day for its inefficient failure to 
satisfy, in an economic or optimal way, the desires that characterise human beings as they are. He 
contemplated no radical change or development in human nature and, though he thought things 
would be immensely better, if laws were reformed on Benthamite lines, he envisaged no 
millennium and no utopia. There would always, he thought, be “oppositions of interest” and 
“painful labour, daily subjection, and a condition nearly allied to indigence will always be the lot 
of numbers.” […] Marx condemned the existing forms of society not for mere inefficiency, but 
because its economic system stunted and distorted human beings and prevented the exploited 
masses, and indeed also their exploiters, from developing their distinctively human powers. This 
could be rectified, not by the mere spread of ideas or enlightened education or piecemeal reform, 
but only by a radical and, if necessary, violent transformation of the economic and social structure 
of society. But with that transformation complete there would be conditions under which all men 
could achieve their full development in a form of society where men were humanly related to each 
other. Such optimism about the aftermath of revolution contrasts with Bentham's sober warning 
that “it may be possible to diminish the influence of but not to destroy the sad and mischievous 
passions”122. 
 
As Parekh outlines, the debate between Marx and Bentham turns in large part on their 
different approaches to economics, but also on their different conceptions of human nature. 
                                                 
121  Of course, when in developed countries such as the U.S., roughly 1% of the population controls nearly 80% of 
the wealth, it would be hard to argue that the distribution of this wealth across a wider layer of society would not 
significantly increase the standard of living of an enormous number of people. But that is slightly beside the 
point, here. 
122  The Modern Law Review Vol: 36 Issue: 1 Date: 01/1973 Pages: 2 – 17. 
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Bentham regards human nature as relatively fixed, and destined to remain not appreciably 
different from its appearance in capitalist society. Marx on the other hand, argues that on the 
basis of a transformation in production and a revolutionary change in society, human nature 
could develop and flourish in a way that is not currently possible. 
This leads us to the second of the two criticisms of Bentham which I identified earlier in 
this subsection. Marx agrees with Bentham that a coherent moral theory will be based on a sound 
conception of human nature. But Marx charges that Bentham pursues this project of theorizing 
human nature in a limited and myopic way. According to Marx, Bentham not only reduces a 
wide diversity of distinct human relations and modes of experience to one single relation of 
utility. He also relativizes utility to one type of human existence, that of the petty bourgeois 
small business owner. Marx writes: 
The principle of utility was no discovery of Bentham. He simply reproduced in his dull way what 
Helvétius and other Frenchmen had said with esprit in the 18th century. To know what is useful for 
a dog, one must study dog-nature. This nature itself is not to be deduced from the principle of 
utility. Applying this to man, he that would criticise all human acts, movements, relations, etc., by 
the principle of utility, must first deal with human nature in general, and then with human nature 
as modified in each historical epoch. Bentham makes short work of it. With the driest naiveté he 
takes the modern shopkeeper, especially the English shopkeeper, as the normal man. Whatever is 
useful to this queer normal man, and to his world, is absolutely useful. This yard-measure, then, he 
applies to past, present, and future. (Capital, MECW 35:65 Note 65) 
 
Bentham, says Marx, mistakes one particular historical appearance for a human essence, 
wrongly taking the standard of the modern shopkeeper to be valid for all human beings, across 
all historical times, when in fact, whether or not a thing is useful depends on a whole host of 
contingent, historical factors which vary in each case. 
John Stuart Mill fares much better in Marx's opinion. Marx says of “men like John Stuart 
Mill,” that “it would be very wrong to class them with the herd of vulgar economic apologists” 
(such as Bentham).  However, there is still a problem. Marx writes: 
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J. St. Mill and many other political economists conceive the relations of production as natural, 
eternal laws, but regard relations of distribution as artificial, of historical origin, and subject to the 
control, etc., of human society. (Capital, MECW 30:159) 
 
Marx criticizes J. S. Mill for taking the capitalist mode of production as the necessary economic 
basis for all future society, yet arguing for a new system of distribution on that economic basis. 
But, Marx argues, it is impossible to achieve a radical transformation in the distribution of goods 
without also revolutionizing the mode of production. Marx writes: 
Profit, a phenomenon of distribution, is here simultaneously a phenomenon of production, a 
condition of production, a necessary constituent part of the process of production. How absurd it 
is, therefore, for John Stuart Mill and others to conceive bourgeois forms of production as 
absolute, but the bourgeois forms of distribution as historically relative, hence transitory. […] The 
form of production is simply the form of distribution seen from a different point of view. The 
specific features—and therefore also the specific limitation—which set bounds to bourgeois 
distribution, enter into bourgeois production itself, as a determining factor, which overlaps and 
dominates production. The fact that bourgeois production is compelled by its own immanent laws, 
on the one hand, to develop the productive forces as if production did not take place on a narrow 
restricted social foundation, while, on the other hand, it can develop these forces only within these 
narrow limits, is the deepest and most hidden cause of crises, of the crying contradictions within 
which bourgeois production is carried on and which, even at a cursory glance, reveal it as only a 
transitional, historical form. 
 
Marx's argument is that capitalist production is aimed at and based in the accumulation of profit, 
which is an aspect of distribution. The capitalist requires a store of accumulated labor in order to 
make an outlay for the costs of production, and therefore requires that he receive as much of 
what is produced as possible. Without this, a capitalist venture will be unable to survive amidst 
competition from other businesses. Capitalists must reap a profit, and reinvest it into the 
production process in order to keep the business running. Production and distribution are 
therefore, on Marx's view, two aspects of a single process within capitalism, and so it is 
incoherent to suggest that distribution can be radically transformed upon the economic basis of 
capitalist production. 
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Moreover, Marx argues, it is wrong to suppose that the capitalist mode of production is 
somehow fixed, necessary, or eternal, and not merely “a transitional, historical form,” to adopt 
his phrase. Capitalism constantly revolutionizes the forces of production and yet, as Marx notes 
here and elsewhere, the relations of production restrict human progress and limit the extent to 
which those productive forces can be fully unleashed. The products of capitalism, as Marx 
writes, are not merely the commodities that are produced under it, but also these relations of 
production and the social relations they give rise to: “It is not just this single thing that is 
produced, the commodity, a commodity greater in value than the capital originally advanced — 
but also capital and wage labour; or, the relation is reproduced and perpetuated” 
(“Transformation of Money into Capital,” MECW 30:158). It is this contradiction between the 
(developing, expanding) forces of production and the (narrow, restricting) relations of production 
that Marx believes will lead to an eventual passing away of the capitalist mode of production. 
Marx quotes Mill in Capital, pointing out that 
John Stuart Mill, in his “Principles of Political Economy,” says: “The really exhausting and the 
really repulsive labours instead of being better paid than others, are almost invariably paid the 
worst of all.... The more revolting the occupation, the more certain it is to receive the minimum of 
remuneration.... The hardships and the earnings, instead of being directly proportional, as in any 
just arrangements of society they would be, are generally in an inverse ratio to one another.” 
(Capital, MECW 35:606 Note 67) 
  
So we can see why Marx does not wish to group J. S. Mill together with the “vulgar economic 
apologists,” as Marx appreciates the fact that J. S. Mill argues that the existing distribution of 
goods under capitalism is unjust and ought to be abolished and replaced by a fairer system123. 
However, Marx also writes that “men like John Stuart Mill are to blame for the contradiction 
                                                 
123 This, even though of course Marx would point out that the current relations are just at least according to the 
tenets of capitalist justice. 
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between their traditional economic dogmas and their modern tendencies.” Marx recognized J. S. 
Mill as a thinker who was genuinely concerned with improving society and increasing the living 
standards of the masses of people. Marx also certainly recognizes that J. S. Mill is far and away 
from the apologistic “leather-tongued oracle” that Marx took Bentham to be. His criticism of J. 
S. Mill's Utilitarianism is that without a fundamental change in the way production is organized, 
there can be no radical changes in distribution and therefore the ills which J. S. Mill quite rightly 
seeks to address can never be fully eradicated on the basis of capitalist production. 
In Marx and Mill: two views of social conflict and social harmony, Graeme Duncan 
writes, describing Marx's objections to J. S. Mill: 
[I]n a social order of the kind characteristically envisaged by liberals, the major liberal values 
could not be embodied or realised. Liberalism reflects and idealises, without transforming, the evil 
reality of capitalist society, which must be transformed if genuine individualism is to come into 
being. In its application to Mill, the charge is not hypocrisy, but that his vision of life, if it is 
assumed to have any relevance to the generality of the people, would require much more far-
reaching structural change, especially to the property and the class system, than those which he 
actually advocated124. 
 
Marx's dispute with J. S. Mill, then, also touches upon broader issues about the differences 
between liberalism and Marx's communist theory and in particular on the central question of 
whether the realization of values such as individuality and freedom is possible upon the 
economic basis of capitalist production. Additionally, as we saw earlier in the section of this 
chapter on ideology, within bourgeois thought and among bourgeois thinkers there is still a wide 
range for different theories, viewpoints, and assessments of existing society. Marx recognizes 
this, distinguishing here between the “apologism” of Bentham and the sincere, if according to 
Marx, ultimately unrealizable progressivism of J. S. Mill. 
                                                 
124  Graeme Duncan, Marx and Mill: Two Views of Social Conflict and Social Harmony, CUP Archive, 1997, p. 295. 
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G. A. Cohen argues that Marx overlooks the fact that J. S. Mill did suppose there might 
be some substantive changes in the way that production was organized, and therefore that Marx 
is unfair in charging J. S. Mill with seeing capitalist relations of production as fixed and 
permanent. According to Cohen: 
[J. S.] Mill foresees the demise of wage labour. […] True, he is not looking beyond commodity 
production. He envisages the persistence of a market economy, with capitalist firms replaced by 
co-operative enterprises, not a thorough socialization of the means of production. But this is not 
because he commits any such fallacy as the one Marx exposed. (G. A. Cohen, Karl Marx’s Theory 
of History: A Defence, p. 110) 
  
But I don’t think this defense is quite enough to rescue J. S. Mill’s brand of Utilitarianism 
from Marx’s critique of it. Even on this argument, Mill leaves intact what Marx identifies as the 
essence of the capitalist system—commodity exchange. Marx has no shortage of arguments for 
why it is Utopian to propose that commodity exchange could be the economic basis for what 
Mill would recognize as  more just relations of distribution. “Co-operative enterprises,” 
producing and exchanging commodities within a market economy, it must be said, are capitalist 
firms, and if they are to survive at all, they must operate in ways that are determined by the same 
economic laws of competition and supply and demand that, as Marx devotes so much attention to 
arguing, have had and continue to have a destructive social effect which must be overcome. This 
is the point of Marx’s numerous critiques of the capitalist Robert Owen and the production of 
workers’ co-operative enterprises as a way to be rid of the negative aspects of capitalism. It is not 
as though Marx were unaware that this was being proposed125; but he is less than sanguine about 
the prospects because of cases like this one: 
                                                 
125  In a draft of an article Marx was preparing for publication, he writes: “This much is however certain: the 
Americans, and particularly the poor workers in the large towns of New York, Philadelphia, Boston, etc., have 
taken the matter to their hearts and founded a large number of societies for the establishment of such colonies, 
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Equitable Labour Exchange Bazaars or Offices (the name is given in English in the German 
original) were founded by the workers' co-operative societies in various towns of England in 1832. 
This movement was headed by Robert Owen, who founded such a bazaar in London. The products 
of labour at these bazaars were exchanged for a kind of paper "money" issued as labour "tickets", 
a working hour being the unit. These bazaars were an attempt by the Utopians to organise 
exchange without money in the conditions of capitalist commodity production and soon proved to 
be a failure. (MECW 8:135) 
 
 Co-operative enterprises within a system of capitalist commodity production have been 
attempted, but they have remained small experiments and have not shown themselves to be 
likely candidates as roads to socialism. What J. S. Mill leaves fixed, even by Cohen’s lights, are 
features of the capitalist mode of production which Marx argues must be abolished if a rational 
distribution of goods is to be achieved. 
Allen Wood is strikingly disdainful towards Marx's critiques of Utilitarianism, but I'm not 
altogether convinced that Wood has brought those critiques clearly into view. He complains that 
“Marx's explicit statements about utilitarianism do not give us much to work with. They express 
contemptuous rejection of the doctrine, but give little evidence that Marx understands what he is 
rejecting” (Allen Wood, Karl Marx, p.145). Wood argues, for instance, that Marx is unfair to 
Jeremy Bentham when Marx writes that on Bentham's Utilitarianism, “the utility relation has 
quite a definite meaning, namely, that I derive benefit by doing harm to someone else” (The 
German Ideology, MECW 5:409). But I'm not sure how else we are supposed to construe 
Bentham's comments when he likens the world of human beings to a receptacle that can hold 
only a limited amount of happiness: 
                                                                                                                                                             
and all the time new communities are being set up. The Americans are tired of continuing as the slaves of the 
few rich men who feed on the labour of the people; and it is obvious that with the great energy and endurance of 
this nation, community of goods will soon be introduced over a significant part of their country.  However, it is 
not just in America but in England too that attempts have been made to realise community of goods. Here the 
philanthropist Robert Owen has been preaching this ideal for thirty years, he has sunk the whole of his large 
fortune in it and given everything he had in order to found the present colony at Harmony in Hampshire” 
(MECW 4:223). 
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Take from your 2000 and give to your 2001 all the happiness you find your 2000 in possession of: 
insert in the room of the happiness you have taken out, unhappiness in as large a quantity as the 
receptacle will contain: to the aggregate amount of the happiness possessed by the 4001 taken 
together will the result be net profit? On the contrary, the whole profit will have given place to 
loss. How so? Because so it is that such is the nature of the receptacle, the quantity of unhappiness 
it is capable of containing during any given portion of time is greater than the quantity of 
happiness.126  
 
Bentham really does seem to treat the distribution of utility as a zero-sum or perhaps more 
accurately, a negative-sum game, and that serves as his rationale for eventually abandoning the 
principle of “the greatest happiness to the greatest number” and coming to regard it as hopelessly 
naïve. Bentham assumes that there is a definite limit to the amount of happiness that can be 
divided among members of a community, and that benefit to one person is harm to another. 
Bentham's conception of utility distribution is the reason that he argues that it is always morally 
wrong to appropriate the private property of the minority in order to distribute it among the 
majority—he argues that this can only amount to diminishing the happiness of the minority to an 
intolerable degree in order to achieve some almost unnoticeable increase of happiness to each 
member of the majority, so that the end result of such an operation is always an increase of 
unhappiness rather than of happiness. Such a view might well be worth rejecting out of hand, but 
as far as I can tell, it really is Bentham's considered view. If Wood has a reason for reading 
Bentham differently than this, he doesn't provide the argument for it or seem to address the fact 
that this is the view Marx has in mind. In any case, I think it is hardly accurate to say, as Wood 
does, that Marx's comments about Bentham “exhibit even less substantive disagreement with 
Bentham's principle than comprehension of it” (Wood, Karl Marx, p.145). Marx appears to quite 
accurately describe Bentham's view, and insofar as Bentham's Utilitarianism relies on an 
                                                 
126  From “Excerpt on the Phrase ‘Greatest Happiness of the Greatest Number’,” in John Troyer (ed.), The Classical 
Utilitarians: Bentham and Mill, 2003 
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assumption of perpetual scarcity and rules out any substantive redistribution of wealth as 
immoral, I would think that Marx's disagreement with Benthamite Utilitarianism is, to say the 
least, quite substantive. 
I hope to have demonstrated here that Marx is both aware of and sensitive to the 
existence of different strands of Utilitarianism, which he takes to be of differing degrees of merit. 
I also believe that Marx's critiques of Bentham and of J. S. Mill show the ways in which Marx's 
turn to economic questions in his later works informs a continuing engagement with moral 
theory. Marx's approach, and I think this is particularly clear in the case of his critique of J. S. 
Mill, is to examine the economic assumptions made by such theories and investigate whether the 
theories' positive proposals are realistic, given the specific limits that a society's modes of 
production can place on the ability of human beings to organize that society in a rational and 
moral way. But this is not by any means to suggest that moral concerns have been crowded out 
entirely by some strict economic determinism. Rather, Marx seems to agree in certain key 
respects (though, by no means in all respects) with J. S. Mill's moral vision of what type of 
society human beings should strive to build. The main bone of contention here concerns the 
means by which such a society is to be achieved, and what conditions must be realized in order 
to produce it. 
In this section, I have addressed Marx's critiques of various bourgeois moral concepts 
such as rights and equality. After discussing these, I went on to treat Marx's later critiques of 
Utilitarianism, in particular, his argument that Utilitarianism only gets off the ground due to the 
“dogmatic” assumption that it is not possible to produce conditions of abundance, and his 
diagnosis of J. S. Mill's brand of Utilitarianism as resting on a failure to see economic production 
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and economic distribution of two aspects of a single process, so that it is not possible to 
transform one without transforming the other. 
In the concluding section of this chapter, I will review the connections among Marx's 
critiques of alienation and bourgeois rights, and his historical materialist method, and explain 
how they relate to his moral philosophy and also interact with one another to form an argument 
for communism. 
4.5 CONCLUSION OF CHAPTER FOUR 
The way out of the crises produced by capitalism is not backward to a simpler time, and so Marx 
is to be distinguished from romantic anti-capitalists who recognize only the negative 
consequences of capitalism. Marx theorizes the ways in which capitalism has both produced the 
conditions in which it is  possible to see clearly that the highest aim for human beings is the 
“greatest possible development” of their “varied aptitudes”, and made it possible to produce a 
society in which such a full and free development of human potential would be realized. The first 
volume of Capital features an explanation of capitalism's revolutionary and reactionary aspects 
in this regard, which is worth citing here in full: 
[I]f, on the one hand, variation of work at present imposes itself after the manner of an 
overpowering natural law, and with the blindly destructive action of a natural law that meets with 
resistance at all points, modern industry, on the other hand, through its catastrophes imposes the 
necessity of recognising, as a fundamental law of production, variation of work, consequently 
fitness of the labourer for varied work, consequently the greatest possible development of his 
varied aptitudes. It becomes a question of life and death for society to adapt the mode of 
production to the normal functioning of this law. Modern industry, indeed, compels society, under 
penalty of death, to replace the detail-worker of to-day, grappled by life-long repetition of one and 
the same trivial operation, and thus reduced to the mere fragment of a man, by the fully developed 
individual, fit for a variety of labours, ready to face any change of production, and to whom the 
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different social functions he performs, are but so many modes of giving free scope to his own 
natural and acquired powers. (Capital, MECW 35:490) 
 
Under capitalism, “variation of work” tends to take the form of, on the one hand, the 
constant threat workers face of being thrown out of their current employment and forced to 
scramble for new work, or on the other hand, the drudgery and monotony of performing just one 
sort of task for the whole of their lives (while innumerable other workers are doing the same with 
regard to innumerable other tasks), so that labor in the case of each individual person takes on 
the character of a stultifying narrowness. Yet, capitalism also makes human production, on a 
social scale, ever more varied, more dynamic, and more complex. What remains to be achieved, 
Marx argues, is for this variation, dynamism, and complexity to be made into features of the 
lives of individual persons and not merely of the society taken as a whole. This is a 
transformation that can only be achieved as a result of the revolutionary and modernizing 
processes of capitalism itself, and through the conscious, rational, and social intervention of 
human beings into those processes so that they become man's powers rather than powers over 
man. 
At the same time that Marx identifies tendencies within capitalism that tend toward the 
socialization of production and the development of “rich individuals,” he is by no means 
committed to any fatalism about the realization of socialism or of fully developed communism. 
Such an achievement will be the work of individuals cooperating consciously and socially to 
realize and exert their historical agency. However, it would be wrong to think that because Marx 
is not a strict determinist, the field is open for voluntarism and moralism, or that whether or not 
communism will be achieved depends entirely on the presence and number of noble 
revolutionaries who, purely out of some personal sense of virtue and moral law, produce a new 
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society at great cost to themselves. Communism may not be the only possible outcome, but Marx 
argues that when capitalism's crises become too significant for it to go on as a mode of 
production, the range of choices becomes strictly delimited. In the words of Rosa Luxemburg, 
they boil down to “socialism or barbarism” or as Marx puts it here, life or death. 
As in his earlier works, here in writings such as those which make up the Grundrisse and 
Capital, Marx's conception of human individuals is a central focus in his worldview, along with 
his conviction that the development of human capacities and of “rich individuality” is the highest 
aim for human beings. He continues to base his criticisms of capitalism and his arguments for 
communism on the relative potentials of these two economic systems to allow for the exercise 
and expansion of human powers. In the Grundrisse, Marx writes that if achieved, communism 
would allow for the 
free development of individualities, and hence not the reduction of necessary labour time in order 
to posit surplus labour, but in general the reduction of the necessary labour of society to a 
minimum, to which then corresponds the artistic, scientific, etc., development of individuals, made 
possible by the time thus set free and the means produced for all of them. (Grundrisse, MECW 
29:91) 
  
Marx returns to this theme in the first volume of Capital, where he again addresses the 
manner in which capitalism has developed the potential for individual human development to a 
historically unprecedented level—a potential which can only be realized with a transition to 
socialist relations of production: 
The intensity and productiveness of labour being given, the time which society is bound to devote 
to material production is shorter, and as a consequence, the time at its disposal for the free 
development, intellectual and social, of the individual is greater, in proportion as the work is more 
and more evenly divided among all the able-bodied members of society, and as a particular class is 
more and more deprived of the power to shift the natural burden of labour from its own shoulders 
to those of another layer of society. In this direction, the shortening of the working day finds at last 
a limit in the generalisation of labour. In capitalist society spare time is acquired for one class by 
converting the whole life-time of the masses into labour time. (Capital, MECW 35:530) 
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Capitalism has reduced socially necessary labor time to a minimum, but paradoxically, the more 
efficiently that reduction is accomplished, the more that dead labor rules over living labor, with 
stored-up surplus labor strengthening the hand of the capitalist against the worker. And as he 
writes in the third volume of Capital, capitalist production 
squanders human lives, or living-labour, and not only blood and flesh, but also nerve and brain. 
Indeed, it is only by dint of the most extravagant waste of individual development that the 
development of the human race is at all safeguarded and maintained in the epoch of history 
immediately preceding the conscious reorganisation of society. (Capital, MECW 37:92) 
 
And with that “conscious reorganisation of society,” Marx argues, the reduction of socially 
necessary labor would be a source of freedom for human beings. They would have more of their 
time available to them for pursuits beyond the mere struggle for survival; they would be able to 
exercise, develop, and expand their powers and develop as “rich individuals”. 
Marx argues for a transition to a new type of society in which human beings would be 
able to develop as “rich individuals” who realize themselves in the external world through their 
conscious activity. Such a transition would, he writes, involve the achievement on the part of 
human beings of a better and clearer understanding of the relationship between themselves and 
their products. As Marx emphasizes in the Grundrisse, “Nature does not construct machines, 
locomotives, railways, electric telegraphs, self-acting mules, etc. They are products of human 
industry; natural material transformed into organs of man's will over Nature, or of man's activity 
in Nature” (Grundrisse, MECW 29:92). 
While of course everyone knows that one does not come across a locomotive in nature in 
just the same way one stumbles upon a frog or a ravine, it is important to fully recognize just 
how much promise such developments hold out for the immense ability of human beings to 
shape their natural and social world based on human understanding. Creations such as machines, 
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railways, “self-acting mules” and, we can add, computers, airplanes, and all the rest are, in 
Marx's words, “organs of the human brain, created by the human hand; the power of knowledge, 
objectified.” He continues: 
The development of fixed capital shows the degree to which society's general science, knowledge, 
has become an immediate productive force, and hence the degree to which the conditions of the 
social life process itself have been brought under the control of the general intellect and remoulded 
according to it. (Grundrisse, MECW 29:92) 
 
There is an all-too-common tendency to caricature Marx as a dull mechanist, stubbornly 
blind to the importance of ideas. But in examining Marx's views in the way that I have, I am 
convinced that quite the opposite is true. Marx is extremely clear and forceful about the power of 
human knowledge, and he is only more successful than idealist thinkers on this point because he 
is not forced to resort to mysticism in order to explain how it is that human beings can realize 
their ideas in the external world. 
In this chapter, I have completed the work of tracing themes such as alienation and “rich 
individuality” all the way through Marx's thought and into his mature work, and showing how he 
continues to engage with specific issues in moral theory such as the question of moral rights and 
the viability of moral theories such as Utilitarianism. I have also shown that Marx continues to 
put forward a moral critique of capitalism and a moral argument for communism, based on his 
conception of human beings as natural and social beings for whom the essence of their existence 
is the labor process. That labor process is an active and conscious interaction of human beings 
with their environment, through which they satisfy their needs and develop their powers. Far 
from these themes taking a back seat to a one-sided and untenable economic determinism in 
these later works, they become the subject of an even deeper engagement during this period, as 
does the moral conception that they are a part of. It is here in these later works that Marx most 
  243 
clearly and explicitly theorizes the full development of “rich individuality” as the highest aim for 
human beings. 
In the following chapter, the Conclusion of this study, I will explain the lessons we can 
draw, now that we have achieved a careful exploration of the topic of morality across Marx's 
philosophical corpus. I will review the connections among Marx's treatments of topics such as 
alienation, individuality, human freedom, and economic development, and the relevance of each 
of these subjects to moral theory, over the course of his work. In addition to this, I will revisit 
some of the most persistent myths about Marx's moral conception, which I have tried to dispel, 
and suggest several avenues for further research. 
  244 
5.0  CONCLUSION 
Although Marx did not produce a particular work in which he laid down a systematic and 
thorough presentation of his own views regarding morality, he did leave behind an immense 
body of work investigating a wide array of issues in moral theory. Through a close and careful 
analysis of his thought, it is possible to see that Marx had a distinct and systematic conception of 
morality, and we can say what that conception was. 
Marx argues that human consciousness is determined by human existence, and that the 
essence of that existence is the labor process—human beings' interaction with their environment 
in order to satisfy their needs. Human beings, Marx argues, are distinct from other types of 
natural beings in that they produce not merely instinctively, but as what he calls “species-
beings”. They are able to produce in accordance with a conception of themselves as a species, 
with conditions for flourishing that belong to the species. They are also able to produce in 
accordance with the standards of other species and of abstractions such as beauty. Human beings 
produce teleologically, first representing an end in thought, and then realizing it in the external 
world through their labor, which Marx argues is an inherently social process. 
Marx's moral theory is based on this conception of essential human nature. However, 
when we speak of human nature with respect to Marx's thought, it is important not to think of 
that nature as static or to reduce it to human beings' merely biological nature. Human beings, as 
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mammals, are of course biological beings and have needs that proceed directly from their nature 
as such. However, humans are also “social beings.” In satisfying their needs through labor, 
human beings develop new powers and new ways of interacting with the world around them. 
They transform their nature and develop “social” or “historically arisen” needs which they then 
go on to satisfy through the labor process. The satisfaction of those historically arisen needs 
allows for a further expansion of human powers, and Marx argues that this process provides the 
basis for a potentially limitless development and the appearance of “rich individuals” who relate 
to their own development as an inner need. 
Marx develops his conception of human essence by investigating the results of history 
and anthropology. As he writes in The German Ideology, he applies the method of historical 
materialism, taking concrete, existing human beings and their real conditions of existence as the 
starting point for his theorizing. Marx argues that under capitalism, human beings are alienated 
from their essence as social beings who produce their own existence through labor. Nearly all of 
man's works take on an independent and hostile character that overpowers him, so that instead of 
human beings mastering their products, they are mastered by them. The abolition of that 
alienation, and the achievement of building a society in which human beings can consciously and 
rationally pursue their own development as an end, is the highest moral aim for Marx and forms 
the basis of his critiques of capitalism and arguments for communism. 
Marx is concerned with the development of “rich individuals” but very critical of what he 
sees as the tendency of bourgeois moral philosophy to theorize not from the standpoint of 
concrete, living individuals as they exist in the world, but from the standpoint of “abstract 
individuals.” He criticizes such theories as Kant's morality based on free will or Stirner's ethical 
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egoism on the basis that they fail to conceive of the individual as a social being or as a being 
whose range of actions are in many ways determined by factors beyond his control. Similarly, 
Marx critiques bourgeois rights theory, arguing that the rights of the bourgeois state correspond 
to an imagined “atomized” subject who requires nothing from society except perhaps to be left 
alone to engage in the individual pursuit of happiness. While Marx argues that transitional 
socialist societies would still utilize and apply concepts of rights and justice, they would do so in 
a way that accounted more fully for the specific needs of concrete individuals. He also envisions 
an eventual transition to a fully developed communist society in which concepts of right and 
justice would not apply. This society, he argues, would realize the principle, “From each 
according to his ability, to each according to his needs,” and be based on relations of human 
solidarity. 
Famously, Marx identifies morality as a form of ideology, and numerous interpreters 
have taken this as evidence that for Marx, morality is always false, illusory, and reactionary. 
However, I have argued here that this is not the case and that we cannot understand ideology as 
inherently reactionary. Morality is thoroughly ideological, however a distinction can be made 
between what Marx identifies as reactionary morality that functions as a bulwark of an 
oppressive and alienating social order, and a progressive morality which, Marx thinks, would 
correctly ascertain which actions, principles, social arrangements, etc. are most likely to allow 
for a full development of “rich individuals” who would live in accordance with their essence as 
natural and social beings who produce their existence through labor. Marx argues that with the 
resolution of class conflicts, ideological forms of thought would no longer have a basis in 
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material conditions. However, that time has not come, and the proletariat continues to need 
ideological forms of thought in order to theorize its historical situation. 
Relatedly, Marx is hostile to moralism and Utopianism. He does not see moralizing or the 
issuance of moral judgements as an effective means, in and of itself, to realize the type of society 
that, he argues, would be necessary in order for human beings to live in accordance with their 
essence. In evaluating specific moral questions, Marx evaluates a whole host of concrete 
historical factors to reach a conclusion about whether a particular action, principle, movement, 
etc., is such as to promote or inhibit the realization of human nature and the development of what 
he calls “rich individuals,” human beings for whom the exercise, development, and expansion of 
their own capacities is their greatest need, and for whom labor has been transformed from 
drudgery into “life's prime want.” And so morality, according to Marx, is not mere abstract 
moralizing, but a scientific analysis of which things are most likely to promote the development 
of human beings. The morality he develops is thoroughly historical, and so the specific fact of 
the matter about whether an action or a state of affairs is moral or immoral can be different in 
different historical situations. However, on Marx's view it is possible to say with a very 
reasonable degree of accuracy which things are actually likely to promote the development of the 
“rich individuality” of human beings, and which things are not. This allows Marx to claim an 
objectivity for the moral judgements that he makes.   
In the Introduction to this dissertation, I wrote that my intention was to pursue three 
related aims. First of all, I hoped to demonstrate the falsity of the doctrine of Marxist amoralism. 
One too-commonly held view about Marx's theory has it that Marxism's appeal to historical laws 
and claims to scientificity render it devoid of moral content. I have argued that at no point in 
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Marx's career can the doctrine of Marxist amoralism be considered a correct description of his 
views regarding morality. 
Secondly, I have attempted to show what the moral content of Marx's theory is. I have 
argued that Marx's approach to morality is based in a specific conception of essential human 
nature. For Marx, human beings are essentially natural and social beings who satisfy their needs 
by intervening consciously and purposively into the world around them. He argues that the 
highest aim for human beings is for them to live in accordance with their nature as social beings 
who produce their own existence through labor. 
Lastly, I have attempted to show that Marx's approach to morality is both plausible and 
defensible. I have mostly done this by defending it against a range of charges, such as the charge 
that it is incoherent (because somehow at odds with his historical materialism), or that it relies on 
an untenable conception of human nature, or that a theory that does not appeal to eternal, 
intrinsic human rights cannot be rightly called a “moral theory.” I am sure it has not escaped the 
notice of my reader that unlike numerous recent Anglophone interpreters of Marx, I have not 
busied myself with taking potshots at his historical materialist method127. Rather, I have sought 
to show how its application to economic, political, social, and philosophical questions allowed 
Marx to make an astonishing array of penetrating insights into the nature of capitalist society and 
                                                 
127 A few potshot takers: Jon Elster, who attempts to replace historical materialism with methodological 
individualism in his book, Making Sense of Marx; Nicholas Churchich, in Marxism and Morality; G. A. Cohen, 
in Karl Marx's Theory of History: A Defence, although there Cohen does see himself as quite friendly to Marx; 
R. G. Peffer, in Marxism, Morality, and Social Justice writes that “The notion that history is inherently tending 
toward communism because it is inherently tending toward the self-actualization of human species-being—in 
particular, the maximization of human freedom—is simply leftover Hegelian baggage having no scientific value 
whatever.” Interestingly enough, despite the often hasty and dismissive way in which Allen Wood treats the 
question of Marx's approach to morality, he supplies a rather sensitive and detailed discussion of Hegelian and 
Marxist dialectics in his book, Karl Marx. 
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of the human condition, which remain pressingly relevant today for anyone still interested in 
understanding the world and promoting further human progress and development within it. 
The question of whether or not Marx was a strict economic determinist is one which 
brings the issue of dialectics directly to the fore. I think the manner in which Marx's views 
regarding economic determinism have been distorted provides an example of how important it is 
to accurately assess his method. Marx does think that human existence is determined, in the last 
analysis, by the conditions of production in a given society. However, he also believes that in 
intervening into the natural world to satisfy their needs, which is something that they must do, 
human beings acquire new powers and thereby expand their range of freedom to act. When Marx 
argues that in capitalist society, human beings are controlled by the movement of commodities 
governed by external economic laws of supply and demand, he also emphasizes that at the very 
same time, those economic laws which compel human beings to produce with ever-increasing 
efficiency also provide the basis for a society in which socially necessary labor would be driven 
down to a minimum and human beings would be able to pursue interests and pursuits not 
narrowly subordinated to the struggle for survival. It is true, as I have emphasized in the previous 
chapter, that Marx does not posit a world of fully autonomous beings who act in ways totally 
undetermined by and independent of the world in which they exist. This goes doubly for human 
beings who, he argues, are alienated from their nature as natural and social beings who produce 
their own existence. Yet, I do not think that to acknowledge what should be an obvious fact 
about human beings is to assert an unfreedom that would make morality or moral judgements 
misguided or incoherent. It is merely to recognize that as it is, human beings operate within a 
limited sphere of freedom, and to argue that within that sphere, they ought to do those things 
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which expand their freedom, push external necessity back to its furthest possible limit, and 
increase the capacity of human beings to, as Marx puts it, humanize the world. 
Over the course of writing this dissertation, a number of avenues for further research 
have seemed particularly compelling. There are a number of authors128 who argue that while 
Marx might have a moral theory, he also has a problem of moral motivation and cannot provide 
an argument for a reliable connection between a person's recognizing that she ought to be a 
revolutionist and her actually being one. One thing that is striking about these authors is that they 
tend to leave Marx's class analysis of capitalism almost completely to the side, and they also 
seem to want to thrust upon Marx the very moralism that he rejects. As I have argued throughout 
this dissertation, Marx never thinks that there is any reason to expect that merely demonstrating 
to a person that he or she has good external reasons to bring about communism would be 
sufficient to motivate them to engage in revolutionary activity. His most important arguments for 
why people will promote communism have nothing to do with the power of purely moral 
persuasion, and so I strongly suspect that the critics of Marx who accuse his view of being 
impracticable or unrealistic because of a problem of moral motivation are pressing an objection 
that is somewhat beside the point. 
I have addressed Marx's critiques of various forms of bourgeois liberalism, but one very 
interesting and important project would be to apply his critique to a brand of liberalism that 
claims to take to heart human development as an end in itself: the capabilities approach of 
Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen. In Capital, Marx argues that John Stuart Mill wishes to 
                                                 
128 Daniel Brudney in Marx's Attempt to Leave Philosophy, Allen Buchanan in “Revolutionary Motivation and 
Rationality,” Mancur Olson in The Logic of Collective Action, and others. 
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keep capitalist relations of production intact and change the relations of distribution to better 
satisfy the needs of human beings along a relatively egalitarian model. Marx writes that as well-
intentioned as this may be, it is thoroughly Utopian because an economic system's relations of 
production and relations of distribution are intrinsically related. I suspect that the capabilities 
approach is vulnerable to a similar (or even the same) line of argument. A Marxist treatment of 
Sen and Nussbaum's capabilities approach would evaluate the extent to which they seem to be 
satisfied to leave the basic structure of capitalism intact, and determine whether it is reasonable 
to suppose that, on a capitalist system, we could expect in the long run to end up with any 
distribution of goods much more morally defensible than the one we have now. 
One common anti-communist charge is that Marxists are cold, Machiavellian calculators 
who believe that the end of communism justifies any means whatsoever. I think this is a very 
crude oversimplification of the relation between means and ends in Marx's moral reasoning. I 
plan to develop my dissertation further, and in doing so it would be a matter of some priority to 
thoroughly investigate the relationship between means and ends in Marx's thought. 
I think that in light of Marx's arguments that morality is a thoroughly historical 
phenomenon that has arisen as a result of human social development, it would be fruitful to 
investigate, from a historical materialist perspective, the historical origin of moral concepts in 
human thought. I also think it would be a very fruitful interdisciplinary project to conduct a 
historical study of the reception of Marx's thought on morality within the international workers' 
movement and examine how Marx's ideas regarding morality have been understood, applied and 
further developed throughout its history. This is a project I would like to pursue in further 
developing my treatment of Marxist morality. 
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